It seems entirely plausible to me that Iran is sending an increasing amount of military aid to Shiite groups in Iraq. My question is, what faction in Iran in doing this?
Iran seems to be extremely complex, with the population being split into four groups: Young people (who make up 1/2 the country), most of whom just want more political/economic freedom; Moderates who want to steer the country toward some form of democracy; Conservative clerics who want to maintain the status quo; and the Revolutionary Guard who have been described as a state within a state (until recently, that is).
The magnitude of the disaster that the Iraq adventure will trigger has yet to be experienced. However, I think that at a minimum it has greatly complicated any resolution of our differences with Iran. It appears that we are on the cusp of driving a majority of the population, who wanted better relations with the West, into the arms of the Clerics and their new allies, the Revolutionary Guards.
I guess this is what happens when you have a Commander-In-Chief that doesn't do nuance. Does the following statement describing the current political climate in Iran remind you of another country?
"The clear trend in Iran is that the hard-liners have indicated that they don't care what it is that the people want. They believe that they have God on their side, and they are prepared to do what is necessary in order to continue with their rule."
Iranian Leadership
globalsecurity.org
http://globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/leadership.htm. . .
The clear trend in Iran is that the hard-liners have indicated that they don't care what it is that the people want. They believe that they have God on their side, and they are prepared to do what is necessary in order to continue with their rule. Iran has an evolving constitutional change, which has been to reduce the powers of elected positions, like that of the president of the parliament, and to expand the powers of appointed positions from the supreme religious leader, and to expand the powers of the judiciary. So the space for elections is diminished. But only the hardest liners among the conservatives are prepared to use all-out repression at this point. That reflects this constant dynamic between hard-liners and more moderate camps within the Islamic government that is really moving toward a more representative and democratic system. The hardest-line people are the people who control the secret police, the people who control the military, and the Revolutionary Guards. And they have clearly indicated that they are prepared to use force to kill people in order to stay in power, irrespective of what the election shows.
. . .
The Revolutionary Guards Are Back
The Economist
Jun 17th 2004
http://economist.com/world/africa/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2773140. . .
THE ramshackle traffic police in Tehran are nowadays backed up by muscular paramilitaries in camouflage fatigues. Dozens of seats in parliament and a brace of top posts have recently been filled by ex-servicemen. The generals have stopped President Muhammad Khatami's reformist government from putting a showpiece airport into operation. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), set up more than two decades ago as an ideological counterweight to the less politically minded (and now less well-equipped) regular army, may be quietly taking control.
The reformists, once dominant but now being squeezed out of power, fear so. Last year their conservative opponents helped a former guardsman become Tehran's mayor. In May, another was appointed to head the broadcasting monopoly. One reformist newspaper reckons that some 90 out of 290 deputies in Iran's new parliament have a “background in revolutionary and military institutions.
. . .