New 9/11 Timelines Entries for October

[KJF]

As you may have noticed, the 9/11 Timeline has switched from a system of big updates to putting out entries in dribs and drabs, usually, say, 20-30 a week or so, to which I make a very, very modest contribution. Over 100 new entries were added in October, in addition to lots of alterations to old ones. To find the new entries, just go to the site:
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/project.jsp?project=911_project
and click on the "Recently Added Events" button near the top. The last 100 events added can be displayed.

This is my selection of a few representative and interesting new entries for October:

March 6, 2000 and After: Numerous CIA Officers Learn Hijacker Is in US; Fail to Inform FBI
After the CIA learns that hijacker Khalid Almihdhar has a US visa (see January 2-5, 2000) and hijacker Nawaf Alhazmi has arrived in Los Angeles (see March 5, 2000), operational documents reporting this are accessed by numerous CIA officers, most of whom are in the Counterterrorism Division. However, it is unclear what is done with this information as CIA Director George Tenet and Counterterrorism Center Director Cofer Black will later incorrectly testify that nobody read the cable stating Alhazmi had entered the US (see October 17, 2002), so the use to which the information is put is never investigated. In addition, the CIA fails to inform the FBI that the al-Qaeda operative has entered the US. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 182>
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency, Nawaf Alhazmi

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a030600numerouscialearn#a030600numerouscialearn


Between February 23, 2001 and June 2001: Germans Monitor Call Between Moussaoui and Bin Al-Shibh
While Zacarias Moussaoui is living in Norman, Oklahoma, and getting flight training there, he makes a phone call to Germany that is monitored by German intelligence. The call is to Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who is intimately involved in the 9/11 plot and has been a roommate of hijackers Mohamed Atta and Marwan Alshehhi. Bin al-Shibh stayed in London for a week in early December 2000 and met with Moussaoui there (see October 2000-February 2001). Phone records further indicate that there was at least one phone call between Moussaoui and the landlord of the Hamburg apartment where Mohamed Atta and other 9/11 hijackers lived. But the timing of the call has not been revealed, nor is it known if that call was monitored as well or not.

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a022101calltohamburg#a022101calltohamburg


July 5, 2001: Ashcroft Is Warned of Imminent, Multiple Attacks from Al-Qaeda
The CIA briefs Attorney General Ashcroft on the al-Qaeda threat. He is warned that a significant attack is imminent, preparations for multiple attacks are in the late stages or already complete, and that little additional warning can be expected. The briefing addresses only threats outside the US. He was also briefed by the CIA on the al-Qaeda threat on May 15, 2001. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 258-259, 534> One week later, the FBI will brief him about the al-Qaeada threat in the US and he will reportedly reply, “I do not want to hear about this anymore” (see July 12, 2001). By the end of July, he will stop flying commercial aircraft in the US (see July 26, 2001).
Entity Tags: John Ashcroft, al-Qaeda

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a070501ashcroftwarned#a070501ashcroftwarned


5:43 a.m.: Hijackers Check in at Portland Airport; Atta Becomes Angry with Ticket Agent
Mohamed Atta and Abdulaziz Alomari check in at the US Airways counter at Portland International Jetport Airport. They are wearing ties and jackets. Atta checks in two bags, Alomari none. Atta is randomly selected for additional security scrutiny by the FAA’s Computer Assisted Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) (see (6:20 a.m.-7:48 a.m.)). However, the only consequence is that his checked bags will be held off the plane until it is confirmed that he has boarded. <9/11 Commission, 7/24/2004, pp. 1; 9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 2 ; CNN, 3/3/2006> Noting that their flight is soon due to leave, the ticket agent who checks them in, Michael Tuohey, says, “You’re cutting it close.” Tuohey thinks the pair seems unusual. He notices they both have $2,500 first-class, one-way tickets. He later comments, “You don’t see many of those.” Atta looks “like a walking corpse. He looked so angry.” In contrast, Tuohey says, Alomari can barely speak English and has “a goofy smile, I can’t believe he knew he was going to die that day.” Tuohey will later recount, “I thought they looked like two Arab terrorists but then I berated myself for the stereotype and did nothing.” Atta becomes angry when Tuohey informs him he will have to check in again in Boston. He complains that he was assured he would have a “one-step check-in.” <9/11 Commission, 8/26/2004, pp. 2 ; Associated Press, 3/7/2005> Tuohey will be recalled to work later in the day to speak to an FBI agent about his encounter with Atta and Alomari. He is shown video footage of them passing through the airport’s security checkpoint upstairs (see (Between 5:45 a.m. and 5:53 a.m.)). Although recognizing the two men, he notices that in the video they are no longer wearing the jackets and ties they’d had on when checking in just minutes before. He assumes they must have taken these off and tucked them into their carry-on baggage. He is also informed that the security camera behind his own desk, which should have captured the two hijackers, has in fact been out of order for some time.
Entity Tags: Portland International Jetport Airport

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a543portlandcheckin#a543portlandcheckin


July 2003: Bin Laden Hunt Frustrated Because Equipment Is in Iraq
Lt. Gen. John R. Vines, commander of US troops in Afghanistan at this time, will later complain that an opportunity to kill bin Laden is lost due to a lack of the right equipment. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) like the Predator are in short supply due to the war in Iraq. Vines receives intelligence that bin Laden is on the move and can take one of three routes. However, there is only one UAV to send. Vines will later recall, “A UAV was positioned on the route that was most likely, but he didn’t go that way. We believed that we were within a half-hour of possibly getting him, but nothing materialized.”
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden

http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a0703nodrones#a0703nodrones