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Senate, December 13, 1995:
Mr. HATCH. I thank you, Mr. President.
Many of us in this body believed we had to act. While we accepted that we could not make a persuasive case that U.S. troops needed to enforce or protect a vital interest, we believed that the world's remaining superpower had the power, the means, and the moral responsibility, to act.
We voted, again and again, to lift the immoral arms embargo on the young Bosnian state, which was largely unarmed, and was the target of the barbarians of `ethnic cleansing.'
This summer, we passed legislation, with a strong bipartisan 69 votes, to lift the embargo.
The Administration, proclaiming concern for the Bosnians, argued that lifting the arms embargo would cause the Serbs to attack the eastern enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica. For this grotesquely false reason--a reason bloodily refuted by the massacres in Srebrenica that occurred anyway--the Administration argued that we could not let the victims defend themselves. The Administration argued--again and again--that lifting the embargo would spread the war and would require the use of thousands of U.S. forces to extract the U.N. and allied forces. And so, the Administration argued that lifting the embargo was not an acceptable course of action.
Now, less than a month after the signing of the Dayton Accord, the Administration is deploying United States troops to Bosnia to implement the military annex of that accord.
There is a temporary truce in Bosnia. The killing has mostly stopped. The ethnic cleansing has not. And, the administration believes, most sincerely, that the deployment of the NATO Implementation Force, now known as IFOR, will, in the words of President Clinton, `help create a secure environment so that the people of Bosnia can return to their homes, vote in free elections, and begin to rebuild their lives.' The administration expects this to take approximately 1 year.
Mr. President, I respect the President's prerogative in foreign policy. I believe this is a principle we must respect if we are to convey the proper influence and power of this great Nation overseas. I supported this principle under previous Presidents, and I strongly objected when the Members of the opposing party in this body sought to frustrate Presidents Reagan and Bush.
I was disappointed when this body passed the resolution supporting President Bush's decision to deploy to Iraq by merely 52 votes. We had a clear vital interest at stake then. And, had we waited, we now know that our troops would have been subject to the weapons of mass destruction Saddam Hussein was on the verge of using.
Mr. President, I respect the principle of the President's prerogative in making foreign policy, but I have grave reservations--grave reservations--about the Bosnia policy on which the President is embarking.
But, I wish to make one point exceedingly clear: I believe that the Congress must show our support for the U.S. military. This Senator will always support American troops abroad.
I have recently learned that a Utah reserve unit will be among those troops deployed to this region, and several other Utah reservists have been put on alert. There is no way that this Senator will not do anything and everything to make sure that those troops have the backing they need in terms of equipment and materiel and moral support for what they do to serve our country's objectives.
But, appreciation and support for how well our troops carry out our policy does not mean we cannot question the policy itself as well as engage in some retrospective about U.S. policy.
I wish the President had taken a different approach on Bosnia 3 years ago. Candidate Clinton said he would lift the arms embargo. As I have said, I believe it was immoral to maintain an arms embargo against Bosnia while it was subjected to slaughter by a heavily armed Yugoslavia. I must say that, with his record, there is a credibility question when the President asserts it is the `right' thing to now send troops to Bosnia.
I believe that the Atlantic alliance is the most successful military alliance in the history of the world. The major democracies of the world held together throughout the cold war, and Europe remained secure. The world is still a dangerous place after the cold war, and I believe that NATO must remain relevant. I support the enlargement of the alliance, because I believe the alliance promotes political values as well as enforces security, and I wish to support the democracies of central Europe.
But NATO's credibility has suffered greatly during the Bosnia debacle. Tied by the dual key with the United Nations, the greatest military alliance was ineffective while genocide occurred. NATO stood by while cities and towns were shelled, while humanitarian convoys were turned back, while helicopters violated a no-fly zone. A NATO F-16 was shot out of the sky this summer by Serbs using Russian military hardware.
The Administration argues that NATO credibility is at stake. But I must ask: What happens if the I-For goes to Bosnia, and, after 1 year and the departure of I-For, the parties return to war? Will NATO be more credible for having gone to Bosnia with great fanfare, but having returned without success, or worse, with casualties we cannot justify?
This administration proclaims that this is a chance for peace in Bosnia. I do not doubt the President's sincerity. And I do not doubt that the administration is motivated by noble notions. I fear, however, that its ideals are immature.
Peace is not the absence of conflict, Mr. President. We will always have conflict. Peace, I believe, is the management of conflict, the management of conflict so that it does not escalate into violence and war.
And, when I look at the Dayton Accord, Mr. President, and the record of this administration, I fear that many issues about managing the conflict remain unaddressed.
The administration has spoken about a clear exit strategy, partly because we in the Congress have demanded it. But if we do not have a vision of how to manage the conflict after our mission expires, I see very little reason to go in at all. We need a post-exit strategy, Mr. President, and I've heard very little of one.
A post-exit strategy--and the success of the I-For mission--depends on a number of factors. I believe these include, but are not limited to: First, ensuring that the Bosnian Serbs do not pursue territorial gains beyond those they have won in this ignominious partition known as the Dayton Accord; second, completing the agreement between Croatia and Serbia over Eastern
Slavonia; third, building and maintaining a cooperative relationship between the Bosnians and the Croatians; and, most importantly, fourth, maintaining the political and military viability of the Bosnian state.
Elements within the Bosnian Serbs have been proclaiming against the Dayton Accord since the day they were signed. Demonstrations have been staged almost every day. Are we to proceed while these rogue elements threaten, with arms, to ignore the accord?
The administration tells us that it will rely on President Milosevic of Serbia to control these elements. President Milosevic has been very cooperative and effective, we are told.
President Milosevic, I recall, was the instigator of the war against Bosnia and has reneged on his promises on numerous occasions over the past 4 years. Perhaps Milosevic has converted--and I believe in conversion--but I have doubts about the sincerity of those who convert after a mild NATO bombing campaign.
Mr. President, I still do not know what the administration intends to do if our U.S. forces are subject to mortar attacks from rogue elements.
For example, if we're attacked from a populated area by rogue elements that move freely within it, how will we respond? With a phone call to Belgrade? How does President Clinton plan to hold President Milosevic accountable for keeping the Bosnian Serbs in line with the accord?
I am also greatly concerned about the agreement between Croatia and Serbia over eastern Slavonia. We should recall the brutal occupation of that Croatian territory. We should recall the pictures of the city of Vukovar, left a smoking rubble by the Serbs, complete with mass graves.
Since then the Serbian Army has occupied the area, cleansed it, and extracted its natural resources. The Croats and Serbs signed an agreement just before the Dayton Accord to return eastern Slavonia to Croatia. The agreement allows for 1 year to revert the territory to Croatia, but it has a 1 year extension clause, to be exercised by either party.
The implementation of the international force to monitor the territory is already stalling. I predict here that the Serbs will ask for that 1 year extension; and, 1 year from now, Eastern Slavonia will still be occupied by the forces of Belgrade.
It is a powder keg. If we do not ensure the peaceful transfer of that occupied territory, there will be a war within 2 years, and that war will spread to Bosnia, and the I-For mission, with its casualties, will have been for naught.
Mr. President, I am deeply concerned that the administration has not focused on this issue.
Mr. President, we need to do more to strengthen the ties begun with the Washington Agreement last year to build the Croat-Muslim relationship.
I have little expectation that the Serbian entity will ever participate in the unitary government of Bosnia-Hercegovina. But without the Croats and Muslims cooperating, Mr. President, we may end up participating in a three-way partition conducted by ethnic cleansing.
Since the beginning of this war, I have argued for a policy of lift-and-strike. Lift the arms embargo on Bosnia and Croatia, and allow them to defend themselves against Serbian aggression. Use air power to dissuade the aggressors while the victims arm themselves.
We saw a version of lift-and-strike this summer, when the Croatian Army, strong again, recaptured the Krajina and coordinated with the Bosnians to deliver military defeats to the Serbs. Our NATO forces went into the skies in August and September to force the Serbs to accept a choice: more military defeats or a negotiated settlement. Lift-and-strike worked, Mr. President, as we said it would.
Lift-and-strike was posited on the premise that a balance of power on the ground would effect a real peace, a peace based on the cessation of violence through deterrence.
Now that the President has decided to deploy the I-For, I believe that it is essential that we ensure that Bosnia is able to defend itself. That, Mr. President, is the only way that we can guarantee that the Bosnians shall not be subject to more ethnic cleansing, to more deadly attacks--unless we plan to keep I-For there forever.
Mr. President, if we are not absolutely dedicated to arming the Bosnian Government, we should be realistic enough to know that the war will reignite shortly after IFOR departs. And then, Mr. President, we'll ask, what was the point? For what did NATO expend its credibility? For what did America risk its sons and daughters? A decent interval to another war is not an acceptable answer, Mr. President.
So 5 years before the end of this bloody century, we debate again sending our troops to Europe. We didn't need to come to this point. The Dayton Accord is abstract, the realities on the ground brutal and complicated. We didn't need to come to this point.
But America has given its word, and credibility of that word, we are told, is at stake. Let me preface my final comments by saying that I am equally concerned about America's standing abroad and about maintaining our leadership in NATO.
But, our credibility is more threatened, I believe, by pursuing a mission with guaranteed casualties and uncertain goals, than it is by telling our allies now that we do not support this policy, this deployment, and that we will arm the Bosnians until they can defend themselves.
But if this policy will be implemented--and already our troops are arriving in Bosnia--we must try to improve it. If we are to effect any positive influence here, Mr. President, we must insist that we arm the Bosnian government so that when we leave, we are not a few steps ahead of the next conflagration.
Therefore, Mr. President, I support the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution opposing the President's decision to deploy, but strongly support the Dole-McCain resolution commending U.S. troops and setting conditions for the deployment which, I hope, will increase the possibility that this mission will not have been a waste of blood, treasure, and, yes, credibility.
Mr. President, I commend the majority leader for his statesmanship in recognizing that President Clinton is our President, that he does have a right to put these troops there, a constitutional right, and once they are there, we have an obligation, as patriots, to stand with them and to help them.
So I will support the Dole-McCain resolution, but I also support the Hutchison-Inhofe resolution as well.
Mr. President, this is a serious thing. I have been over that land. I have been over that territory. I have met with people on all sides of these issues. I have read the histories of the last 600 years of that area. And I have to tell you, I think putting our young people there is a tragic mistake. But once they are there, I am going to do everything in my power to support them.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous
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