Hussein regime left only dregs to lead his army
By Risa Brooks. Risa Brooks is a political science professor at Northwestern University. Her research on Arab militaries includes studies published by Rand Corp. and the London-based International Ins
Published June 27, 2004
As the political transition in Iraq approaches, hopes are being raised that the U.S. may finally begin to free itself from the obligations of occupation. Most important, the transition raises the prospect that U.S. forces might be coming home--if not immediately, then in the not-too-distant future. This, of course, presumes that someday soon Iraqi national security forces will begin to take over security from U.S. and coalition forces.
The unfortunate reality is that Iraqi authorities are going to face tremendous obstacles in doing this. Despite recent efforts to increase recruitment and training for Iraq's forces, these soldiers and militiamen are very far from forming a competent and effective organization. The friends and relatives of American service men and women should be warned: Given the history of the Iraqi armed forces, it is unlikely that Americans' loved ones will be home for good anytime soon.As everyone knows, Saddam Hussein's regime ruled mostly through coercion and repression. It relied heavily on force to keep people in line. Iraqis were imprisoned on the minor suspicion of conspiracy. Rare uprisings were quashed ruthlessly. In fact, so effective was the threat of force that its overt use was rarely witnessed.snip--------- check out these paras, sound familiar anyone?
To do that, Iraq's political leadership used tactics common in authoritarian militaries. The regime promoted political lackeys rather than skilled and talented leaders who might compete with Hussein for his soldiers' loyalties. It resisted delegating authority to junior officers so that those officers could not become a threat. It encouraged fights and suspicions within the security forces and the conventional military to prevent them from conspiring.
These methods worked: Hussein ruled for more than two decades. But they also eroded the skill and competence of the officer corps. They poisoned the culture within the armed forces. These were not organizations respectful of merit, let alone human rights and civil liberties. They did not reward critical thinking or honest appraisals of their capabilities and strategic situations. Many of the methods instead discouraged independent action and thought.more (free sunscription req'd.)------->
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