Riverside County, California impedes court-ordered voting system observation
Black Box Voting Consumer Report Sept 13 2004
Riverside County's tactics would do a Communist country proud.
When Republican candidate Linda Soubirous asked for a recount, she requested 44 items to audit the election. Riverside denied 39 of them, including a denial of her right to compare the internal flash memory of the touch-screen voting machines with the votes that showed up on the WinEDS Central Tabulator. (for another story on Central Tabulator vulnerability, click here:
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/78)
Riverside's refusal was of particular importance, for two reasons: 1) The main argument that touch-screen proponents make, claiming their machines can be audited, is that you can pull the flash memory inside the machine to compare it with the tally. Soubirous' case was the first in which a candidate actually asked to do that; her request was denied.
2) During the counting of the election, on two occasions, employees of the vendor were observed to access the central tabulator. On the second occasion, the employee uploaded something from a card in his pocket, but refused to allow anyone to look at the card, and then left the state with it. (See Black Box Voting Consumer Report on this incident:
http://www.blackboxvoting.org/?q=node/view/27)
With the help of attorney Greg Luke, and some support from the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Soubirous took the issue to court. A judge allowed her to get a look at the touch-screen flash memory, and also said her group could observe as the data from the touch-screens was backed up.
According to programmer Jeremiah Akin, one of the leading voting integrity advocates focusing on Sequoia Voting Systems, the process of observation was a sham.
"They allowed only one person in the room. I was told to stand between tape marks," he said.
Akin asked Riverside to demonstrate that the cartridges were empty before Riverside transferred results for Soubirous' election onto them.
Riverside refused to demonstrate that the cards were not preloaded with data, saying it would take too long. Riverside then responded that he was not allowed to ask questions.
Then Akin attempted to watch the data transfer process -- but the county had positioned the computers so that the backs were facing the person standing in the taped area, so he could not view the screens.
Akin was not able to see most of the screens at all. He did glimpse a portion of one screen, with glare from the lights on it, making it difficult to see. (Note to future observers: Show up with binoculars and a periscope.)
What Akin did manage to see on the screen was curious: They were transferring from the touch-screen voting machines to a pair of laptops, to a "z" drive, a designation typically reserved for networks. If data was transferring through a network, anyone could be anywhere -- including in another room -- superimposing their own information onto the data.
"There is no valid reason to use a network for this task," says Akin, explaining that it was an unnecessary step that took up more time and introduced points of failure into the process.
It was not possible to track the data by following the cartridge through the process. Cartridges were pulled, stacked, mixed around, put out of eyesight, and uploaded onto computers whose screens could not be observed.
When allowing other observers to enter, the original observer was told to leave the room, leaving the process unobserved for a portion of time.
The next observer was then allowed to stand in between tape marks, stare at backs of computers, and ask no questions.
# # # # #Next Black Box Voting public event: Sept 22 in Washington, DC, demonstrations of the GEMS central tabulator hack.
Best,
Bev Harris