Welcome to DU!
The truly grassroots left-of-center political community where regular people, not algorithms, drive the discussions and set the standards.
Join the community:
Create a free account
Support DU (and get rid of ads!):
Become a Star Member
Latest Breaking News
Editorials & Other Articles
General Discussion
The DU Lounge
All Forums
Issue Forums
Culture Forums
Alliance Forums
Region Forums
Support Forums
Help & Search
What's ahead in the war in Ukraine? -- Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School
Sometimes it seems like the war news we see is 1) too many pom poms or 2) ignorant reporters 3) some level of bias
Recently discovered this page... seems like the most accurate and realistic depictions I've seen.
The Ukrainian Strategy
The Ukrainians’ terrain-focused war of maneuver is constrained by two factors: limited artillery ammunition and equipment production, and coalition considerations. Ukraine started the war with 1,800 artillery pieces of Soviet caliber. These allowed firing rates of 6,000 to 7,000 rounds a day against 40,000 to 50,000 Russian daily rounds. By now this artillery is mostly out of ammunition, and in its place Ukraine is using 350 Western caliber artillery pieces, many of which are destroyed or breaking down from overuse. Meanwhile, Western nations are themselves running out of ammunition; the U.S. is estimated to produce only 15,000 155mm shells a month. This constraint has forced Ukraine to adopt mass infantry formations focused on regaining territory at any cost. Ukraine simply cannot go toe to toe with Russia in artillery battles. Unless Ukrainian troops close to direct fire fights with Russian troops, there is a significant chance that they will be destroyed at a distance by Russian artillery.
The Russian Strategy
The Russian forces are limited by manpower but strengthened by massive artillery and equipment stockpiles enabled by a robust military industrial complex. While there have been numerous reports in Western media that the Russian army is running out of artillery ammunition, so far there’s been no visible slacking of Russian artillery fire on any front. Based on these factors, the Russian side has relied on a traditional firepower-centric war of attrition. The goal is to force an unsustainable casualty rate, destroying Ukrainian manpower and equipment, while preserving Russia’s own forces. Territory is not important; its loss is acceptable to preserve combat power. At Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson, the Russian army refused to fight under unfavorable conditions and withdrew, accepting the political cost to preserve its forces.
The Ukrainians’ terrain-focused war of maneuver is constrained by two factors: limited artillery ammunition and equipment production, and coalition considerations. Ukraine started the war with 1,800 artillery pieces of Soviet caliber. These allowed firing rates of 6,000 to 7,000 rounds a day against 40,000 to 50,000 Russian daily rounds. By now this artillery is mostly out of ammunition, and in its place Ukraine is using 350 Western caliber artillery pieces, many of which are destroyed or breaking down from overuse. Meanwhile, Western nations are themselves running out of ammunition; the U.S. is estimated to produce only 15,000 155mm shells a month. This constraint has forced Ukraine to adopt mass infantry formations focused on regaining territory at any cost. Ukraine simply cannot go toe to toe with Russia in artillery battles. Unless Ukrainian troops close to direct fire fights with Russian troops, there is a significant chance that they will be destroyed at a distance by Russian artillery.
The Russian Strategy
The Russian forces are limited by manpower but strengthened by massive artillery and equipment stockpiles enabled by a robust military industrial complex. While there have been numerous reports in Western media that the Russian army is running out of artillery ammunition, so far there’s been no visible slacking of Russian artillery fire on any front. Based on these factors, the Russian side has relied on a traditional firepower-centric war of attrition. The goal is to force an unsustainable casualty rate, destroying Ukrainian manpower and equipment, while preserving Russia’s own forces. Territory is not important; its loss is acceptable to preserve combat power. At Kyiv, Kharkiv and Kherson, the Russian army refused to fight under unfavorable conditions and withdrew, accepting the political cost to preserve its forces.
https://www.russiamatters.org/analysis/whats-ahead-war-ukraine
AUTHOR
Alex Vershinin
U.S. Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin retired after 20 years of service, including eight years as an armor officer with four combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and 12 years working as a modeling and simulations officer in NATO and U.S. Army concept development and experimentation. This included a tour with the U.S. Army Sustainment Battle Lab, where he led the experimentation scenario team.
Alex Vershinin
U.S. Lt. Col. Alex Vershinin retired after 20 years of service, including eight years as an armor officer with four combat tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and 12 years working as a modeling and simulations officer in NATO and U.S. Army concept development and experimentation. This included a tour with the U.S. Army Sustainment Battle Lab, where he led the experimentation scenario team.
7 replies
= new reply since forum marked as read
= new reply since forum marked as read
It's a tweet. Fog of war and all that. Live with it.
Link to tweet
Trent Telenko
@TrentTelenko
Remember all the "Russian experts" from a year ago who said Russia had enough artillery shells to last a 5-year war?🤣🤣🤣🤣
Russian Shell🧵⬇️
@TrentTelenko
Remember all the "Russian experts" from a year ago who said Russia had enough artillery shells to last a 5-year war?🤣🤣🤣🤣
Russian Shell🧵⬇️
ChrisO_wiki
@ChrisO_wiki
1/ Russia's ammunition shortage in eastern Ukraine is reportedly so severe that its troops there have reportedly been issued with completely unusable munitions, including shells which are so rusty they have simply disintegrated. ⬇️
A click through on ChrisO_wiki's tweet leads to further discussion, drawing on OSINT and other sources, including translations of intercepted Russian armed forces chit-chat about widespread artillery ammunition shortages which are not just affecting Wagner (which has recently been complaining bitterly about being wilfully "deprived" of ammo), but the army as a whole.
Russia can still put up considerable barrages in certain battle zones, but they're diminishing, certainly since that article was written in December. Meanwhile, in the last few days Ukraine's deployed some longer-range missiles which the Russians don't recognize and seem to have severe trouble intercepting.
Vershinin's consistently called for the West to step up its arms production. Of course, MAGA and Putin fan types love it because they're rooting for Russia to win and can interpret his writings as implying Ukraine's doomed.