Zugzwang

[bemildred]

Mods: my original work.

ZUGZWANG(*)

While taking my walk these last few days, I have been trying to figure out what will happen next in Iraq, or more precisely, what the current administration is trying to do. There are only a few basic interpretations of the situation, so let's see if we can think our way through them.

First, one might say we have enough troops in Iraq. This seems to be an untenable conclusion.1,2

So then, admitting we need more troops, one might claim the current recruiting arrangements are working fine and they will produce the necessary troops as needed. This does not seem to coincide with the facts either.3,4

And in fact, it seems that efforts are being made to scavenge troops from elsewhere in the world to supply needs in Iraq. 5,6

Well then, how might we resolve this troop shortage? We could try to get other countries to send more troops, and this is being done, but without much success. In fact there seems to be a decline in support from other countries over time; in any case we are not getting more support as time goes on. 8,9

We could try to "Iraqify" the war, developing and training an Iraqi force to help us with the fighting. An effort of this sort has been under way for some time now, but with limited success 10.

The elections, currently scheduled for the end of January appear to be intended to shore this effort up, among other things. If the elections are carried off with some credibility, leading to a government that a substantial number of Iraqis are willing to fight for, the current occupation can be transformed into an Iraqi civil war in which we support one side, and we can let them do most of the fighting. In the most optimistic version of this scenario, once our side has won the ensuing civil war, we could withdraw from public view in Iraq and reduce our troops strength to something more sustainable. One can see from this why the administration is so reluctant to postpone the elections, as that would also postpone this happy scenario, and at some point such a delay will force other strategies to be employed; that is the troops shortages will have to be addressed with non-Iraqi forces.

We seem to have had some success in getting this scenario off the ground, and I would wager that the main thrust of the administration effort now it to make this work. 11

Despite it's drawbacks, this provides a semblance of "peace with honor", i.e. we have an orderly exit from the quagmire with some shreds of credibility left. I consider this, extraction from the quagmire with miltary and political credibility sufficient to permit the pursuit of an interventionist foreign policy in the future, to be the probable most important strategic goal of the administraion at this point. This is not unlike the goal of Nixon's policies when he inherited VietNam from Johnson.

If it proves out that Iran supports the elections, they may succeed. Although getting into bed with Iran, SCIRI, and al Sistani to elect a Shi'ia-Kurd government, that will then fight our war for us against the Sunni, may produce a far from ideal result in Iraq, it offers the hope of extraction from the quagmire. I have a feeling that al Sadr may be heard from again in this regard 12,13, and the magnitude of the support that al Sistani can command is uncertain, but one can only await events in these regards.

Now, if the Iraqi resistance succeeds in postponing or preventing entirely the elections, either the occupation must be ended, or more troops must be found, and they must be trained and equipped and so on. There seem to be two main approaches to getting more troops: incentives and the draft. Incentivized methods would include mercenaries, service-to-citizenship programs, and improvements in the pay and benefits of servicepeople. These incentivized approaches are already in use, and are apparently not sufficient even to maintain current troops levels 14,15.

That leaves the draft. That is the last choice, and I believe we will only see it considered when it becomes clear that the alternative is a "dishonorable" withdrawal. And that is because a reinstitution of the draft has enormous political risks and consequences domestically. The risks are that the draft will fail, that as in VietNam, the level of refusal will be so high as to call into question the legitimacy of the government, and also that it will mobilize a political reaction sufficient to challenge the current rulers of the State. Given the existing "polarized" political situation these risks must be taken seriously. The consequences are several, most essentially that a draftee is not merely an employee, he is a citizen-soldier, and the state incurs a debt when it demands his services, and it activates a citizen. A new GI bill will be required, and all those returning veterans will be politically active and vocal long after the war is done, ahd they will not sit quietly while their benefits are cut.

So, now, what can we conclude? The Iraqi elections are central. If they can be held, and if they then result in a government with the legitimacy to fight and win a civil war for control of Iraq, then the US may escape from it's quagmire. If not, we may see a draft, and if not a draft, then some sort of constructed fig-leaf and a withdrawal with whatever dignity can be mustered. And all of this depends on the actions of al Sistani and al Sadr and the Kurds and the Sunni, the people of Iraq, and on Iran. The administration meanwhile stalls for time and hopes for a bit of luck.