General Discussion
Related: Editorials & Other Articles, Issue Forums, Alliance Forums, Region ForumsThere was a time when I handled
Top Secret documents. The rule was simple if you lost positive, regulatory control over a document, it was ASSUMED to have been compromised, and your ass was court-martialed grass.
Quite simple, really.
EYESORE 9001
(29,732 posts)I *may* have been released from Leavenworth by now.
burrowowl
(18,494 posts)HubertHeaver
(2,539 posts)Where they would have a firm grip on your gonads.
Deep State Witch
(12,716 posts)I held a TS//SCI clearance for over 30 years, until I retired at the end of 2020. I had some of those other clearances, too. Not the nuclear-related ones. If I would have walked out with something like this, I would have had my door broken down by the FBI. No negotiations, no nothing.
SunSeeker
(58,283 posts)When he deserves ZERO benefit of the doubt.
MineralMan
(151,269 posts)orleans
(36,918 posts)trump is special
Bo Zarts
(26,361 posts)I had a TS, SI, Crypto, Code-Word security clearance. I flew TS, SI, Crypto combat missions in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. As unit missions operations officer, I had other duties that gave me additional "needs to know," beyond my piloting duties.
A secure burn pit (with wire top to prevent ash escape) was within the chain-link and razor-wire fencing that encircled the operations compound. Nothing classified left the compound. Nothing.
The "code-word" portions (there were more than one) of my clearance are still classified, although it is now fairly well known what my unit's missions were. And when I hear those common words, to this day, it still gives me pause.
We were serious as heart attacks about security. All kinds of security. Many lives, including our own, depended on it.
alfredo
(60,301 posts)H2O Man
(79,051 posts)mn9driver
(4,848 posts)It had to be continuously controlled until it was either declassified or destroyed. No exceptions. When we were deployed to a remote site with non-US security we had to burn everything every day before we could leave for the night.
tekriter
(830 posts)Way back in the 1970s I often ferried secret reconnaissance data from our aircraft to Strategic Air Command Headquarters. THE headquarters, in Nebraska.
Later, in civilian life, I wrote operation and repair manuals for aircraft equipment that required a secret clearance, so the work I created was itself classified. On one project I had to get Special Access clearance, for a project that to this day is not unclassified even though it was canceled in 1991 without ever being fielded. On that project I not only had responsibility for my own material, but for a year or so I was security officer for my entire group.
When a secret document is transferred between two people, a classified data receipt is generated. You sign it over to someone, they sign the receipt as the new recipient.
The receipt itself is not classified but it does contain the materials title and copy number. I still have every classified data receipt I ever had, dating back to 1978.
Just in case they ever ask.
Evolve Dammit
(21,774 posts)JustAnotherGen
(38,054 posts)If I looked sideways at a cop in a traffic stop - I'd get a fucking death sentence!
He's getting special treatment - arrest him now.
irisblue
(37,511 posts)SeattleVet
(5,903 posts)Reality Winner was jailed for mishandling ONE document.
AllaN01Bear
(29,490 posts)classified docs out . alarms would sound and doors would lock. her words . shed get nowhere.
Laura PourMeADrink
(42,770 posts)If a legitimate person checks out a document to review with the prez, are they responsible for making sure it gets back. Are they called? Just strikes me this whole ordeal - there should be tons of people screaming because they checked out docs for president dingbat
zipplewrath
(16,698 posts)I worked in the private sector, I had fairly high level clearances too, without being specific. (we're not supposed to declare those in a public forum). What happened here could be classified as a "data spill" which is handled one way. They try to figure out who saw the documents and determine the magnitude of the problem, and ultimately debrief them to find out who they may have told about what they saw, and then constrain them from telling anyone.
The issue here is that when I handled controlled documents, I was in a controlled area (which generally speaking is the ONLY place where they should be). If, say, I accidentally left them uncontrolled on a desk or a meeting room, then it would be determined who had access to those areas at that time. Everyone who worked in those areas would generally be cleared to see them. They would consult the "visitors log" to see who might have been there at that time and interview them to ask if they were exposed to them.
The problem here is that where they were stored, no one knows who had access to them. Furthermore, since the person who was responsible for them (TFG) cannot be trusted to acknowledge who had access and how they had been handled and stored, it's going to be assumed that someone saw them that not only should not have seen them, but their knowledge would be detrimental to the security of the USA. Right now I suspect that the FBI is trying to determine who can be identified as being that person, so that Trump can be accused of exposing information to people detrimental to the USA. If that can't be determined, then the charges against him will be significantly less. He can still be charged, but it will be basically "mishandling" and "capricious concern" kind of charges. He won't be subject to the UCMJ, he will be subject to civil/criminal law.
If he were me, he'd lose his clearance and as such be unable to obtain employment. Unfortunately I don't think that this will be an issue for him. Unfortunately, without evidence that he showed it to someone detrimental to the interests of the USA, he's most likely not to be convicted of espionage or treason.