Reply #47: that's wrong on almost every possible level

[Neil B Forzod]

Your post is alarming in the sheer amount of disinformation it contains. Please check a few facts before posting... USCV's propensity for publishing incorrect data is bordering on embarrassing.

1. Tight secure operating system as a base (unlike Diebold, Sequoia, and some others).

That's a pretty gross misstatement of fact. ES&S does actually use Windows for almost all of its important software, including everything related to election definition and setup, result tabulation and reporting. ES&S touchscreens don't use Windows (Diebold's use Windows CE, while Sequoia's use Linux) but it's hardly an issue. ES&S optical-scan machines do use custom firmware, but so does Diebold's optical scan machine. Sequoia's optical-scan machine is actually the same as the ES&S machine -- they won the rights to the technology several years back when ES&S was sued by the government over violating anti-trust laws with their monopolistic, non-competitive business practices. (But they're much better now. :eyes: )

As for the characterization of their operating system as "tight" and "secure"... that's entirely subjective. With all due respect, I'll lay ten to one odds that you don't actually know what operating system is used, or what's especially "tight" or "secure" about it relative to the operating systems used by other vendors.

2. INDEPENDENTLY auditable DREs because they use an open source bar code on their paper rolls and make an open source system that any geek can build to audit the paper rolls (OK I still hate DREs because the majority of voters never take the extra step to verify a stupid paper roll)

ES&S doesn't actually have an independently-auditable DRE at all, since they don't have a VVPAT unit that's been certified either federally or in any state. Nor have they sold a single DRE with a VVPAT unit anywhere. ES&S is actually the only major vendor without a voter-verified paper-based unit in production, and ES&S is the slowest vendor to respond to the demand for one. Sequoia was the first to sell and deploy such a unit, in New Mexico. Diebold has actually sold the most DREs with a voter-verified paper audit trail, with sales exceeding those of all other major vendors combined.

Ignoring all of that, your statement is disingenuous in the extreme. Any DRE with a voter-verified paper record of the votes is independently auditable regardless of the type of bar code printed on that paper record, because you can simply read the text on the paper. For you to imply that the ES&S vaporware paper-trail unit can be audited better than real units from every other vendor on the basis of its bar code, of all things, (which, incidentally, can't even be used in several states including California) makes one question your motives, especially in light of the overall tone of your post.

3. They put their money into R&D rather than lobbyists and have responded to the criticisms of voting activists by improving their systems.

With all due respect, Kathy, you just made that up. ES&S is a privately-held company, and as such they don't publish (nor are they obligated to publish) what they spend on R&D versus other areas. Consequently you have no idea how much they spend on R&D. You can find out what Sequoia, Diebold, even poor, bankrupt AccuPoll spend on R&D because they're publicly-traded and they have to report on their expenditures.

And for what it's worth, you'd clearly be surprised to know that ES&S actually spends more on lobbyists than any other vendor. There's a reason they're the largest vendor of election equipment in the United States.

4. ES&S sells a really good optical scan system that is easier for election officials to use and their AutoMARK ballot printer is ideal for disabled (in fact much more disabled friendly than DREs) and it is ideal for foreign languages so no extra ballots need to be pre-printed in foreign languages.

ES&S actually sells a very old optical scan system that's widely regarded in the industry as inferior to both the Diebold and Hart units. Its scan engine is based on 1980s fax machine technology, and it operates like one. Watching it scan a ballot at the rate of an inch or two per second is almost painful to watch when you compare it against competitors' offerings (and I have experience with all of them, unlike most "experts" who post things on the internet). Despite what's usually reported here and elsewhere, the state of Florida is mostly run with ES&S equipment, and most of the problems there have been with ES&S equipment. Sequoia's optical-scan machine is the same as ES&S' unit, and the main reason there aren't more reports of problems with it is that they haven't really sold it anywhere (Cook County and Chicago purchased it last year, but I don't believe it's actually been used there yet.)

With all due respect, AutoMARK is no more "ideal" than your typical DRE for the disabled and is certainly not "much more disabled friendly than DREs". You simply made that up, like your earlier assertions. Unlike you, I'm not advocating either type of device. I'm simply basing my statements on claims made by actual disabled people, and in general the disabled community appears to be equally satisfied with either option (I can dig up the studies if necessary).

And for whatever trivia value it's worth, AutoMARK is currently the basis of a pending lawsuit in at least one state.

Note: Just because some suspicious election results patterns have occured in counties using ES&S optical scan machines does not indicate that the vendor had anything to do with it.

That's just... I don't even know how to respond to that, except maybe to ask "how much has ES&S actually donated to USCV and/or Kathy Dopp?" Are you serious? In almost every election Diebold is accused of rigging election results, even if hand recounts show the original results were correct. Triad technicians were repeatedly accused of rigging Ohio election results after last year's presidential election, even though none of the recounts supported it. (I'm not interested in debating Triad's or Diebold's alleged election-rigging activities. The point is that every other vendor is automatically suspect, but you'd like people to believe that ES&S is somehow above the same level of suspicion? Just because you like their AutoMARK device? Please. That's an insult to our collective intelligence.)

Fun trivia fact: ES&S bought Triad after the 2004 election, and currently employs all the former Triad people in Ohio. But I guess they're all better now. Right? Uh huh.

Fun trivia fact #2: In the last two elections in California, ES&S machines miscounted the absentee votes, and in fact subtracted the absentee totals from the correct totals in some counties. That hasn't been reported because the secretary of state's office has hushed it up to avoid causing more public outcry there after the recent, raucous public meetings over Diebold TSX certification. Better yet: my inside source has seen the actual video of ES&S machines miscounting votes in California. There's video of voters selecting a candidate in the top left corner of the touchscreen, and a different candidate in a different race being selected down in the bottom left of the screen. Or better: there's documentation of ES&S machines failing parallel-monitoring tests in California on election day. Parallel monitoring: that means they randomly take some machines out of service right before opening the polls, and process some test ballots on those machines independently at the SoS office to make sure they count votes correctly. And the ES&S machines didn't. Take a 5-minute breather from shilling for ES&S and file a public records request for this information with the California secretary of state's office instead. Ask for the video, if you like. Then come back here, post it, and then tell us again how we should all be pushing our election officials to run out and buy ES&S equipment. :eyes:

I have spoken with the chief engineer and one of the developers at ES&S and they were even considering joining the open voting consortium and making their source code open source but the open voting consortium demanded that they phase out the paper rolls and they decided that they couldn't phase out a product that already has a widespread customer base.

Well one of you is lying, and out of respect I'll assume it's the ES&S guy. ES&S never seriously considered joining the OVC, and any decision not to join them certainly wasn't based on their inability to phase out a product that actually has zero customers, isn't certified or deployed anywhere, and (as of July) was still mired in development.


Your other points about no system being perfect, and about all systems having attack vectors by knowledgeable insiders with access to the system are true, and they're not pointed out nearly enough. And I agree that routine independent audits of voter-verified ballots would be a big improvement to the electoral system. But your endorsement of ES&S on what amounts to almost entirely fabricated grounds is naive at best and deceptive at worst.

Neil