Federalist Paper # 65 - aka Hamilton's Lament on Impeachments...

[NeoGreen]

https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Federalist+Papers#TheFederalistPapers-65

The Powers of the Senate Continued
From the New York Packet. Friday, March 7, 1788.
Author: Alexander Hamilton (aka Publius)

To the People of the State of New York:

THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments. As in the business of appointments the executive will be the principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be discussed in the examination of that department. We will, therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character of the Senate.

A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust. They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit depositary of this important trust. Those who can best discern the intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning that opinion, and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the arguments which may be supposed to have produced it.

Worth repeating:
A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective.

I hold a for the Republic and the Democracy upon which it depends.

[rwsanders]

1. OK I'm reading this early in the morning and the coffee hasn't kicked in yet (yeah 1000 is early)

I'm not quite getting the meaning of this. Is he saying it should be an easy thing?
It should be.
It is not a criminal trial, it is judging a persons fitness for the job. When I get worked up, I say we should go back and impeach Nixon, Ford, Reagan, Bush, Bush the sequel, Cheney, AND Trump just to set the record straight and deny benefits to any still living.
I get very frustrated that in some organizations (business, government, religious, and military) some folks rise to levels where they are no longer accountable. I always believe the higher up, the higher the standard should be.

[Hermit-The-Prog]

2. it's always going to stir up political passions

That's why the Senate, with its 6 year, staggered terms, is considered the better trier of an impeachment than the House. That doesn't eliminate the division into political factions, but it gives more hope of a deliberation on the merits.

[NeoGreen]

3. My read...

...and please, anyone well versed in the language of Publius, please feel free to chime in with constructive criticism.

A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a government wholly elective.

The difficulty in finding an impartial Court of Impeachment (i.e. the Senate) is greater that the desire.

The subjects of its jurisdiction are those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or, in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust.

The Impeached are likely to be accused of corruption (i.e. an essentially esoteric misconduct unlike an unambiguous misconduct such as shooting someone on 5th Avenue).

They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done immediately to the society itself.

The esoteric misconduct maybe difficult to parse from, or may resemble, routine politics.

The prosecution of them, for this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or inimical to the accused.

Those politically allied with the accused will rail against the impeachment, those who are not, will not.

In many cases it will connect itself with the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities, partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other; and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.

The danger is politics will eclipse impartiality.

The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The difficulty of placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived, when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.

In the end, all Senators are politicians (and among the most successful at being politicians).

[rwsanders]

4. Thanks. Quite a thorough interpretation.