IntelligenceReform Can't wait(3y post911 we had another intel failure-Iraq

[papau]

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A3909-2004Sep7.html

Intelligence Reform Can Wait No Longer
By Thomas H. Kean and Lee H. Hamilton

Wednesday, September 8, 2004; Page A23


We are heartened by the action and debate on reforming the intelligence community that have followed the issuance of our report. In the course of that debate so far, two key criticisms of our proposed reorganization have emerged: first, that we are rushing to judgment and, second, that our management structure would stifle competitive analysis and politicize intelligence.

We strongly disagree that the nation is moving too fast to carry out our recommendations on intelligence reform. We debated these issues for nearly two years, interviewing more than 1,200 witnesses, reviewing millions of documents and holding a series of public hearings. We drew on bipartisan recommendations that have been advocated for decades by distinguished panels, starting with a commission chaired by Herbert Hoover 50 years ago and continuing through the work of the Aspin-Brown commission (1996), the Scowcroft panel (2001), the joint congressional inquiry (2002) and others. Congress has held innumerable hearings, most recently -- and admirably -- this past August. The time to act is now.

On the second criticism, let's be clear: The status quo failed us. It does not foster competitive analysis. This is evident in the Sept. 11 story, as well as in the "group-think" prevalent on intelligence assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. Competing or dissenting views of various intelligence agencies were not effectively incorporated into national intelligence assessments. Furthermore, before Sept. 11, 2001, bureaucratic rivalries and hindrances to information-sharing prevented analysts from knowing the full set of facts scattered throughout our government. No one had access to the complete picture.

Our proposal institutionalizes information-sharing, thus guaranteeing a competitive airing of views. We don't want dissent quashed by group-think; we want competing analyses to be shared broadly, so that intelligence assessments benefit from the full breadth of knowledge across the government. Intelligence centers such as the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) will not be new "stovepipes" stifling differing views. On the contrary, they will smash stovepipes by ensuring that all our intelligence agencies have a seat at the table, and that all information on a topic is available to all analysts. What good is intelligence if it stays locked up in a home agency? The NCTC and other centers would ensure that this will not be the case.

Competitive analysis is also fostered through creation of an empowered national intelligence director (NID), with the authority and responsibility for creating information-sharing networks and insisting on collaborative work. Under the current system, the director of central intelligence (DCI) has real control only of the CIA; thus, when he wants analysis, he turns to CIA analysts. An NID who is separate from the CIA will have the ability and incentive to draw on the effort of all 15 agencies. It is not sufficient merely to strengthen the office of the DCI. This has been tried several times over many years, and has failed because the DCI still lacks control over money and people. He cannot institute change, and thus focuses his attention on the single agency he does control: the CIA. This status quo means competitive analysis will remain stunted; agencies will be shut out of the process; group-think will remain the norm.<snip>

[ewagner]

1. I fell like we're being suckered here........

You know that feeling? Like when you're walking down the midway at a carnival and a "barker" tells you to come in and see the three-headed man......you know you're being taken for a ride.

I don't think there were any "intelligence failures" I think the professionals inside both the FBI and CIA had a pretty good handle on what was going on...Richard Clarke knew...and supposedly even Tenet was "running around with his hair on fire." It wasn't the intelligence community that failed; it was the decision makers in the administration. Condi Rice thought the August 6 PDB was "historical in nature". Cheney was put in charge of terrorism and never held one meeting. Richard Clarke's requests for a "principals meeting" went unheeded.

On the WMD issue, there is so much evidence that the true calculations made by the intelligence community were dismissed in favor of stove-piped information from the OSP and Doug Feith's operation. Cheney himself made multiple trips to the CIA to "jawbone" the intelligence estimates. Even Newt Gingrich was allowed into the CIA inner sanctum in order to shape the intelligence to meet the Administration's requirements.

Intelligence didn't fail unless you consider that Tenet allowed himself to be manipulated by the Administration.

So?

If it's not broke; don't fix it!

Creation of a new intelligence bureaucracy may not help us but, instead, unnecessarily hinder us in rapid response to real threats.

I think we're being suckered. I just feel it.