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David Ignatius, WaPo: Should Kim get the credit for the Korean detente?
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/should-kim-get-the-credit-for-the-korean-detente/2018/05/03/0050c796-4f1d-11e8-af46-b1d6dc0d9bfe_story.htmlPresident Trump deserves credit for seizing the moment for negotiations with North Korea. But some little-noticed documents reveal that Kim Jong Un has been planning his denuclearization offer and opening to the United States for the past five years.
-snip-
How did this extraordinary Korean detente happen? It’s a complicated story, but it appears that Kim has been the main driver. He has relentlessly pursued a dual strategy: to obtain a usable nuclear weapon, and then pivot toward dialogue and modernization of his economy. He sought his nuclear deterrent with almost reckless determination, but he has been surprisingly nimble in making the turn toward diplomacy.
Would Kim have moved toward negotiations regardless of who was president? We’ll never know. But there’s no denying that Trump’s confrontational approach created an opportunity for crisis diplomacy — and that he was bold enough to embrace Kim’s offer of direct talks.
The North Korean documents were highlighted for me by Robert Carlin, a former CIA and State Department analyst who has visited the North more than 30 times since 1996. He retired from the government in 2004 and has since worked at Stanford University. In our many conversations over the past year, Carlin has been consistently accurate in predicting what Kim would do.
Kim first outlined his dual approach, known as the “ byungjin line,” in a speech at a Korean Workers’ Party meeting in March 2013, two years after taking power. He said that North Korea wanted to strengthen its nuclear weapons capability but also improve its backward and impoverished economy. The United States didn’t pay much attention, because Kim also said he wasn’t prepared to discuss denuclearization. But that soon changed.
Kim’s regime explicitly put denuclearization on the table in a June 16, 2013, statement by the National Defense Commission (NDC). Though the statement had the usual rhetoric, calling the United States a “war arsonist” at one point, it also included this remarkable language: “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the behest of our leader” and “must be carried out .?.?. without fail.” The statement also urged “high-level talks between the DPRK [North Korea] and the U.S. authorities to .?.?. establish peace and security in the region.”
-snip-
Kim is like an illusionist who tells you what trick he’s going to do, and then does it before your eyes, daring you to guess the secret. Trump sees himself as a clever, confrontational dealmaker, but he may have met his match with the kid from Pyongyang.
-snip-
How did this extraordinary Korean detente happen? It’s a complicated story, but it appears that Kim has been the main driver. He has relentlessly pursued a dual strategy: to obtain a usable nuclear weapon, and then pivot toward dialogue and modernization of his economy. He sought his nuclear deterrent with almost reckless determination, but he has been surprisingly nimble in making the turn toward diplomacy.
Would Kim have moved toward negotiations regardless of who was president? We’ll never know. But there’s no denying that Trump’s confrontational approach created an opportunity for crisis diplomacy — and that he was bold enough to embrace Kim’s offer of direct talks.
The North Korean documents were highlighted for me by Robert Carlin, a former CIA and State Department analyst who has visited the North more than 30 times since 1996. He retired from the government in 2004 and has since worked at Stanford University. In our many conversations over the past year, Carlin has been consistently accurate in predicting what Kim would do.
Kim first outlined his dual approach, known as the “ byungjin line,” in a speech at a Korean Workers’ Party meeting in March 2013, two years after taking power. He said that North Korea wanted to strengthen its nuclear weapons capability but also improve its backward and impoverished economy. The United States didn’t pay much attention, because Kim also said he wasn’t prepared to discuss denuclearization. But that soon changed.
Kim’s regime explicitly put denuclearization on the table in a June 16, 2013, statement by the National Defense Commission (NDC). Though the statement had the usual rhetoric, calling the United States a “war arsonist” at one point, it also included this remarkable language: “The denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the behest of our leader” and “must be carried out .?.?. without fail.” The statement also urged “high-level talks between the DPRK [North Korea] and the U.S. authorities to .?.?. establish peace and security in the region.”
-snip-
Kim is like an illusionist who tells you what trick he’s going to do, and then does it before your eyes, daring you to guess the secret. Trump sees himself as a clever, confrontational dealmaker, but he may have met his match with the kid from Pyongyang.
2 replies
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= new reply since forum marked as read
Kim or the fucking moron? 
