Fasten your seatbelts: It's time to bring this thing in for a landing
original at
http://www.bbvforums.org/cgi-bin/forums/board-auth.cgi?file=/1954/14296.html Posted on Thursday, November 17, 2005 - 02:50 pm:
Two testing labs in Huntsville, Alabama need to be visited by people
with badges, guns and search warrants. The small offshoot office of
Ciber Labs, run by Shawn Southworth, and the Wyle Labs office which
has been supervised by Jim Dearman, are responsible for repeatedly
certifying defective voting machines that violate Federal Election
Commission standards.
1. New California report confirms that a security problem identified
by Harri Hursti affects both touch-screens and optical scans – Diebold
Election Systems' whole product line.
2. Records obtained by Black Box Voting show that Diebold executives
lied to the Arizona Secretary of State, the Cuyahoga County Board of
Elections, and to hundreds of elections officials throughout the U.S.
about the existence of specific defects.
<snip>
This is a government boondoggle. It won't be solved by being
politically correct.
PERMISSION TO REPRINT GRANTED, WITH LINK TO
http://www.blackboxvoting.org Jim March
BBV Citizen Watchdog
Username: Jimmarch
Post Number: 61
Registered: 01-2005
Best of Black Box? N/A
Votes: 0 (A keeper?)Posted on Thursday, November 17, 2005 - 05:39 pm:
Let's clarify something regarding the absentee ballot processing on
any Diebold system (optical scan county or touchscreen county):
Since mid-2003, Bev Harris has been pointing out the easy
"hackability' of the GEMS central tabulator database: how it can be
hand-edited with a standard copy of MS-Access. We later learned that
it doesn't even take Access present to do it - somebody who knows what
they're doing can type a quick Visual Basic script or Java script in
plain ol' Notepad as Dr. Thompson showed.
Diebold's response has always been "yeah, but then the results in GEMS
won't match the end-of-day tapes at each polling place". And it's true
that both optical scan and touchscreen terminals produce a "results
printout" on cash-register-type-paper showing how many votes were
taken in for each candidate and/or issue. The list looks a bit like:
PRESIDENT
Bush: 46
Kerry: 50
Proposition X:
Yes: 56
No: 34
...and so on, a daily total often three feet or more worth all folded
up and forming a paper audit record stuffed into the official results
envelope by pollworkers.
Good feature. It's open to hacking as Hari Hursti discovered in Leon
County FL but let's ignore that for the moment.
Folks, THERE IS NO SUCH RESULTS PRINTOUT (VOTING MACHINE TAPE) FOR
ABSENTEE BALLOT PROCESSING.
The Diebold absentee ballot optical scanners ("Central Count") don't
record the vote totals this way, even though they're based on the same
hardware as a standard precinct optical scan AND they have the little
printer installed! They could easily print results for each "batch" of
absentees but that feature is completely turned off.
By Diebold.
Which makes the original "GEMS hack" we've been screaming about since
'03 a serious danger, more than Diebold has EVER admitted.
And the only reason we know is that the Libertarians were kind enough
to hire us to inspect the systems in a handful of California counties.
Jim March