We had two major chances to do something constructive. One was to listen to the 1000 anti-Taliban leaders who were adamantly opposed to a bombing campaign in the first place. The second was to let the damn Loya Jirga pick the candidate they wanted, instead of imposing Karzai on them. The arrogant imperial jackasses had to insist on doing it their way instead.
http://www.nadir.org/nadir/initiativ/agp/free/9-11/warafghanistan.htm Those who disagree can therefore be dismissed, among them, for example,
the 1000 Afghan leaders who met in Peshawar in late October in a U.S.-backed effort to lay the groundwork for a post-Taliban regime led by the exiled King. They bitterly condemned the U.S. war, which is "beating the donkey rather than the rider," one speaker said to unanimous agreement. The extent to which anti-Taliban Afghan opinion was ignored is rather striking -- and not at all unusual; during the Gulf war, for example, Iraqi dissidents were excluded from press and journals, apart from "alternative media," though they were readily accessible. Without eliciting comment, Washington maintained its long-standing official refusal to have any dealings with the Iraqi opposition even well after the war ended.(20) In the present case, Afghan opinion is not as easily assessed, but the task would not have been impossible, and the issue is of such evident significance that it merits at least a few comments.
We might begin with the gathering of Afghan leaders in Peshawar, some exiles, some who trekked across the border from within Afghanistan, all committed to overthrowing the Taliban regime. It was "a rare display of unity among tribal elders, Islamic scholars, fractious politicians, and former guerrilla commanders," the New York Times reported. They unanimously "urged the U.S. to stop the air raids," appealed to the international media to call for an end to the "bombing of innocent people," and "demanded an end to the U.S. bombing of Afghanistan." They urged that other means be adopted to overthrow the hated Taliban regime, a goal they believed could be achieved without slaughter and destruction.(21)
Reported, but dismissed without further comment.
A similar message was conveyed by Afghan opposition leader Abdul Haq, who condemned the air attacks as a "terrible mistake."(22) Highly regarded in Washington, Abdul Haq was considered to be "perhaps the most important leader of anti-Taliban opposition among Afghans of Pashtun nationality based in Pakistan."(23)
His advice was to "avoid bloodshed as much as possible"; instead of bombing, "we should undermine the central leadership, which is a very small and closed group and which is also the only thing which holds them all together. If they are destroyed, every Taliban fighter will pick up his gun and his blanket and disappear back home, and that will be the end of the Taliban," an assessment that seems rather plausible in the light of subsequent events.
Several weeks later, Abdul Haq entered Afghanistan, apparently without U.S. support, and was captured and killed.
As he was undertaking this mission "to create a revolt within the Taliban," he criticized the U.S. for refusing to aid him and others in such endeavors, and condemned the bombing as "a big setback for these efforts." He reported contacts with second-level Taliban commanders and ex-Mujahidin tribal elders, and discussed how further efforts could proceed, calling on the U.S. to assist them with funding and other support instead of undermining them with bombs. The U.S., Abdul Haq said, is trying to show its muscle, score a victory and scare everyone in the world. They don't care about the suffering of the Afghans or how many people we will lose. And we don't like that
. Because Afghans are now being made to suffer for these Arab fanatics, but we all know who brought these Arabs to Afghanistan in the 1980s, armed them and gave them a base. It was the Americans and the CIA. And the Americans who did this all got medals and good careers, while all these years Afghans suffered from these Arabs and their allies. Now, when America is attacked, instead of punishing the Americans who did this, it punishes the Afghans. 20. For review, see my Deterring Democracy (New York: Hill & Wang, 1992, 2nd edition), "Afterword."
21. Barry Bearak, "Leaders of the Old Afghanistan Prepare for the New," NYT, Oct. 25. John Thornhill and Farhan Bokhari, "Traditional leaders call for peace jihad," FT, Oct. 25; "Afghan peace assembly call," FT, Oct. 26. John Burns, "Afghan Gathering in Pakistan Backs Future Role for King," NYT, Oct. 26; Indira Laskhmanan, "1,000 Afghan leaders discuss a new regime," BG, Oct. 25, 26, 2001.
22. Barry Bearak, NYT, Oct. 27, 2001.
23. Anatol Lieven, "Voices from the Region: Interview with Commander Abdul Haq," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, posted Oct. 15. See Lieven, Guardian, Nov. 2, 2001. Quotes below from this interview.
http://threehegemons.tripod.com/threehegemonsblog/id54.htmlThe Warlords Win in Kabul
By OMAR ZAKHILWAL and ADEENA NIAZI
KABUL, Afghanistan — On the final night of the loya jirga, more than 1,500 delegates gathered for the unveiling of the new cabinet. Our hearts sank when we heard President Hamid Karzai pronounce one name after another. A woman activist turned to us in disbelief:
"This is worse than our worst expectations. The warlords have been promoted and the professionals kicked out. Who calls this democracy?" Interim government ministers with civilian rather than military credentials were dismissed. Mr. Karzai did not announce the minister for women's affairs, prompting speculation that Sima Samar, the popular current minister in that post, will be removed once international attention shifts elsewhere.
As the loya jirga folded its tent, we met with frustration and anger in the streets. "Why did you legitimize an illegitimate government?" one Kabul resident asked us.
The truth is, we didn't. While the Bonn agreement and the rules of the loya jirga entitled us to choose the next government freely
, we delegates were denied anything more than a symbolic role in the selection process. A small group of Northern Alliance chieftains led by the Panjshiris decided everything behind closed doors and then dispatched Mr. Karzai to give us the bad news This sentiment quickly grew into a grass-roots movement supporting the former king, Mohammed Zahir Shah, as head of state.
The vast majority of us viewed him as the only leader with enough popular support and independence to stand up to the warlords. But our democratic effort to nominate Zahir Shah did not please the powers that be. As a result, the entire loya jirga was postponed for almost two days while the former king was strong-armed into renouncing any meaningful role in the government.
After that announcement, the atmosphere at the loya jirga changed radically. The gathering was now teeming with intelligence agents who openly threatened reform-minded delegates, especially women. Access to the microphone was controlled so that supporters of the interim government dominated the proceedings. Fundamentalist leaders branded critics of the warlords as traitors to Islam and circulated a petition denouncing Women's Affairs Minister Samar as "Afghanistan's Salman Rushdie."
For a view from women who risked their lives teaching women to read clandestinely under the Taliban, see--
http://rawa.fancymarketing.net/testiomny.htm