Frm the Guardian
Unlimited (UK)
Dated Saturday September 4
There will be another Beslan
In asymmetrical war, the most vulnerable will always be on the frontline
By Isabel Hilton
It descended into blood, panic, violence and tragedy. None of the children, parents and teachers killed and wounded in Beslan deserved this barbarism. The children who set off for the first day of school on Wednesday, wearing their new clothes and holding their balloons, could not have been a more innocent target, the anguish of their teachers and parents more undeserved.
Beslan is an extreme example of what is rightly seen as a depraved military tactic. But the equally unpalatable truth is that hostage taking is also a rational tactic in the desperate context of asymmetrical warfare. Despite the likelihood of a bloody end to most hostage situations, they are likely to grow more, rather than less, frequent.
At first sight the appeal of hostage taking is questionable: the hostage takers rarely achieve their stated objectives and often die in the attempt. There is nothing in Putin's record or in that of his security services to suggest that a peaceful solution in Beslan was likely - or that respect for the lives of the hostages would predominate over the political need to end the crisis quickly. Preserving lives takes time. Putin's interest, as it has been in Chechnya, is to create an impression of overwhelming force to pacify domestic anxiety. The hostage takers knew from the outset that they were likely to die.
Hostage taking has not always been so unrewarding. In November 1986, an American hostage was released by an Iranian group that had held him captive for more than 17 months. His release had been bought by the Reagan administration with the transfer of military spare parts for Iran. Despite official denials, governments from Washington and Bogota to Paris have sometimes found it convenient to negotiate the quiet release of prisoners. In doing so they created a double bind. Negotiating improved both the life chances of the hostages and the leader's image: a return in triumph was better than a tragic outcome. But rewarding hostage-taking also raised the incentives: as long as something could be gained, the practice was risky, but in some sense profitable.
Today's hostage-taking, though, from Iraq to Ossetia, is more savage, born of the spread of asymmetrical warfare that pits small, weak and irregular forces against powerful military machines.
Unfortunely, this is true.