U.S. in Vietnam or Soviet Union in Afghanistan?

[oostevo]

U.S. in Vietnam or Soviet Union in Afghanistan?
I'm no modern history expert, but, to me, our occupation of Iraq seems more like the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan rather than the U.S. occupation of Vietnam, even though everyone seems to want to compare Iraq to Vietnam.

Are they doing this because people can relate to U.S. involvement in Vietnam better than they can relate to Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, or is the Vietnam comparison really the more valid?

[unblock]

1. maybe more like britain in the american colonies.

they were a superpower but could not quell the rebels.

[F.Gordon]

2. I like the Soviet Union in Afghanistan

...an old link worth re-reading once in awhile...

The Soviet concept for military occupation of Afghanistan was based on the following:

* stabilizing the country by garrisoning the main routes, major cities, airbases and logistics sites;
* relieving the Afghan government forces of garrison duties and pushing them into the countryside to battle the resistance;
* providing logistic, air, artillery and intelligence support to the Afghan forces; providing minimum interface between the Soviet occupation forces and the local populace;
* accepting minimal Soviet casualties; and,
* strengthening the Afghan forces, so once the resistance was defeated, the Soviet Army could be withdrawn.

...and...

Lessons learned

Modern, mechanized forces are still in peril when committed to fight guerrillas in the middle of a civil war on rugged terrain. The Soviet-Afghanistan war demonstrated that:

A guerrilla war is not a war of technology versus peasantry. Rather, it is a contest of endurance and national will. The side with the greatest moral commitment (ideological, religious or patriotic) will hold the ground at the end of the conflict. Battlefield victory can be almost irrelevant, since victory is often determined by morale, obstinacy and survival.

Secure logistics and secure lines of communication are essential for the guerrilla and non-guerrilla force. Security missions, however, can tie up most of a conventional force.

Weapons systems, field gear, communications equipment and transport which are designed for conventional war will often work less effectively or fail completely on rugged terrain.

Tactics for conventional war will not work against guerrillas. Forces need to be reequipped, restructured and retrained for fighting guerrillas or for fighting as guerrillas. The most effective commbatants are light infantry.

Tanks have a limited utility for the counter-guerrilla force, but can serve as an effective reserve on the right terrain. Infantry fighting vehicles and helicopters can play an important role in mobility and fire support. Mechanized forces usually fight effectively only when dismounted and when using their carriers for support or as a maneuver reserve. Ample engineer troops are essential for both side.

Field sanitation, immunization and preventive medicine are of paramount importance in less-than-optimal sanitary conditions. Immediate medical support to wounded combatants is often hard to provide.

Journalists and television cameramen are key players in guerrilla warfare. The successful struggle can be effectively aided when championed by a significant portion of the world's press.

Logistics determines the scope of activity and size of force either side can field.

Unity of command is very important, yet sometimes impossible to achieve.

Domination of the air is irrelevant unless airpower can be precisely targetted. Seizure of terrain can be advantageous, but is usually only of temporary value. Control of the cities can be a plus, but can also prove a detriment. Support of the population is essential for the winning side.

http://www.bdg.minsk.by/cegi/N2/Afg/Waraf.htm

...eerie comparisons...

[Viking12]

3. Israel in Lebanon

only with more casualties.