General Discussion
Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsWhy paper is considered state-of-the-art voting technology. SAFE ACT H.R.2722 116th Congress.
H.R.2722 116th Congress (2019-2020)
See here:https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2722/text
On June 27, the House passed a bill that would bolster Americas high-tech voting infrastructure with a low-tech fix: paper. Introduced by Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-CA-19), the SAFE Act requires that all voting machines involve the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified paper ballot of the voters vote. While the inclusion of paper ballots may seem like a technological step backward, the SAFE Acts affinity for paper is not a quirk. Election security experts from Harvard, Stanford and the Brennan Center for Justice all recommend the phasing out of paperless voting, and twelve of the thirteen Democratic candidates who have declared a position on election security support mandating the use of paper ballots.
Yet despite expert consensus, political activism, and availability of funding, opposition in the Republican-controlled Senate makes it unlikely that the SAFE Act or any paper ballot standard will be implemented by 2020. With no method to verify votes in the case of software or hardware failure, paperless voting machines represent a large vulnerability. Failure to act on election security risks not only a loss of trust in the next election, but in the democratic process as a whole. [BOLD my addition for emphasis]
THE ROLE OF PAPER BALLOTS IN VOTING MACHINES
Broadly speaking, there are three classes of voting machines. Today, the most commonly used devices are optical scan machines. In this system, poll workers use an optical scanner, a device which registers marks on a page, to process voters paper ballots, storing the results electronically. This system has a paper audit trail by design, and election officials can compare the paper ballots each voter fills out with the scanners tabulation.
A less common class of voting machines is ballot marking devices, in which voters select their choice on a screen. Rather than storing the selections electronically, the machine then prints a paper ballot to be either hand counted or scanned by a computer.
The only widely used machines that do not incorporate paper as a necessary part of their design are direct-recording electronic (DRE) machines. When using DREs, voters select their choices onscreen, transmitting the data straight into the voting machines memory. While DREs can record voters choices onto paper, many do not. These DREs that completely forgo paper ballots are among the most vulnerable parts of American election infrastructure.
FROM PAPER TO PAPERLESS AND BACK AGAIN
Americas turn to paperless voting has its roots in the confusion caused by ambiguous ballot marking during the 2000 election. In its aftermath, Congress passed the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which allocated $3.9 billion to help voting precincts replace old lever and punch card systems with state-of-the-art equipment. While computer scientists warned Congress at the time of the dangers of paperless systems, HAVA passed both chambers of Congress without requiring that funds be used to purchase systems that utilize paper ballots.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/techtank/2019/08/14/why-paper-is-considered-state-of-the-art-voting-technology/
Hermit-The-Prog
(33,343 posts)With paper ballots (physical tokens):
* Paper ballots allow the voter to verify that the ballot represents the voter's vote.
* The general public can verify that the voter cast a ballot, without having to know the vote.
* The general public can verify that the paper ballots are not tampered with while waiting to be counted.
* The general public can observe and verify the count of the ballots.
In electronic voting (abstractions, not physical tokens):
- The voter cannot verify that the internal state of the device represents the voter's vote. (This is true no matter how many pre-election or post-election tests are performed on the device).
- The general public cannot observe or verify that the voter cast a ballot. (The electorate has a critical, prime responsibility to observe and verify this).
- The general public cannot observe or verify the (abstract, invisible, electronic) ballots are true to the forms (state) they were in when cast.
- The general public cannot observe or verify the (invisible, electronic) count of the (abstract, invisible, electronic) ballots.
Elections are far more important than the check-out line at the grocery store, bank or Amazon. Verification is needed by the individual voter, by the rest of the electorate, and by the general public while still maintaining a secret ballot. Physical tokens that human beings can perceive are required.
ElementaryPenguin
(7,800 posts)Bush stole Florida and the Electoral College with the Hursti Hack.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Volusia_error
Grasswire2
(13,569 posts)HAND MARKED PAPER BALLOTS, VOTER VERIFIABLE
STRONG AUDIT TRAIL
STRONG BALLOT SECURITY
..................
NO APPS!
NO WIFI CONNECTION REPORTING!
NO OPTICAL SCANS!
Those are the essentials for a free and fair election.
See @jennycohn1 for a daily update on election security issues....also available on youtube Jennifer Cohn.
diva77
(7,640 posts)verifiable.
It has to be a hand marked paper ballot, just like Grasswire sez!!!!