Reply #9: According to John Dean at Findlaw, Earle's case has legs:

[villager]

The Case Against Tom DeLay: What Has Happened To Grand Jury Secrecy In Texas?

By JOHN W. DEAN
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Friday, Oct. 07, 2005

What is one to make of the criminal charges against Tom DeLay?

I spoke with several knowledgeable Texas lawyers, of both parties, about the case against DeLay; they were willing to speak, but only off-the-record. Or, as one put it, "Who in hell wants to get in the middle of a fight between a polecat and a skunk?" (I don't like unidentified sources. But I will use them in this column, only because they are sharing nothing more their expertise, no inside information. They were offering their professional "speculation," if you will.)

There is no speculation, however, by the grand jurors who have spoken out in this case; they are familiar with the evidence prosecutors must have adduced, before them, to convince them to indict. And what they are saying appears dangerously close to breaking their oaths of secrecy.


The (now) former Majority Leader of the U.S. House of Representatives was indicted on September 28, and again on October 2, by two different Travis County, Texas grand juries. The second indictment is far more serious than the first.

The first indictment charges DeLay with engaging in a criminal conspiracy in violation of Texas Penal Code Section 15.02. It states that DeLay and two of his associates (also indicted) agreed to make corporate political contributions which are prohibited by the Elections Code. If convicted, DeLay faces up to two years in jail and a $10,000 fine.

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DeGuerin's motion to dismiss the first indictment has not been made public. All that is known is that the gist of his argument is a claim that the conspiracy statute cited in the initial indictment, Section 15.02 of the Texas Penal Code, was not applicable at the time of DeLay's purported offense, the alleged 2002 violation of the Election Code prohibiting corporate contributions.

Despite DeGuerin's skill, one of my sources suggests his tactic in filing the motion to dismiss the first indictment when he did, may have been faulty. "DeGuerin probably pulled the trigger too fast," one attorney told me. "Had he waited until it was clear the statute of limitations had passed, and had he made it clear DeLay's waiver of the statute of limitations had ended, he might have done to Earle again what he did in the Kay Bailey Hutchinson case, and raise the technical error when it was too late to fix it. But by going in guns blazing, trying to blow Earle out of the water, Earle simply issued a second indictment to cover himself."

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http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dean/20051007.html