Welcome to DU!
The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards.
Join the community:
Create a free account
Support DU (and get rid of ads!):
Become a Star Member
Latest Breaking News
General Discussion
The DU Lounge
All Forums
Issue Forums
Culture Forums
Alliance Forums
Region Forums
Support Forums
Help & Search
2016 Postmortem
In reply to the discussion: Henry Kissinger, Hillary Clinton’s Tutor in War and Peace [View all]Octafish
(55,745 posts)125. The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and A Forgotten Genocide
One almost needs a supercomputer to keep track of all the blood and suffering.
Book Review:
The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and A Forgotten Genocide
by Gary J. Bass
Winner of the 2014 Lionel Gelber Prize for Foreign Affairs, The Blood Telegram chronicles how Nixon and Kissinger supported Pakistans military dictatorship as it brutally quashed the results of a historic free election. Gary J. Bass argues that the United States embrace of the military dictatorship in Islamabad went on to mould Asias destiny for decades. This book has the potential to fuel international lawyers to research the legal consequences of the passive stance taken by Nixon and his underlings, writes Lenneke Sprik (for the London School of Economics).
When we think of genocide, the first examples that come to mind are often the holocaust, Rwanda, and Srebrenica. Who would mention the mass murder of up to three million Bengalis in the East of Pakistan in 1971 in this regard? And how many people are aware of the culpable passive role of the United States in this genocide? Gary Bass convincingly unravels the rather shocking truth of the American position in the Pakistan crisis in a well-written narrative that contains a strong condemnation of United States bystander role.
When the pro-independence Awami League were elected in 1969, the separation of Pakistan and with that, the independence of the Bengalis living in East-Pakistan, was seen as a threat to the future of the country as a whole. General Yahya Khan, leader of the Pakistani army, took over control before the Awami League could claim its power and started his genocidal campaign against the Bengali population of East-Pakistan in March 1971. Over the course of nine months, millions of Bengalis (mainly Hindus) were killed. International responses to these events were heavily influenced by Cold War rhetoric. Bass account of the genocide in Pakistan shows how a precarious balance of power had to be kept in place, which obstructed a united stance against Yahyas objectionable policies. Ultimately, India under Indira Ghandis leadership intervened in December 1971, which put an end to the genocide. Nixon and Kissinger have proven to be strategic practitioners of Realpolitik in this matter. Their friendship with Yahya, and their support of the genocide through arms supplies, leads Bass to justly criticise the American role in the Pakistani genocide.
By quoting some of the controversial opinions expressed by Nixon and Kissinger, the author not only provides a detailed overview of the factual happenings in Pakistan in the early 1970s, but more than that he reveals the reproachable attitude of the American statesmen towards the humanitarian crisis in Asia. Specifically striking in Bass story is the reflection of the condescending language used by Nixon and Kissinger regarding the Indian people. Their personal sentiments in this matter unequivocally influenced their stance towards the Pakistani crisis. Accordingly, Bass depicts Nixons friendship with the Pakistani dictator Yahya as characteristic for Nixons foreign policy: he was nothing more than a useful bridge in Nixons master plan to get closer to China. It is this picture of the republican president that Bass paints effectively. In doing so, this book raises awareness of how international politics are often governed by national and personal interests rather than moral interests; something that can be considered a timeless phenomenon in times where states are still hesitant to intervene in other states affairs to halt mass atrocities.
In his reconstruction, Bass uses the personal experiences of US general consul Archer Blood as a key figure throughout the book, whose dissenting voice was silenced by Nixon. Bloods telegram asking the State Department for immediate action against the mass atrocities in East Pakistan was neglected and therefore became illustrative of Nixons bystander conduct. Bass even cited several sources arguing that this makes them complicit to genocide. At one point Bass refers to Kissingers clear attitude towards international humanitarian crises by referring to one of his comments in which he pointed out that a humanitarian concern is not necessarily an American concern. Bass could not have made that picture clearer had he not used the sources the way he did.
Throughout the book, the reader wonders why Nixon and the likes took this position towards Pakistan and the Bengali crisis. Bass correctly observes three goals that contributed to the controversial stance taken by the president. First, he explains that Nixon wanted to avoid the destruction of the West-Pakistani army. Second, above all Nixon wanted to maintain his bridge through China (Yahya); and third, the American president feared the collapse of the balance of power if any of the great powers would intervene in Pakistans domestic affairs, which he wanted to prevent at all costs.
SNIP...
If there were any doubts that Nixons presidency was everything except undisputed, this historical account will convincingly dispel them. That humanitarianism had to give way to the political interests of Nixon and Kissinger is the main conclusion drawn from this revealing account of the US stance in the genocide that took place in East-Pakistan in the early 1970s. Whether interested in American foreign policy, international relations, Asian history, or genocide studies, this book will appeal to a wide audience. In a world that focuses more and more on international legal remedies to fight injustice, it might even fuel international lawyers to research the legal consequences of the passive stance taken by Nixon and his underlings.
SOURCE: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/07/27/book-review-the-blood-telegram-nixon-kissinger-and-a-forgotten-genocide-by-gary-j-bass/
The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger and A Forgotten Genocide
by Gary J. Bass
Winner of the 2014 Lionel Gelber Prize for Foreign Affairs, The Blood Telegram chronicles how Nixon and Kissinger supported Pakistans military dictatorship as it brutally quashed the results of a historic free election. Gary J. Bass argues that the United States embrace of the military dictatorship in Islamabad went on to mould Asias destiny for decades. This book has the potential to fuel international lawyers to research the legal consequences of the passive stance taken by Nixon and his underlings, writes Lenneke Sprik (for the London School of Economics).
When we think of genocide, the first examples that come to mind are often the holocaust, Rwanda, and Srebrenica. Who would mention the mass murder of up to three million Bengalis in the East of Pakistan in 1971 in this regard? And how many people are aware of the culpable passive role of the United States in this genocide? Gary Bass convincingly unravels the rather shocking truth of the American position in the Pakistan crisis in a well-written narrative that contains a strong condemnation of United States bystander role.
When the pro-independence Awami League were elected in 1969, the separation of Pakistan and with that, the independence of the Bengalis living in East-Pakistan, was seen as a threat to the future of the country as a whole. General Yahya Khan, leader of the Pakistani army, took over control before the Awami League could claim its power and started his genocidal campaign against the Bengali population of East-Pakistan in March 1971. Over the course of nine months, millions of Bengalis (mainly Hindus) were killed. International responses to these events were heavily influenced by Cold War rhetoric. Bass account of the genocide in Pakistan shows how a precarious balance of power had to be kept in place, which obstructed a united stance against Yahyas objectionable policies. Ultimately, India under Indira Ghandis leadership intervened in December 1971, which put an end to the genocide. Nixon and Kissinger have proven to be strategic practitioners of Realpolitik in this matter. Their friendship with Yahya, and their support of the genocide through arms supplies, leads Bass to justly criticise the American role in the Pakistani genocide.
By quoting some of the controversial opinions expressed by Nixon and Kissinger, the author not only provides a detailed overview of the factual happenings in Pakistan in the early 1970s, but more than that he reveals the reproachable attitude of the American statesmen towards the humanitarian crisis in Asia. Specifically striking in Bass story is the reflection of the condescending language used by Nixon and Kissinger regarding the Indian people. Their personal sentiments in this matter unequivocally influenced their stance towards the Pakistani crisis. Accordingly, Bass depicts Nixons friendship with the Pakistani dictator Yahya as characteristic for Nixons foreign policy: he was nothing more than a useful bridge in Nixons master plan to get closer to China. It is this picture of the republican president that Bass paints effectively. In doing so, this book raises awareness of how international politics are often governed by national and personal interests rather than moral interests; something that can be considered a timeless phenomenon in times where states are still hesitant to intervene in other states affairs to halt mass atrocities.
In his reconstruction, Bass uses the personal experiences of US general consul Archer Blood as a key figure throughout the book, whose dissenting voice was silenced by Nixon. Bloods telegram asking the State Department for immediate action against the mass atrocities in East Pakistan was neglected and therefore became illustrative of Nixons bystander conduct. Bass even cited several sources arguing that this makes them complicit to genocide. At one point Bass refers to Kissingers clear attitude towards international humanitarian crises by referring to one of his comments in which he pointed out that a humanitarian concern is not necessarily an American concern. Bass could not have made that picture clearer had he not used the sources the way he did.
Throughout the book, the reader wonders why Nixon and the likes took this position towards Pakistan and the Bengali crisis. Bass correctly observes three goals that contributed to the controversial stance taken by the president. First, he explains that Nixon wanted to avoid the destruction of the West-Pakistani army. Second, above all Nixon wanted to maintain his bridge through China (Yahya); and third, the American president feared the collapse of the balance of power if any of the great powers would intervene in Pakistans domestic affairs, which he wanted to prevent at all costs.
SNIP...
If there were any doubts that Nixons presidency was everything except undisputed, this historical account will convincingly dispel them. That humanitarianism had to give way to the political interests of Nixon and Kissinger is the main conclusion drawn from this revealing account of the US stance in the genocide that took place in East-Pakistan in the early 1970s. Whether interested in American foreign policy, international relations, Asian history, or genocide studies, this book will appeal to a wide audience. In a world that focuses more and more on international legal remedies to fight injustice, it might even fuel international lawyers to research the legal consequences of the passive stance taken by Nixon and his underlings.
SOURCE: http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/2014/07/27/book-review-the-blood-telegram-nixon-kissinger-and-a-forgotten-genocide-by-gary-j-bass/
"Many soldiers are led to faulty ideas of war by knowing too much about too little." -- Gen. George S. Patton, Jr.
Edit history
Please sign in to view edit histories.
140 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
Highlight:
NoneDon't highlight anything
5 newestHighlight 5 most recent replies
RecommendedHighlight replies with 5 or more recommendations
Bill Clinton, the Lippo Group, and Jackson Stephens of Little Rock, Arkansas (5th Version) 1999
Octafish
Jun 2016
#19
You support white supremacist Paul Craig Roberts. Your argument is invalid. nt
Dr Hobbitstein
Jun 2016
#70
And you've shown DU that you'll believe any far-fetched conspiracy and bring it back to the BFEE.
Dr Hobbitstein
Jun 2016
#72
I hope I've shown DU that I'm not scared to call out supporters of white supremacists,
Dr Hobbitstein
Jun 2016
#79
Here's a more current link for your analysis Doc-its still open for those that can read.
bobthedrummer
Jun 2016
#101
A conversation with yourself about woo sites? I'll pass (as did everyone else).
Dr Hobbitstein
Jun 2016
#109
No, it's code for Conspiracy Theorist. I never called anyone Better Believe It nt
Dr Hobbitstein
Jun 2016
#112
How come you are not trotting out the Trump/Hillary wedding pictures any more?
Sheepshank
Jun 2016
#5
So, show the first you find in what I've posted on this or any thread that's not true.
Octafish
Jun 2016
#18
It's important for those interested in Democratic Action, not Kissinger Action.
Octafish
Jun 2016
#16
The Last Man of the Junta: Open Letter to Henry Kissinger from One of Pinochet's Political Prisoners
Octafish
Jun 2016
#39
K&R Embracing an evil war criminal: all one needs to know (combined with record of reckless Neo Con
amborin
Jun 2016
#23
Emails expose close ties between Hillary Clinton and accused war criminal Henry Kissinger
Octafish
Jun 2016
#67
I would respond to this calumny in my inimitable way but Skinner asked me to be nice.
DemocratSinceBirth
Jun 2016
#53
I would respond to this calumny in my inimitable way but Skinner asked me to be nice.
DemocratSinceBirth
Jun 2016
#59
I am trying to help you. I want you around after we go into G E mode
DemocratSinceBirth
Jun 2016
#66
Banksters! BCCI and Marc Rich were two of those thousand points of green light.
Octafish
Jun 2016
#89
An intelligent person listens to ALL opinions. It helps in not repeating those same mistakes.
tonyt53
Jun 2016
#103
If Kissinger has a house in the DR that he, Hillary and Bill go to for holidays, why can't they
2cannan
Jun 2016
#114
Another learning curve kick for the real DU reality-based community. n/t
bobthedrummer
Jun 2016
#140