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I'm sure that the Al Qaeda is well versed in operational security. Basically that means knowing what plans and names and locations and so that every cell member knows, and then knowing when a cell member is compromised. Once compromised, the organization takes steps to isolate the members and operational plans now known to the opposition.
So, by our "outing" the information gleaned from some set of arrests, all that does is confirm what Al Qaeda must believe, as part of its operational doctrine, the any information in the hands of a compromised cell member is now in the hands of their enemies.
We should publish ALL of the information that we have, first to remove doubts about the motives of this administration, and second, to tell Al Qaeda what they want to have confirmed, namely the limit of the damage done... it follows that if we have compromised sources NOT known to be compromised, that information should NEVER, NOT EVER be told to the enemy.
Famous example... I believe that England knew, through their use of Ultra code breaking, that Coventry England was to be bombed. However, to have done anything about it, like evacuate or stop the raid, would have told the Germans that their encryption was compromised. Churchill decided to sacrifice many people to keep the secret (which, in the long run, saved many more lives by letting the Allies read German codes throughout the war). It was a very tough thing to do...
Conversely, there isn't any reason not to tell the entire world all of the details about what was found on someones computer or through interrogations. Even if all we are doing is confirming what disinformation might be planted that way, the enemy can never be SURE that this is all that we know.
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