General Discussion
Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsComputer Scientists Prefer Paper Ballots
From 2019, but a really good review.
[link:https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/why-computer-scientists-prefer-paper-ballots-wenke-lee/|
33taw
(2,442 posts)lapfog_1
(29,201 posts)having worked for NASA for many years as well a number of high tech companies.
I taught computer science early in my career.
I only would trust paper ballots.
I don't NEED same night results on an election, I think we could all wait a day or so.
htuttle
(23,738 posts)Paper ballots are the only secure method.
I was reading another article recently about e-voting, written by computer scientists (can't find the link right now), and the author finally let loose the industry secret:
"Look, there are a lot of us who aren't that good at what we do. If you put us in charge, everyone is going to die!"
Couldn't have said it better myself.
In every company I've been in (as an IT person), there are WAY too many IT people who aren't that good at what we do.
33taw
(2,442 posts)lpbk2713
(42,757 posts)some times it comes down to being the best bullshitter.
Hermit-The-Prog
(33,345 posts)MH1
(17,600 posts)Optical scanning of paper ballots is good. Technology-assisted marking of the paper ballot is fine.
No system is perfect, though. There was plenty of election fraud before black box voting. It's just executed differently.
The ONLY true prevention against election fraud is strong, informed engagement of the citizenry from both parties. But black box voting puts election integrity beyond their reach. Paper ballots don't, or at least it is much more difficult to get away with fraud.
jg10003
(976 posts)eniwetok
(1,629 posts)My town just upgraded their old optical scan ballots... which offer the convenience of a fast electronic count... and a verifiable paper trail for recounts. I was involved in a recount once... and while boring, the count was easily verifiable. What's not to like?
Wounded Bear
(58,654 posts)not impossible, but harder.
And they do leave a paper trail to allow audits to verify the results.
Hermit-The-Prog
(33,345 posts)The problem is that elections need to be both secret and public, and be verified by human beings using their own senses. National elections put trillions of dollars and hundreds of millions of lives at stake.
With paper ballots (physical tokens):
* Paper ballots allow the voter to verify that the ballot represents the voter's vote.
* The general public can verify that the voter cast a ballot, without having to know the vote.
* The general public can verify that the paper ballots are not tampered with while waiting to be counted.
* The general public can observe and verify the count of the ballots.
In electronic voting (abstractions, not physical tokens):
- The voter cannot verify that the internal state of the device represents the voter's vote. (This is true no matter how many pre-election or post-election tests are performed on the device).
- The general public cannot observe or verify that the voter cast a ballot. (The electorate has a critical, prime responsibility to observe and verify this).
- The general public cannot observe or verify the (abstract, invisible, electronic) ballots are true to the forms (state) they were in when cast.
- The general public cannot observe or verify the (invisible, electronic) count of the (abstract, invisible, electronic) ballots.
moondust
(19,981 posts)Old Cynic says there's also no way for a corrupt or partisan computer manufacturer to create a secret back door into a paper ballot or a disconnected adding machine/calculator monitored by at least two or three (bipartisan) election officials.