What's behind the TSA's witness tampering?

[villager]

from the latest "Practical Nomad" travel newsletter...

<snip>

The government has alleged, but Moussaoui has not conceded, that
Moussaoui's lies to the FBI when he was arrested in August 2001 caused
(and were intended to cause) more deaths on 11 September 2001 that
would have been prevented had Moussaoui confessed to the FBI and fully
informed on his co-conspirators. Under current Federal law, Moussaoui can only
be executed if the government can prove this to the judge beyond
reasonable doubt.

That's the purpose of the current "sentencing trial". It's an
evidentiary, fact-finding hearing, before a Federal judge, under the Federal rules
of criminal procedure and evidence, on essentially the sole question of
whether the measures the FAA claims they would have taken in the name
of "aviation security" if they had gotten Moussaoui's full confession in
August 2001 -- and which are among essentially the same measures the
FAA and its successor the TSA actually have taken since 11 September 2001
would actually have helped prevent the September 11th attacks or saved
any lives if they had been done sooner.

That's what panicked Ms. Martin into into illegally coaching the
witnesses from her agency and its predecessor: the prospect of a fair hearing and
a judicial verdict on the likely efficacy for safety, security, and
reduction of loss of life to terrorism of her agency's so-called
"security" measures. According to news reports, she told the witnesses
in her e-mail messages that she feared the judge might find that
Moussaoui's lies didn't lead to any deaths, since the things the FAA would have
done if they had known more about the attackers' plans wouldn't have
prevented them.

Presumably she knew she might be caught violating the witness
sequestration order. If she was (as, indeed, she has been), the result
would be that the "death notice" would be dismissed, and Moussaoui
would live out his life in prison. But she took that risk anyway, a decision
that makes sense only if she was more eager to avoid a verdict that the
FAA and TSA tactics wouldn't have made us any more secure than she was
eager to avoid having the death notice dismissed and Mousaoui live.
The real worst-case scenario for Martin, which she and and the TSA
apparently have now succeeded in averting, was a judicial verdict that
as the TSA's own advisory committee, Congressional auditors from the
GAO, and every independent airline security expert I've ever spoken with
have have already concluded -- the TSA has failed to make a case for its
airline passenger surveillance measures as being justified on grounds
of safety, security, prevention of terrorism, or saving of lives.

Which, of course, brings us to the real question below the surface of
this case: If these aren't really measures that will make us safer, why is
the TSA compelling things like the conversion of airline reservations and
operational systems into an infrastructure of surveillance ? It's hard
to avoid the conclusion that surveillance, not security, is the real goal
that justifies -- at least to some three-letter agencies of the
government -- the dollar expense (billions) and political cost of these programs.


----------------
Edward Hasbrouck
<http://hasbrouck.org>