CIA conduct before 9/11

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Ali Soufan (Op-Ed in the NYT 4/22/09):

One of the worst consequences of the use of these harsh techniques was that it reintroduced the so-called Chinese wall between the C.I.A. and F.B.I., similar to the communications obstacles that prevented us from working together to stop the 9/11 attacks. Because the bureau would not employ these problematic techniques, our agents who knew the most about the terrorists could have no part in the investigation. An F.B.I. colleague of mine who knew more about Khalid Shaikh Mohammed than anyone in the government was not allowed to speak to him.

My Tortured Decision

In all the torture discussion, there has been no mention of the bizarre pre-9/11 conduct by the CIA. Author Lawrence Wright on Soufan in relation to the Cole investigation (from the first printing of The Looming Tower):

Because there was a preexisting indictment for bin Laden in New York, and al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi were his associates, the bureau already had the authority to follow the suspects, wiretap their apartment, intercept their communications, clone their computer, investigate their contacts--all the essential steps that might have prevented 9/11. (pg. 330-331)

Soufan wondered why money was leaving Yemen when a major operation was about to take place. Could there be another operation under way that he didn’t know about? Soufan queried the CIA, asking for information about Khallad and whether there might have been an al-Qaeda meeting in the region. The agency did not respond to his clearly stated request. The fact that the CIA withheld information about the mastermind of the Cole bombing and the meeting in Malaysia, when directly asked by the FBI, amounted to obstruction of justice in the death of seventeen American sailors. Much more tragic consequences were on the horizon. (page 329)

Then the CIA chief drew Soufan aside and handed him a manila envelope. Inside were three surveillance photos and a complete report about the Malaysia meeting-the very material Soufan had been asking for, which the CIA had denied him until now. The wall had come down. When Soufan realized that the agency and some people in the bureau had known for more than a year and a half that two of the hijackers were in the country, he ran into the bathroom and retched. (page 362)

The NSA and FBI UBLU also withheld information about al Qaeda operatives inside the US. The "Gorelick wall" explanation is BS. It was used to justify giving US intelligence police state powers. We still don't know why the NSA and FBI UBLU acted as they did. Top secret. Redacted interviews with officials involved might show up on the NARA website in about 50 years.

The CIA acted in bad faith before and after 9/11. Soufan clearly states that the legal interrogation methods were working but evidently weren't sufficient for linking Bin Laden to Hussein. It appears the same crowd at the CIA who withheld the al Qaeda information before 9/11 were also involved in pushing for the CIA to take over high level detainee interrogations in mid 2002. The result? False confessions were used for political advantage and social conditioning (i.e. the constant fearmongering ensured there would be less resistance to White House goals. And though it's difficult to believe, the White House doesn't always have the best interests of the public in mind). An added benefit was that torture resonated with the authoritarian GOP base. Tough on terror indeed. "All this stupid (here stupid referred to the US Constitution and the Geneva Conventions) red tape was giving al Qaeda free reign!"