Here are a couple of sections of the opinion ruling on the merit of the claims
The critical question is whether the plaintiffs’ injuries are fairly
traceable to the defendants’ allegedly false statements, and on that question there
are just too many unknowns. Although they too alleged that they relied on the
false statements to their detriment, not a single named plaintiff who contributed
money to the Sanders campaign set out the dates (exact or approximate) of his or
her donations. We do not know why the complaint omits the dates of all donations
to the Sanders campaign, but the silence makes it impossible to know whether any
named plaintiffs representing the Sanders donor class made their donations before
or after the false statements were made, or before or after the publication of the
hacked documents in June of 2016, or before or after Senator Sanders endorsed
Secretary Clinton in July of 2016. These details matter. If, for example, those who
donated money to the Sanders campaign did so before the false statements were
made, the statements could not have caused them financial injury. See Sweigert,
334 F. Supp. 3d at 43 (explaining in a similar case that causation was not
adequately pled because the complaint was devoid of allegations that the plaintiff
donated money in reliance on anything the DNC or its officials said or did).
I love this section discussing the complete stupidity of the claim that the DNC violated the DC consumer protection law and that donors were consumers.
As noted, the CPPA prohibits various unfair or deceptive trade practices.
See D.C. Code § 28-3904 (“It shall be a violation of this chapter for any person to
engage in an unfair or deceptive trade practice, whether or not any consumer is in
fact misled, deceived or damaged thereby[.]”). It allows a “consumer [to] bring an
action seeking relief from the use of a trade practice in violation of a law of the
District [of Columbia].” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(A). A “consumer,” in turn, is
a person who “does or would purchase . . . or receive consumer goods or services.”
D.C. Code § 28-3901(a)(2)(A). See also Price v. Indep. Fed. Sav. Bank, 110 A.3d
567, 574 (D.C. 2015) (“n order to obtain redress under the CPPA, [the plaintiffs]
must be ‘consumers,’ defined as ‘a person who . . . does or would purchase . . . or
receive consumer goods or services.’”) (quoting § 28-3901(a)(2)(A)). As a result,
“the CPPA does not cover all consumer transactions, and instead only covers trade
practices arising out of consumer-merchant relationships.” Sundberg v. TTR
Realty, LLC, 109 A.3d 1123, 1129 (D.C. 2015).
The named plaintiffs representing the DNC donor class made their donations
directly to the DNC, which is a non-profit corporation. See First Amended
Complaint at ¶¶ 103–09, 153. Because there are no allegations that any of them
purchased or received any consumer goods or services, they are not “consumers”
under the CPPA. See Silvious v. Coca-Cola Co., 893 F. Supp. 2d 233, 236
(D.D.C. 2012) (prisoner who had not purchased Coca-Cola was not a “consumer”
under the CPPA and could not sue the soft-drink’s manufacturer for fraudulent
labeling); Slaby v. Fairbridge, 3 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 1998) (person whose
research proposals were rejected by a federal agency was not a “consumer” under
the CPPA because her claim did not arise out of the purchase or receipt of
consumer goods or services).
We note, as well, that the DNC is not subject to liability under the CPPA for
the conduct set out in the complaint. As the plaintiffs alleged, the DNC is a nonprofit entity, and the CPPA limits the liability of non-profit organizations: “An
action brought . . . against a non-profit organization shall not be based on
membership in such organization, membership services, training or credentialing
services, . . . or any other transaction, interaction, or dispute not arising from the
purchase or sale of consumer goods or services in the ordinary course of business.”
D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(5). In the words of the D.C. Circuit, “the available
evidence suggests that the D.C. Council acted specifically to shield non-profit
organizations from statutory liability for membership-related disputes.” In re APA
Assessment Fee Litig., 766 F.3d 39, 53 (D.C. Cir. 2014). Here the complaint
frames a dispute between the DNC and some of its supporters concerning
organizational behavior. Because there are no allegations that the DNC acted as a
merchant or sold or provided consumer goods and services to the plaintiffs, the
CPPA claim fails.
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