What if Israel were to call a ceasefire...

[cigsandcoffee]

...and Hezbollah kept shooting rockets at their cities? What should Israel then do?

edit: I don't think you can call for peace without having an answer to this

[onenote]

1. engage in more "aggression"?

:sarcasm:

[The Stranger]

2. Bomb the innocent Lebanese civilians that never even supported Hezbollah?

Wait, that's already happened.

[cigsandcoffee]

7. Nice and snide, but it's a non answer.

Really, what should Israel do? If you're calling for peace, it's an eventuality you should be prepared for.

[malaise]

24. 600 Lebanese are dead

We've been calling for a cease fire for two weeks.

[cigsandcoffee]

26. Indeed. But beyond the calls to "stop killing children!!!11"

Have you considered what Israel should do if the rockets continue to come in from Labanese territory (as they were before this confrontation)?

Israel may well be worried about her own children, and wishful calls for peace with no backup plan aren't going to address their concerns.

[malaise]

31. I have long ceased worrying about

parents or countries who only worry about their children. E'FUGGING'NOUGH - stop the slaughter in Lebanon now.

[cigsandcoffee]

33. That's a bumper sticker.

What about a lasting peace. What's your plan if Hezbollah keeps shooting?

As I said to another poster down the line, are you really calling for peace or are you calling for Israel to be a sitting duck?

[TX-RAT]

41. UN official accuses Hezbollah of 'cowardly blending' among civilians

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/742562.html

[SammyBlue]

40. What do you expect from Israel Haters? Intelligence

All they have is platitudes.

[cigsandcoffee]

44. I don't think name-calling is constructive.

But I am a bit shocked that there hasn't been a good answer (or any answer, really) to my OP yet from anyone looking for Israel to immediately withdraw. I'm frankly amazed.

[SammyBlue]

51. Cigs, I've been accused of being a PNAC supporter, a Freeper

a Bush Bot, a murderer supporter, a racist, a bigot and xenophobe for defending Israel, both on these boards and out in public.

All I said was "Israel haters offer nothing but platitudes." What I said is light. And if a platitude burper is name calling, the person that is directed at needs to develop thicker skin.

[The Stranger]

57. You shouldn't even have to be asking that.

STOP THE KILLING. This new meme about: No one can control both sides, so we have to keep killing is not going to work either. Give it up.

[RSMS9999]

9. just look at recent history

Israel withdrew from Gaza several months ago. There were no troops in Gaza and it was an effective "cease-fire", whatever cease-fire really means when it involves a terrorist organization and a country. The rockets continued to fly out of Gaza and Israel "restrained" for as long as possible until Hamas attacked Isreali soldiers in Israel and captured Gilad Shalit. Only then has Israel actually made moves to stop the rocket fire.

Most people just dont understand that Hezbollah and Hamas will NEVER stop firing rockets until Israel is destroyed. Its easy to live in this fairytale land where terrorists desire peace and everyone lives happilly ever after.

[Scurrilous]

39. Israel restrained nothing...

...they pulled their troops and colonists out of Gaza and then turned it into their own personal shooting gallery lobbing missiles and bombs at whomever they deemed deserving of 'targeted assassination.'

[bryant69]

3. March gently into the seas and let nature take it's course

[LSK]

4. What if both sides stopped bombing and exchanged prisoners?

:shrug:

[cigsandcoffee]

32. It would be wonderful....

But what if Hezbollah kept up the attacks the way they did before this skirmish? That scenario is more likely than a prisoner exchange bringing a lasting peace.

If you were Israel, and the attacks contnued after that, what would you do?

If you don't know the answer, then you are not really calling for peace - you're calling for Israel to be a sitting duck.

[The Stranger]

58. I think someone called your bluff, so you had to add new facts.

Israel refused to deal for the prisoners, despite having done so in the past (the whole "can't negotiate with terrorists" being shown to be bullshit), but wanted to use the capture this time to "show Hezbollah a lesson." It hasn't worked out as planned.

[Behind the Aegis]

5. Does it matter?

Seems quite a few here support the actions of the terrorist organization, Hizb'allah. Any action by Israel would be condemned. The thing is Israel will not lay down and die, like so many want. That is the source of their frustrations.

[Tom Joad]

13. All we are saying is for Israel to stop the carnage.

We also want Hizb'allah to stop firing rockets too.
Stop twisting the intentions and words of the people of DU.

[cigsandcoffee]

15. Let's say Hezbollah won't agree to your calls for peace...

...and that is not an outlandish scenario, really.

What would you then have Israel do?

[The Stranger]

59. Why don't you get out of their country (again) and see?

It worked for six years (2000-2006), didn't work for 19 years (1981-2000)-- YOU DO THE MATH.

[Behind the Aegis]

18. Riiight!

Stop telling what I have seen at this VERY board! Where it may not be your position, there are some here that would disagree with you! You speak for yourself! I will do the same!

[Scurrilous]

16. Yep BtA...

...all the terrorist supporters here at DU are frustrated because Israel won't lay down and die.

Thanks for that brilliant analysis. :thumbsup:

[Behind the Aegis]

19. Good you can see that to be true.

[cigsandcoffee]

22. I doubt anyone here supports terrorists...

...but it does seem pretty clear that some of the folks calling for peace haven't thought this through at all beyond saying "I want for them to stop shooting!"

Well, I want the Easter Bunny to bring me a dozen gold bars, but I'm not counting on it. It would seem that the bunny scenario is as likely as the idea that Hezbollah will stop shooting, but it appears few people have considered that.

[hfojvt]

35. "Coulda been so beautiful. coulda been so right ..."

Go read liberaloasis for the last week or two. According to them, negotiations between Lebanon and Israel and between Hamas and Israel had been making progress. Of course, there are extremists in Hezbollah and Hamas and Israel who do not want to see that progress, so they try to provoke the other side. When the other side reacts, that gives their faction more power. This link explains it best:

http://www.liberaloasis.com/2006/07/letting_the_militants_win.php

Of course, now that they have taken twenty steps back it will be a few years, if ever, for them to get back to that point.

[Scurrilous]

6. Sounds like what happened in Gaza...

...Hamas called a ceasefire and Israel continued firing rockets and dropping bombs.

[cigsandcoffee]

10. That's also a non-answer.

If you want Israel to lay down their arms, what would you suggest they do if Hezbollah keeps up the attacks?

[cigsandcoffee]

21. self-delete

(wrong spot)

[QuestionAll...]

8. rebuild lebanon at their own expense.

and hizbollah should also compensate for what they've done in Israel.

just too damn bad you can't rebuild dead people.

what a crying shame.

[Tom Joad]

11. Those of us who are calling for a cease-fire want a full cease-fire

by all sides, not only Israel. It doesn't seem like Israel is capable of stopping its propensity for committing carnage, however. Nor will more than a few U.S. politicians call for such. It is fallen on the U.S. public to demand that our government, the funder of Israel, demand a cease-fire.

See http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=view_all&address=364x1747261

[cigsandcoffee]

14. Well, let's say Israel agrees to that...

...but Hezbollah does not. If the attacks were to continue, what should Israel do?

I assume you belive the route they are taking now would never be the right answer. What route would you have them take instead to defend against outside attacks?

[Tom Joad]

20. It is very likely if Israel stops, Hezbollah would stop. If not, then

come back to me. Israel should also negotiate for release of their soldiers and release the Lebanonese fighters they have held for years. It should also finally be willing to withdraw from ALL of Lebanon, something it has not ever done since taking it in 1982.

[cigsandcoffee]

23. Haven't you thought this through at all?

You haven't considered the possibility that Hezbollah may not stop terrorist attacks?

[Name removed]

27. Deleted message

Message removed by moderator. Click here to review the message board rules.

[Sparkly]

30. Whaaaa???????

:crazy: :crazy: :crazy: :crazy: :crazy:

[anewdeal]

34. turn off faux news and maybe you'd understand.

[Sparkly]

36. I'm not watching faux news... What the hell are YOU watching?!?? nt

[TX-RAT]

43. Yea, Right

[Tom Joad]

37. It is Israel that is creating the most carnage. Haven't you been

seeing anything in the last few days?

[cigsandcoffee]

38. At the moment, it is. But they are responding to rocket attacks.

If Israel heeds your call to stop, but the rockets keep coming, what would you have them do?

How an Earth can you make these impassioned calls for peace without having an answer to this?

[TX-RAT]

45. Maybe Hezbollah should stop hiding among civilians.

[Tom Joad]

53. Maybe Israel should end occupation.

It only partially withdrew from Lebanon. It held kidnapped Lebanon fighters.

[TX-RAT]

56. Your saying Israel had troops in Lebanon before the soldiers were taken?

[Behind the Aegis]

60. Wrong!

Even your beloved UN says Israel fulfilled its withdrawal from Lebanon! It holds criminals, not some poor Lebanese souls. :eyes:

[sandnsea]

25. Hezbollah hasn't stopped for 3+ years

This didn't just crop up last month, criminy.

[kentuck]

12. It's easier to call a "ceasefire" once you have accomplished ...

your military mission.

If you are on the losing side, it is more difficult to accept a ceasefire...

[seriousstan]

17. Let the U,N, handle it, they're impartial....

[cigsandcoffee]

28. I'm not sure if your serious, but that option has been tried.

The UN was supposed to be getting Lebanon to reel in Hezbollah attacks. Their efforts were not working.

[seriousstan]

29. In this case, only my name was serious..........stan.

[Donald Ian Rankin]

42. A good question.

The answer is simple: let it be known that a plan to withdraw to the Green line, participate in the viable establishment of Palestinian state with partial sovereignty over Jerusalem, replace the right of "return" with some combination of a right to return based of having ancestors resident in the region in the last few generations within the last few generations and, crucially, support those arab factions genuinely committed to peace, was in the works and would be acted on soon, but that it was conditional on it being clear that the "war" was over.


I think the chances that that would be enough to secure a lasting almost-peace are very good indeed - there would still be the occasional attack on Israel by fanatics for a generation or so, but not with a frequency justifying war, if the majority of the arab population was dedicated to opposing them.


The crucial thing is that it would have to be sudden. If Israel makes it clear that there's been a sea-change in it's attitudes then there's a chance for peace. If it happens by dribs and drabs then too many arabs will still associate the Israeli-regime-offering-peace with the Israeli-regime-who-killed-my-father/wife/son/daugher/sister/brother and continue violence. The arabs don't have the opportunity to make a similar sea change; if they offer peace then Israel will simply say "thanks very much" and continue to occupy and oppress; besides which there are too many factions for that degree of cohesive action to be possible.


If Israel isn't willing to make that degree of painful concession then violence against it *will* continue, and it has no right to take any action against it: if I steal something of yours then trying to stop you reclaiming it is not self-defence.

[cigsandcoffee]

47. You've put all the onus on Israel.

And you've also assumed that the militants who lead the attacks against them can be contained by moderates if only Israel acquiesces to demands and lays down arms. This doesn't address that the militants do not recognize Israel's right to exist, and wish to see it wiped off the map.

What responsibility would you place on Hamas and Hezbollah? I see none in your post. Let's assume Israel does what you ask, but the militants (unfazed by moderate demands) contnue the rocket and terrorist attacks? What then?

[Donald Ian Rankin]

48. First of all, that's a big "if".

If that was what happened then the best strategy would be to provide arms, money and training to those arab forces that did support peace, on the condition that they cracked down on the remainder, and to do everything possible to promote prosperity in the regions around Israel.

If Israel did withdraw to its own borders etc and attacks on it continued then I think it would have the *right* to use some degree of force against those attacking it (although not nearly as much as it is currently using), but it still would be a really stupid strategy: Israel has no mechanism for fighting that doesn't create far more militants than it kills or captures.

Israel's only options are genocide, the status quo, or concilliation.

Let me ask you the reverse question: what do you think the Israelis should do in the current situation?



P.S. You're right, I do place most of the onus on Israel, partly because I think the conflict is mostly their fault (the arabs have clearly got the better claim to the debated lands), but mostly for the reasons I have already given.

To restate them, the Israelis are the only side who *could* act to end it. The arabs are far more factionalised, and while the Israelis making the principal concession demanded of them (establishment of a viable Palestinian state) would probably be met with arab response, the reverse is not true, I think.

I think that a peace settlement will have to involve the ultimate disarmament of Hamas and Hezbollah, but that that is never going to be achieved by force short of wholescale genocide. The only way it can happen is the way the IRA terrorist campaign has been ended here in the UK: meet the root causes and bring enough people into the mainstream that it is clear to the extremists that violence is counterproductive.

[Superman Returns]

46. wow this thread is hilarious

really, there is no strategy other than to attack Israel and call it a terrorist nation. Just a lot of feelings coming to the surface for all DU to see. Besides all the emotion, there is no thought out strategy by anti-Israeli action posters to bring peace to the region. Have Israel disarm along with a terrorist group? Please. Hezbollah wants a never ending war until Israel is gone. There is no photo-op with Israeli and Hezbollah leaders signing a peace treaty on the Whitehouse lawn. This day will never happen.

[RSMS9999]

49. its sad

I dont understand how people ignore the fact that Israel was within it's borders, doing nothing to harm lebanon when hezbollah crossed into Israel and killed and abducted IDF soldiers. Then they proceed to explain that Israel would be left in peace if they didnt fight against hezbollah. its insane.

[whistle]

50. Has anyone read, or seen reviews of this book titled Peace Time

...and perhaps more importantly has Condi Rice read it?

<snip>
Peace Time:
Cease-Fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace
Virginia Page Fortna

Paper | 2004 | $21.95 / £13.95 | ISBN: 0-691-11512-5
Cloth | 2004 | $60.00 / £38.95 | ISBN: 0-691-11511-7
264 pp. | 6 x 9 | 3 line illus. 15 tables. 2 maps.


Shopping Cart | Reviews | Table of Contents
Introduction or

Explore full text using Google Book Search

Why do cease-fire agreements sometimes last for years while others flounder barely long enough to be announced? How to maintain peace in the aftermath of war is arguably one of the most important questions of the post--Cold War era. And yet it is one of the least explored issues in the study of war and peace. Here, Page Fortna offers the first comprehensive analysis of why cease-fires between states succeed or fail. She develops cooperation theory to argue that mechanisms within these agreements can help maintain peace by altering the incentives for war and peace, reducing uncertainty, and helping to prevent or manage accidents that could lead to war.

To test this theory, the book first explores factors, such as decisive victory and prior history of conflict, that affect the baseline prospects for peace. It then considers whether stronger cease-fires are likely to be implemented in the hardest or the easiest cases. Next, through both quantitative and qualitative testing of the effects of cease-fire agreements, firm evidence emerges that agreements do matter. Durable peace is harder to achieve after some wars than others, but when most difficult, states usually invest more in peace building. These efforts work. Strong agreements markedly lessen the risk of further war. Mechanisms such as demilitarized zones, dispute resolution commissions, peacekeeping, and external guarantees can help maintain peace between even the deadliest of foes.

Virginia Page Fortna is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Columbia University.

Review:

"Peace Time deserves a prominent place in new scholarship on war. The book is an outstanding example of creativity, scholarly attention to a normatively important question, hard-headed integrity as well as of the creative employment of multiple methods. . . . Fortna has produced an important book."--H.E. Goemans, Japanese Journal of Political Science

Endorsements:

"This is a first-rate work of political science. Page Fortna does something all too rare in contemporary international relations research. She asks a normatively important question--what factors determine the success or failure of a peace agreement following an interstate war?--and then develops a compelling answer based on a systematic and careful consideration of relevant evidence. Both as an example of research methods and for its substantive conclusions it should be a natural choice for graduate and advanced undergraduate seminars."--James D. Fearon, Stanford University

"Addressing an extremely timely and important subject, this book will generate considerable interest from both the academic and policy community. Page Fortna offers a compelling analysis of the duration of peace and of the ability of belligerents and outsiders to affect the risks of a renewed war. Peace Time not only taught me a lot but also generated several new ideas I would like to pursue. I look forward to assigning it in both my undergraduate and graduate classes."--Suzanne Werner, Emory University

Table of Contents:

List of Figures and Maps ix
List of Tables xi
Acknowledgments xiii
INTRODUCTION 1
CHAPTER ONE
A Theory of Agreements and the Durability of Peace 10
CHAPTER TWO
Investigating the Durability of Peace 39
CHAPTER THREE
The Baseline Prospects for Peace 76
CHAPTER FOUR
Agreements: Epiphenomenal or Functional? 114
CHAPTER FIVE
Agreements and the Durability of Peace 151
CHAPTER SIX
Peace Mechanisms: What Works and What Doesn't? 173
CONCLUSION 211
APPENDIX A
Cease-Fires and the Resumption of War 217
APPENDIX B
Cease-Fires Data Set 219
References 223
Index 235


Subject Area: Political Science and International Relations

<snip from the Book Introduction>

This book explores two sets of factors to help explain why peace sometimes fails quickly and sometimes lasts longer. One set consists of situational or structural factors, characteristics of the situation over which the belligerents have little or no control. These include features of the war just fought, such as the military outcome, the cost of the war, and how many states were involved in it. They also include material conditions such as geography and the relative power of the states involved, as well as features of the belligerents' relationship such as their prior history of conflict and the stakes over which they fought. These "preexisting conditions" at the time of the cease-fire establish the baseline prospects for peace. Situational factors also include shifts over time that affect the likelihood of war, such as changes in military capability or in regime type.

The second set consists of deliberate attempts to enhance the durability of peace. These include measures such as the separation of troops and the creation of demilitarized zones (DMZs), monitoring by international observers, guarantees by third parties, confidence-building measures, and dispute resolution procedures, among others. These measures are often incorporated into cease-fire agreements by belligerents with the intent of helping to enforce the agreement. But do these measures work?
<more>
http://www.pupress.princeton.edu/chapters/i7763.html

[whistle]

52. Well, here is a PhD candiate who has done some work on the subject

...of creating a peace and making it work:
<snip>

Making and Keeping Peace

Suzanne Werner
Associate Professor
Emory University
Atlanta, GA 30322
[e-mail]

and

Amy Yuen
PhD Candidate
Emory University
Atlanta, GA 30322
[e-mail]

<....The author conludes with>

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The implications of this analysis are significant. We have extended recent discussions of the durability of peace by considering the recurrence of war as a distributional problem rather than solely as a problem of enforcement. While it is clear that in many instances the belligerents struggle with enforcement problems and may often fall back into war because they cannot trust each other to keep the terms of the agreement, in other instances, the belligerents deliberately choose war because they believe that a new war will lead to a better settlement than previously realized.
Whether the problem the belligerents confront is one best characterized by enforcement dilemmas or distributional problems, suggests very different strategies to help ensure the peace. If the problem is an enforcement problem—a mutually acceptable settlement exists but the belligerents struggle with credibly committing to its terms, then mechanisms like those highlighted by Fortna (2003) should help to institutionalize the peace. If the problem is a distributional problem—at least one belligerent believes that a renewed war could lead to better terms of settlement, then the appropriate response might be very different. The key to peace from a distributional perspective is to ensure that the belligerents share similar enough beliefs about the likely outcome of the war and that the settlement terms reflect those beliefs. Significantly, changes that occur after the settlement can make the original settlement terms obsolete as the belligerents change their beliefs about the outcome of a renewed conflict. As a result, to prevent a recurrence of conflict, the belligerents (with possible aid from third parties) must either make the terms of settlement flexible so that the terms can change as conditions change or make the costs of returning to war so high that the settlement is robust to any changes that may occur in the future. The results suggest that such flexibility or robustness is particularly important in instances where the information from the initial conflict is not completely consistent.

The analysis also suggests that third parties must be very careful when they pressure belligerents to ceasefire that they are not encouraging a de facto settlement that is not at all consistent with the belligerents’ beliefs about the likely course of the war. Encouraging, for instance, a ceasefire line along the antebellum division is unlikely to survive if one side was making significant advances during the course of the war. In such instances, while the belligerents may agree to the ceasefire temporarily to appease powerful third parties, at least one of the belligerents is going to resist pressures to institutionalize the peace. Rather than accept provisions like demilitarized zones or monitors that could create roadblocks for a renewed conflict, the belligerents bow to the pressure to ceasefire but anticipate the opportunity to renew the conflict.

An important caveat to this pessimistic analysis of third party intervention, however, exists. If the belligerents know that any renewed war will ultimately end the same as the first because the third party will again intervene and prevent a decisive victory by the stronger side, then there will be no expectation that a renewed war will lead to better terms and no incentive to break the peace. In this instance, the third party may be able to end the war without increasing the risk of recurrence. The problem is that in many instances third parties pressure the belligerents to ceasefire and then quickly lose interest leaving open the real possibility that a renewed war will turn out differently. In these instances, long-term success will depend not only on the initial will to stop the fighting but the perception that the resolve will last. We believe that these considerations are particularly relevant to our understanding of the termination and postwar stability of civil conflicts. While our analysis is currently restricted to interstate conflicts, the impact of third party intervention on intrastate conflict may be even greater. Increasingly, powerful third parties are attempting to make peace in intrastate conflicts. Our analysis suggests that their ability to create a lasting peace is in serious question given that the long-term commitment of third parties is often highly questionable.

As a final note, it is important to recognize that even if ceasefires that come about as a consequence of third party pressure are significantly more likely to fail, it is not necessarily clear that such pressure does not serve the interests of the belligerents or humanitarian interests more generally. On the one hand, our results suggest that ceasefires that come about as a consequence of third party pressure are significantly more likely to fail than ceasefires that come about without such external intervention. This implies that third party pressure to stop fighting can actually increase conflict and the associated costs by increasing the risks that the belligerents experience multiple conflicts. On the other hand, third party pressure to ceasefire can significantly shorten the original conflict. As a result, the costs the belligerents endure may be less for each conflict. It is not clear whether a single, lengthy conflict or several, shorter conflicts are more costly for the belligerents. What tradeoffs third parties or the international community are willing to make will clearly depend on the details of each individual conflict.

<see the entire paper at>

http://polisci.emory.edu/about/reiter/Werner%20Yuen.doc

I read that last paragraph as: Although cease-fires may not be the best way to resolve conflicts, Condi Rice should go for it, then hammer out the details of how to make it work for both parties.

[theanarch]

54. Donald Ian Rankin is right...

...simply agreeing to a cease fire solves nothing, if Israel doesn't commit itself to addressing the core issues that perpetuate "terrorism": the illegal occupation(s), the illegal settlements (colony-planting), land-grabbing and water-stealing, the kidnapping/extrajudicial detentions/targeted assassinations of Palestinian leaders, the economic strangulation of the occupied territories, etc. The onus IS on Israel because they are the pro-active players in this crisis, and their obstinate refusal to back down or off one iota is what fuels the flames of hatred and violence. I also dispute the premise of your oft-repeated question, which seems to presume that "Arabs" are irrational and untrustworthy. A better question would be, what should Palestinians do every time they agree to a ceasefire (as Arafat--Israel's sock-puppet negotiating partner/scapegoat/whipping boy--so often did) and Israel keeps building more settlements, stealing more land, fences/walls off more territory, etc., etc.?

[dennis4868]

55. that's why Israel....

does not want a ceasefire. They must kill every last member of Hazballah in order to defend their country.

[theanarch]

61. as i didn't see a "sarcasm" attached...

...to your post, the presumption is you made it all seriousness. If that is the case, one must ask, at what price? Is it possible to '...kill every last member of Hazhallah (sic)" without committing genocide (or something close to it), and are you morally comfortable with that? Do you honestly believe obliterating an entire country, targeting its civilian infrastructure, and creating a humanitarian crisis of 700,000+ refugees will intimidate or cow them into submission, especially when 60 years of doing just that has demonstrated the exact opposite? And does a country protected, as Israel is, by the world's fourth largest military machine really need to do all these self-defeating things, when better results can be achieved with a little good-faith diplomacy, at a fraction of the human and material cost?

[oberliner]

62. UN RES 1559

Israel already did call a cease fire and withdrew all of its troops from Lebanon as per the requirements of UN Resolution 1559.

And then Hezbollah completely disarmed and disbanded as per the requirements of that same resolution.

How could Hezbollah possibly be shooting rockets into Israel?