CENTCOM report Details Iraq Chaos in 1999

[MiaCulpa]

Of the many complaints regarding the Iraq war -- even among its proponents -- has been the apparent lack of planning for a post-Saddam Iraq. As it turns out, according to previously classified documents released through the FOIA, nothing could be further from the truth. There was a very detailed plan, with a target number of 400,000 US troops for the invasion, that still predicted horrific consequences, but was not reviewed by those involved in the planning of the invasion of Iraq. CENTCOM was led in a series of war games in 1999 called 'Desert Crossing' by Marine General Anthony Zinni (ret.) to assess the outcome of deposing Saddam Hussein, to be used in producing an after-action report. As detailed as the CENTCOM report is, it was still believed that more study and planning would be needed for either the possibility of a U.S. led invasion of Iraq, or a U.S. response to any military crisis involving Iraq after both the best-case scenario, and worst-case scenario war games.

Eerily similar to actual events in Iraq were the predicted rival forces competing for power leading to instability, and periods of widespread bloodshed.

Hotly debated was the likelihood of Iraq attempting to use WMD's against the U.S. , or any other nation, and the clear need to develop responses for various case scenarios, such as Iraqi use of WMD's on a non-ally neighbor in order to determine the appropriate scale, scope and nature of a U.S. response.

Also anticipated was the exacerbation of hostilities with Iran due to a pro-western governement in Baghdad. Management of Iran was deemed 'critical' to the success of the mission, with discussion of lifting sanctions against Tehran in hopes of improving the relationship with the United States.

A democratic government in Iraq was believed not feasible, and that the U.S. might have to instead settle for assisting other Middle Eastern governments in creating a transitional government for Iraq.

Zinni made his opposition to the war widely known before the invasion, and had strong cautions for the current administration in a keynote address at the Middle East Institute in October of 2002:

"In a keynote address striking for its critical assessment of the Bush administration, Zinni stressed the need to get the Israeli-Palestinian peace process back on track, build a broad coalition against Iraq, create trust among allies in the region -- and put Saddam Hussein's threat in perspective.

He also took issue with hawks in and around the administration who downplay the importance of Arab sentiment in the region. "I'm not sure which planet they live on," Zinni said, "because it isn't the one that I travel." And he challenged their suggestion that installing a new Iraqi government will not be especially difficult. "God help us," he said, "if we think this transition will occur easily."

Following his speech, in an exchange moderated by former U.S. ambassador to Israel Edward Walker, Zinni answered questions from the audience. In that session he was even more pointed as he discussed the possible consequences of an attack on Iraq and why war should always be used only as a last resort."


Zinni himself called CENTCOM when it became apparent that the invasion was imminent and suggested they get out the 'Desert Crossing' reports. He was told they never heard of the plan, and that the Pentagon would handle all of the planning.

With the initial problem in Iraq accurately anticipated as one of security even with the war games predicted need of 400,000 troops for the best of outcomes under the anticipated conditions and report recommendations of Desert Crossing, the invasion began in '03 with Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld approving a mere 160,000 troops.

http://miaculpa.blogspot.com/2006/11/desert-crossing.html