http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/timeline.jsp?timeline=complete_timeline_of_the_2003_invasion_of_iraq&general_topic_areas=alZarqawithere are no proofs :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abu_Musab_al-ZarqawiAt the time, Zarqawi's group was probably more a rival of bin Laden's than an ally. <3><4><5><6> According to the Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence released in September 2006, "in April 2003 the CIA learned from a senior al-Qa'ida detainee that al-Zarqawi had rebuffed several efforts by bin Ladin to recruit him. The detainee claimed that al-Zarqawi had religious differences with bin Ladin and disagreed with bin Laden's singular focus against the United States. The CIA assessed in April 2003 that al-Zarqawi planned and directed independent terrorist operations without al Qaeda direction, but assessed that he 'most likely contracts out his network's services to al Qaeda in return for material and financial assistance from key al Qaeda facilitators.'"(page 90)
A CIA report in late 2004 concluded that it had no evidence Saddam's government was involved in, or aware of, his Baghdad medical treatment, and that "There’s no conclusive evidence the Saddam Hussein regime had harbored Zarqawi."<16> <17> One U.S. official summarized the report: "The evidence is that Saddam never gave Zarqawi anything."<18> Jordan's King Abdullah has said that Jordan had detailed information of where in Iraq Zarqawi lived. Jordan attempted to have Zarqawi extradited, "but our demands that the former regime
hand him over were in vain," King Abdullah said.<19> However, one of the Operation Iraqi Freedom documents that the Bush Administration has been releasing to the public indicates that Saddam had actually made the search for Zarqawi a “top priority” of his security forces, but that they were unsuccessful in locating him. <7>
In June, 2006, the Weekly Standard published an article by Thomas Joscelyn citing the claim by Dr. Muhammad al-Masari that Saddam's government actively aided Zarqawi prior to the invasion of Iraq, and that "Iraqi army commanders were ordered to become practicing Muslims and to adopt the language and spirit of the jihadis." Joscelyn asserts:
Just as Saddam ordered, many of Iraq's senior military and intelligence personnel joined or aided Zarqawi's jihad. Many of the more prominent supporters and members of Zarqawi's al Qaeda branch, in fact, came from the upper echelon of Saddam's government. Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri (aka the "King of Clubs") and his sons allied with Zarqawi, as did members of Muhammad Hamza Zubaydi's (aka the "Queen of Spades") family. Zarqawi's allies included Muhammed Hila Hammad Ubaydi, who was an aide to Saddam's chief of staff of intelligence, and some of his more lethal operatives served as officers in Saddam's military, including Abu Ali, "Al-Hajji" Thamer Mubarak (whose sister attempted a martyrdom operation in Jordan), Abu-Ubaidah, and Abdel Fatih Isa. <20>
Whether this actually strengthens the case that Saddam collaborated with al-Qaeda is unclear. Former regime luminaries could easily have their own reasons for working with Zarqawi, not necessarily "Saddam’s orders." Al-Masari is a Saudi exile who??s lived in London since 1994. His claims about Saddam’s policies are contrary to the intelligence community’s consensus, and the reliability of his sources is unknown to the public. Joscelyn's source, Abdel Bari Atwan, admits that al-Masari’s claims are "disputed by other commentators" and offers no reason that al-Masari should be believed and not these "other commentators." <8> Reports of cooperation between Saddam and al-Qaeda aren’t new, but have been assessed by intelligence professionals as being "of varying reliability and contradictory." <9> Salon.com:
Former CIA counterterrorism chief Cannistraro explains that hundreds, if not thousands, of raw reports from first-, second- and third-hand sources flood into the CIA offices around the world every day. But these are of little or no use until they can be analyzed. "The problem with raw intelligence is you can cherry-pick it," he says. "It's like having the Bible in your hand; you can pick and choose individual passages to prove almost any point."<10> No one from the Bush administration has indicated, even on background, that al-Masari’s claims represent evidence strong enough to affect the intelligence community’s consensus that there there does not appear to have been a "collaborative relationship" between al-Qaeda and Saddam. <11>
The 2006 Senate Report on Prewar Intelligence concluded that Zarqawi was not a link between Saddam and al-Qaeda: "Postwar information indicates that Saddam Hussein attempted, unsuccessfully, to locate and capture al-Zarqawi and that the regime did not have a relationship with, harbor, or turn a blind eye toward Zarqawi."