Zubaydah Interrogator, from the horse's mouth: Torture Was Unnecessary and Ineffective

[babylonsister]

http://yglesias.thinkprogress.org/archives/2009/04/zubaydah-interrogator-torture-was-unnecessary-and-ineffective.php


Zubaydah Interrogator: Torture Was Unnecessary and Ineffective
Matthew Yglesias


People continue to treat the claim that institutionalized torture is not an effective investigative method as some kind of fringe position adopted out of convenience by squishes who don’t want to face up to the hard tradeoffs in the world. But the fact remains that this is what you hear from everyone who does investigations professionals. And it’s also the case that you never see examples of highly effective investigative agencies being reliant on torture. The Dzerzhinksy-era NKVD put on a lot of great show trials, but the Bratton-era NYPD didn’t bring about an impressive drop in crime rates through “enhanced interrogation methods.”

Meanwhile, here’s Ali Soufan, an FBI supervisory special agent who oversaw elements of the Zubaydah interrogations, speaking out:

For seven years I have remained silent about the false claims magnifying the effectiveness of the so-called enhanced interrogation techniques like waterboarding. I have spoken only in closed government hearings, as these matters were classified. But the release last week of four Justice Department memos on interrogations allows me to shed light on the story, and on some of the lessons to be learned. <...>

It is inaccurate, however, to say that Abu Zubaydah had been uncooperative. Along with another F.B.I. agent, and with several C.I.A. officers present, I questioned him from March to June 2002, before the harsh techniques were introduced later in August. Under traditional interrogation methods, he provided us with important actionable intelligence. <...>

There was no actionable intelligence gained from using enhanced interrogation techniques on Abu Zubaydah that wasn’t, or couldn’t have been, gained from regular tactics. In addition, I saw that using these alternative methods on other terrorists backfired on more than a few occasions — all of which are still classified. The short sightedness behind the use of these techniques ignored the unreliability of the methods, the nature of the threat, the mentality and modus operandi of the terrorists, and due process.

Soufan hints at this briefly, but another problem with institutionalized torture is that it wrecks your entire system of laws. If you do a normal investigation and get someone to cough up the name of a confederate, then you can arrest the confederate. And then you can interrogate him through normal methods. But if you torture someone to get him to cough up the name of a confederate, then what do you do? Well, you’ll have to kidnap him and send him to a “black site” or something. But then whatever info you get from him also has to go on the “secret” side of your operations. That means you can’t share it effectively with state and local law enforcement, or with the Border Patrol or with Immigration and Customs Enforcement.

Either that, or else in the name of effective counterterrorism you need to completely rebuild the entire system of law enforcement and criminal justice along Stalinist lines. The FBI, which in additional to having national security responsibilities has always been in a position where it needs to cooperate with the “ordinary” police and prosecutors, is attuned to these kind of problems which, I think, is one reason why it was more institutionally resistance than the CIA to getting into the torture business. But in the long haul, to fight terrorism it’s extremely important to have effective methods of information-sharing and cooperation both vertically and horizontally across a very large country with a great diversity of law enforcement agencies. To take the most “high value” sources of information and unplug them from the rest of the system is a disaster.

[babylonsister]

1. Could someone please send this to darth? nt

[harun]

3. I am sure he already knows it. Which is why he is out front trying to push the lie

that it somehow gave the U.S. this magical intel that saved everyone. Without that lie they would have no support in the public opinion at all.

[Junkdrawer]

2. This is so important...K&R

[flyarm]

4. And Did James Mitchell Also Write the Psychological Profile of Abu Zubaydah Bybee Used?

read the whole story.......
http://emptywheel.firedoglake.com/2009/04/23/and-did-james-mitchell-also-write-the-psychological-profile-of-abu-zubaydah-bybee-used/#more-4008

And Did James Mitchell Also Write the Psychological Profile of Abu Zubaydah Bybee Used?
By: emptywheel Thursday April 23, 2009 10:17 am

snip:
But is it too cynical to suggest that Mitchell also had an interest in saying that Soufan and the FBI's (and apparently, in part, CIA's) non-brutal techniques failed? From page 24 of the Senate Armed Services Committee report:

Subsequent from his retirement from DoD , Dr. Jessen joined Dr. Mitchell and other former JPRA officials to form a company called Mitchell Jessen & Associates. Mitchell Jessen & Associates is co-owned by seven individuals, six of whom either worked for JPRA or one of the service SERE schools as employees and/or contractors. As of July 2007, the company had between 55 and 60 employees, several of whom were former JPRA employees.


snips;
But Mitchell may have done more than certify that the only way to get Abu Zubaydah to speak was to waterboard him. He may have been the guy who did the psychological profile that found him fit to be waterboarded.

The May 30, 2005 memo attributes an incredibly chilling comment, acknowledging that waterboarding exceeded the guidelines laid out in the 2002 OLC memo, to a "psychologist/interrogator."

The IG Report noted that in some cases the waterboard was used with far greater frequency than initially indicated, see IG Report at 5, 44, 46, 103-04, and also that it was used in a different manner. See id. at 37 ("he waterboard technique ... was different from the technique described in the DoJ opinion and used in the SERE training. The difference was the manner in which the detainee's breathing was obstructed. At the SERE school and in the DoJ opinion, the subject's airflow is disrupted by the firm application of a damp cloth over the air passages; the interrogator applies a small amount of water to the cloth in a controlled manner. By contrast, the Agency Interrogator ... applied large volumes of water to a cloth that covered the detainee's mouth and nose. One of the psychologists/interrogators acknowledged that the Agency's use of the technique is different from that used in SERE training because it is "for real--and is more poignant and convincing.")

Is this "psychologist/interrogator" the person who supplied the dubious profile (the one disputed by FBI people) that Bybee used to determine that Abu Zubaydah was fit to be waterboarded?

According to your reports, Zubaydah does not have any pre-existing mental conditions or problems that would make him likely to suffer prolonged mental harm from your proposed interrogation methods. Through reading his diaries and interviewing him, you have found no history of "mood disturbance or other psychiatric pathology<,>" "thought disorder<,> ... enduring mood or mental health problems." He is in fact "remarkably resilient and confident that he can overcome adversity." When he encounters stress or low mood, this appears to last only for a short time. He deals with stress by assessing its source, evaluating the coping resources available to him, and then taking action. Your assessment notes that he is "generally self-sufficient and relies on his understanding and application of religious and psychological principles, intelligence and discipline to avoid and overcome problems." Moreover, you have found that he has a "reliable and durable support system" in his faith, "the blessings of religious leaders, and camaraderie of like-minded mujahedin brothers." During detention, Zubaydah has managed his mood, remaining at most points "circumspect, calm, controlled., and deliberate." He has maintained this demeanor during aggressive interrogations and reductions in sleep. You describe that in an initial confrontational incident, Zubaydah showed signs of sympathetic nervous system arousal, which you think was possibly fear. Although this incident led him to disclose intelligence information, he was able to quickly regain his composure, his air of confidence, and his "strong resolve" not to reveal any information.



snip:
So it seems that in the early days of the torture program, the "psychologist/interrogators" were the ones making these medical and psychological judgments. Precisely the kind of people contracted to the CIA from Mitchell's consulting firm.