http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/062104c1.htm"The most frustrating after-the-fact scenario for me to understand and to explain is the communication link on that morning between the FAA operations center and the NMCC," said Monte Belger, who was the acting FAA deputy administrator when the attacks occurred. "I know how it's supposed to work, but I have to tell you it's still a little frustrating for me to understand how it actually did work on that day."
FAA and Defense officials testified during the final public hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States on Thursday. Belger said the FAA initiated a "hijacking net" at 9:20 a.m. that he thought included the NMCC.
"The hijacking net is an open communication net run by the FAA hijack coordinator, who is a senior person from the FAA security organization, for the purpose of getting the affected federal agencies together to hear information at the same time," he said.
"It was my assumption that morning, as it had been for my 30 years of experience with the FAA, that the NMCC was on that net and hearing everything real time," he added. "And I can tell you I've lived through dozens of hijackings in my 30-year FAA career, as a very low entry-level inspector up through to the headquarters, and they were always there."
http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0604/061704c1.htmThe timeline the commission lays out is different from the one previously given by Defense officials. Because they were so different, the commission called Defense officials to testify again. Retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold, who commanded the Continental U.S. NORAD Region when the attacks happened, said the commission had helped him understand the facts of the timeline. Arnold testified in May 2003, but gave information that the commission has since found to be incorrect.
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In some cases, communication between agencies and officials broke down at critical moments. For example, the military command center could not patch the FAA into a secure teleconference. The FAA, on the other hand, thought it had a communications link established with NMCC through the FAA's "hijack net," only to learn later that the link did not exist.
"We found no evidence that, at this critical time, during the morning of Sept. 11, NORAD's top commanders, in Florida or Cheyenne Mountain, ever coordinated with their counterparts at FAA headquarters to improve situational awareness and organize a common response," the report states.
Additionally, President Bush--who was in Florida when the attacks began and then boarded Air Force One--could not maintain a steady communications link with NMCC. Bush, who testified privately before the commission in April, told the panel he gave an order that military aircraft could fire on aircraft that did not respond, the report said.. That order, however, was never passed to fighter pilots over Washington and New York City because a NORAD commander and a weapons director were unsure how the pilots would, or should, proceed with the order, the report states.