http://www.tompaine.com/feature2.cfm/ID/10326Article in TomPaine by Marshall Auerback, an international portfolio strategist with a U.S. money management firm. I never heard of him, but his picture of the situation is interesting.
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Since the U.S. occupation of Iraq began, the pipelines north of Haditha have been the targets of repeated sabotage. The result, according to GLL, is a shortage of natural gas and the inability to use all of the capacity of Iraq's refineries. Consequently, the country is still producing well below its current estimated capacity of 2.5mmbd of crude oil production. Equally problematic from the Americans' perspective is the increasingly unaccommodating policy stance of the Saudis, who had hitherto been relied upon to offset looming oil shortages. As it now stands, the Israel-Palestine conflict has no direct impact on Middle Eastern oil supplies. However, it has led to a movement of solidarity among Middle Eastern states against the Bush administration's perceived one-sided support of Israel and in addition has led the Saudis, fearing their "special relationship" with America to be under threat, to play the oil card in a manner highly inimical to American economic interests.
No Surprise To Bush
It is not as if the Bush administration wasn't warned: Before his visit to Bush's ranch near Crawford, Texas, Crown Prince Abdullah (through his interpreter) told the press that allowing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict "to spiral out of control will have grave consequences for the United States and its interests." On June 10, 2003, the Saudi oil minister sent letters to the companies negotiating contracts for participation in the natural gas industry of the Kingdom. Subsequent to those letters, the following has occurred:
* July, 2003—The Saudi government announces gas agreements with Shell (Anglo-Dutch) and Total (French)
* August—State visit to Moscow by Crown Prince ‘Abd' Allah-al-Saud
* September—OPEC ministers adopt Saudi Arabia's proposals to reduce production quotas, despite of expectations in advance of the meeting that the status quo would be maintained.
* January, 2004—Saudi Arabia announces gas agreements with Lukoil (Russian), Sinopec (Chinese), Agip (Italian), and Repsol (Spanish)
* February—OPEC Ministers adopt another Saudi proposal to reduce production quotas.
Note the complete exclusion of U.S. energy companies in all prominent new Saudi energy ventures; this is hardly consistent with an ostensible pledge to flood the market with oil around October to guarantee the election of a president viewed to be fundamentally hostile to Islamic interests by the vast majority of OPEC nations. It is equally salient that the officially stated OPEC price range of $22-$28 per barrel has largely been ignored by virtually all OPEC members (judging from the extent to which they are producing above agreed quota numbers)—not only because higher prices can be sustained in spite of this widespread "cheating" on quotas, but also because of growing opposition among its members to American policies in the Middle East.
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