Here, for example, is Part II, Article 2.1:
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
hrweb.comSuppose one is a lawyer, who on behalf of an atheist client, must persuade a very diligent bureaucrat that the Covenant protects atheist. How does one argue? The question is whether atheism falls under "race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
Atheism appears not to be a race, colour, sex, or language; nor is it a matter of national or social origin, or property
If one reads "birth or other status" as involving a typographical error (for which "birth, or other status" was the actually intended reading) one might suppose atheism to be covered under the catch-all
other status. The difficulty to such a reading is simply that there then is no indication whatsoever regarding what "other status" might signify, whereas if one reads
birth or other status as a unitary descriptor, it might naturally indicate notions of social class (aristocrat? serf?) and caste (untouchable?). Since one may have lower caste clients in the future, the second reading seems rather preferable
So if atheism is covered, one must explain to the bureaucrat that it is certainly covered either as "religion" or "political or other opinion." However, the argumentative client (who frequents the R/T forum here) has already had many discussions with the bureaucrat and has already convinced the bureaucrat that atheism is not covered under the Covenant category of religion. One therefore persuades the bureaucrat that atheism is essentially a kind of political or other opinion
Some time after one makes this argument, an agnostic presents as a client, again seeking the Covenant rights. Various friends of the agnostic have very helpfully written to the bureaucrat, describing the agnostic as an atheist -- and therefore certainly not religious. The road then seems smooth: after all, is it not just like the prior case? But at the last minute, the bureaucrat asks,
On the basis of what opinions, is the client seeking these rights? It appears the client's agnosticism is not associated with any definite opinions. The bureaucrat rereads the Covenant, acknowledges the client cannot be discriminated against for holding opinions, but concludes that nothing prevents discrimination against the client for not holding opinions -- for the Covenant plainly protects definite opinions, but does not mention protecting an absence of opinion, the latter silence implying no such protection was intended
The correct solution to the problem, of course, is to get rid of idiots who insist on precise and limiting definitions (when illustrative and encompassing interpretations are intended) or who insist on reading pragmatic texts intended to promote certain objectives with the logical rigor appropriate to a mathematical script