"Al-Sadr's Success a Product of Washington's Policies"

[nosmokes]

For a past PINR analysis on Moqtada al-Sadr, visit the following article from April of 2004:
''What To Do With Moqtada Al-Sadr''
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The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is a global organization that provides analyses of conflicts and other international events. We are currently independently funded giving us the freedom to analyze objectively. PINR seeks to provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. We approach a subject based upon the powers and interests involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader.

23 June, 2004
"Al-Sadr's Success a Product of Washington's Policies"

From the early days of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, insurgents launched guerrilla-style attacks against U.S.-led forces. In these first weeks of the insurgency, the Iraqi population offered marginal support to the guerrilla movement, since it was new and unknown. As the occupation wore on, the insurgents gained more support due to the popular anger held by much of Iraq's population over the instability brought by U.S.-led forces. Nevertheless, the insurgency still lacked a central unifying figure for disenfranchised and marginalized Iraqis to gravitate towards. This vacuum has now been partially filled by the young Shi'a leader, Moqtada al-Sadr.

Al-Sadr, who is said to be about 31 years old, is the son of respected Shi'a cleric Mohamed Sadeq al-Sadr, who was assassinated by Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party in 1999 due to his outspoken criticism of its policies. The rest of al-Sadr's family -- including his two older brothers and a well-known uncle -- were also murdered by Ba'ath Party operatives.

Despite his family connections, al-Sadr never quite had the popularity or respect required to make him an important leader. His power resonated from his private militia known as the Mehdi Army. Shortly after the invasion, al-Sadr and his militia recognized the power vacuum that had been created and quickly went into action by supplying food and essential supplies to Iraqis suffering the hardships of war.

But it was his public, charismatic and outspoken defiance of the U.S.-led occupation that earned him the most support. Up until al-Sadr's blunt criticism of U.S. policies, none of Iraq's other prominent leaders would risk speaking out against Washington. Fearing that such action would cause the U.S. to silence them, or marginalize them from power, these leaders remained relatively neutral, deciding that the best way to achieve their interests was through cooperation and sacrifice with Washington.
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