REPEAT: The Senate considering the constitutionality of Trump's impeachment trial...

[Tom Rinaldo]

is worse than a diversion from Trump's actual crime, it is constitutionally inappropriate for Senators to weigh their vote based on that "concern". A Senate trial of a federal official who was impeached while still in office, who no longer is in office, is clearly NOT unconstitutional on its face as nothing in the constitution prevents it. Not only are there compelling legal arguments to affirm it's constitutionality (the potential remedy of barring said official from running again for office) but there is clear legal precedent for such Senate trials occurring.

It can be argued that the ultimate constitutionality of such a Senate Trial has not yet been firmly established, but that is an argument that needs to be made in front of the U.S. Supreme Court, if at all. Senators are overstepping their constitutional role if they seek to overlook Trump's "high crimes and misdemeanors" based on their personal interpretation of the U.S. Constitution . That is not within the purview of the legislative branch to determine. The Senate's task is to weigh the actual merits of the charges that the House impeachment managers present them with. Should Trump be found guilty based on actions he undertook while in office, that conviction can later be appealed to the Judicial branch to rule on the constitutionality of the actual proceedings. The Supreme Court could then vacate that conviction if such an appeal succeeded.

THAT is how our constitution is designed to work. Democrats need to stay on message during the Senate trial; Senators do your own job and stop pretending that you sit on the Supreme Court also.

[Stallion]

1. The Constitution Does Not Provide for an Appeal of a Conviction of Impeachment

I don't know why this keeps coming up

[unblock]

3. well, that's not entirely true....

let's say that congress decided to impeach and convict and bar from office someone who never even held public office at all. that person could certainly ask the supreme court to declare such impeachment unconstitutional.

in fact, imagine if congress decided to impeach and convict and bar from office all minorities. there's a pretty blatantly unconstitutional impeachment action that the supreme court would be on firm ground to step in and invalidate.

hopefully such things will never happen, but with these nutjobs, especially given how they wanted to impeach hillary before she could become president, you never know.

[Stallion]

4. The U.S. Supreme Court Has Already Held Impeachment is a Non-Justiciable Political Question

OCTOBER TERM, 1992

Syllabus

NIXON v. UNITED STATES ET AL.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 91-740. Argued October 14, 1992-Decided January 13, 1993

After petitioner Nixon, the Chief Judge of a Federal District Court, was convicted of federal crimes and sentenced to prison, the House of Representatives adopted articles of impeachment against him and presented them to the Senate. Following proceedings pursuant to Senate Rule XI-which allows a committee of Senators to hear evidence against an impeached individual and to report that evidence to the full Senate the Senate voted to convict Nixon, and the presiding officer entered judgment removing him from his judgeship. He then commenced the present suit for a declaratory judgment and reinstatement of his judicial salary and privileges, arguing that, because Senate Rule XI prohibits the whole Senate from taking part in the evidentiary hearings, it violates the first sentence of the Constitution's Impeachment Trial Clause, Art. I, § 3, cl. 6, which provides that the "Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments." The District Court held that his claim was nonjusticiable, i. e., involved a political question that could not be resolved by the courts. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

Held: Nixon's claim that Senate Rule XI violates the Impeachment Trial Clause is nonjusticiable. Pp. 228-238.

(a) A controversy is nonjusticiable where there is "a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it .... " Baker v. Carr, 369 U. S. 186, 217. These two concepts are not completely separate; the lack of judicially manageable standards may strengthen the conclusion that there is a textually demonstrable commitment to a coordinate branch. Pp. 228-229.

(b) The language and structure of Art. I, § 3, cl. 6, demonstrate a textual commitment of impeachment to the Senate. Nixon's argument that the use of the word "try" in the Clause's first sentence impliedly requires a judicial-style trial by the full Senate that is subject to judicial review is rejected. The conclusion that "try" lacks sufficient precision to afford any judicially manageable standard of review is compelled by older and modern dictionary definitions, and is fortified by the existence of the three very specific requirements that the Clause's second and third sentences do impose-that the Senate's Members must be under oath or affirmation, that a two-thirds vote is required to convict, and

225

that the Chief Justice presides when the President is tried-the precise nature of which suggests that the Framers did not intend to impose additional limitations on the form of the Senate proceedings. The Clause's first sentence must instead be read as a grant of authority to the Senate to determine whether an individual should be acquitted or convicted, and the commonsense and dictionary meanings of the word "sole" indicate that this authority is reposed in the Senate alone. Nixon's attempts to negate the significance of "sole" are unavailing, while his alternative reading of the word as requiring impeachment only by the full Senate is unnatural and would impose on the Senate additional procedural requirements that would be inconsistent with the three express limitations that the Clause sets out. A review of the Constitutional Convention's history and the contemporary commentary supports a reading of the constitutional language as deliberately placing the impeachment power in the Legislature, with no judicial involvement, even for the limited purpose of judicial review. Pp. 229-236.

(c) Justiciability is also refuted by (1) the lack of finality inherent in exposing the country's political life-particularly if the President were impeached-to months, or perhaps years, of chaos during judicial review of Senate impeachment proceedings, or during any retrial that a differently constituted Senate might conduct if its first judgment of conviction were invalidated, and by (2) the difficulty of fashioning judicial relief other than simply setting aside the Senate's judgment of conviction. See Baker, supra, at 210. P. 236.

(d) A holding of nonjusticiability is consistent with this Court's opinion in Powell v. McCormack, 395 U. S. 486. Unlike the situation in that case, there is no separate constitutional provision which could be defeated by allowing the Senate final authority to determine the meaning of the word "try" in Art. I, § 3, cl. 6. While courts possess power to review legislative action that transgresses identifiable textual limits, the word "try" does not provide such a limit on the authority committed to the Senate. Pp. 236-238.



https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/506/224/

[TwilightZone]

5. An impeachment cannot be appealed to the SC.

https://www.lawfareblog.com/supreme-court-has-no-role-impeachment

As for your hypotheticals, they're somewhat ridiculous. Impeachments are about individuals, not groups of people, and no one is going to impeach someone who has never held public office.

[unblock]

6. legitimate impeachments can't be appealed, i agree

the supreme court isn't going to get into the details of senate procedure and interfere with their right to conduct the trial in the manner the senate sees fit -- as per the nixon opinion above.

but the point of my hypotheticals is that the supreme court likely *would* weigh in if congress went beyond its legitimate impeachment powers. yes, my examples are hopefully ridiculous; but then again, these days, they're only ridiculous because the supreme court would step in and knock down such impeachments.


as regards the o.p., if it's actually unconstitutional to try a former president (which is also a ridiculous claim), the supreme court could step in and say so. they don't get into senate procedure, but they do opine on senate powers. so they're not going to say anything about how an impeachment trial is conducted, but they could say something about whether or not it can happen at all.

[unblock]

2. i disagree that constitutionality is the sole perview of the supreme court

i certainly agree that impeachment and trial of former officials is constitutionally permitted. in fact, republicans agree because they are on record wanting to impeach hillary before she even became president, had she won. zero republicans said anything about it being unconstitutional when it's used against a democrat....


but in general, congress *should* consider restraint if they honestly think something is unconstitutional. they should *not* say, "hey, i think this is bill is unconstitutional, but let's pass it and let it become law even though it's really an abuse of our powers, then let the supreme court knock it down in three years or so."

thinking a congressional action is unconstitutional is a valid reason for a representative or senator to vote against it or to try to stop it.

the only problem here is that republicans are lying when they say they think it's unconstitutional. it's clearly not unconstitutional, and they know it. they're just inventing a procedural excuse to dodge having to vote on the merits.

[Klaralven]

7. Since Senators are sworn to uphold the Constitution, they must not engage in an unconstitutional act

Just like anyone else who has sworn to uphold the Constitution.