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Inside Biden's 'Hug Bibi' Strategy, by Franklin Foer
This article by Franklin Foer in The Atlantic is the best explanation I've seen anywhere of Biden's approach to Israel, and the thinking behind it!Inside Biden’s ‘Hug Bibi’ Strategy
by Franklin Foer
[ . . . . ]
Biden’s visit isn’t simply a dramatic gesture of solidarity born of his deeply felt Zionism. It is a strategic mission, an expression of his highly psychological approach to foreign policy—and of the insights into the Israeli psyche he’s gleaned through his many visits to the country and from his long relationship with that nation’s political elite.
[ . . . . ]
This was a strategy built on an understanding of Israeli anxiety. The nation, historically encircled by enemies, desperately craves the affirmation of American friendship at its moments of peril. It needs to feel loved and secure when it fears for its existence. Instead of hectoring Israel, Biden wanted to bank emotional capital. He wanted Netanyahu to understand his own belief in Israel’s right to self-defense; and he wanted to show the Israeli public his steadfastness. Then, over the course of the conflict, he planned on drawing down the trust he had deposited, by guiding Netanyahu to the most prudent course of action.
During the 11 days of the 2021 conflict, Biden kept calling Netanyahu. As with the current war, Netanyahu’s strategic objectives weren’t entirely clear. Some in the Israeli military told their American counterparts that a ground invasion of Gaza was a live option. The risks of that weren’t hard to see. But instead of lecturing Netanyahu, Biden conducted the calls in the spirit of a Socratic dialogue. He would ask questions that forced Netanyahu to articulate his goals: How will this end? And how will you know when you’ve restored deterrence?
Biden had learned from the failures of the Obama administration. By adapting a more confrontational stance with Netanyahu, that administration may have pleased allies and domestic groups critical of Netanyahu, but it stoked Israeli insecurities. Instead of curtailing settlements or rushing to the peace table, the Israelis rebelled against the pressure. In fact, Biden personally suffered from this approach. When he visited the Jewish state in 2010, the Netanyahu government humiliated him by announcing the expansion of new housing in East Jerusalem. Rather than aborting his trip, which many back in Washington advised, Biden met up with Netanyahu and embraced him, saying, “This is a mess. How do we make it better?”
by Franklin Foer
[ . . . . ]
Biden’s visit isn’t simply a dramatic gesture of solidarity born of his deeply felt Zionism. It is a strategic mission, an expression of his highly psychological approach to foreign policy—and of the insights into the Israeli psyche he’s gleaned through his many visits to the country and from his long relationship with that nation’s political elite.
[ . . . . ]
This was a strategy built on an understanding of Israeli anxiety. The nation, historically encircled by enemies, desperately craves the affirmation of American friendship at its moments of peril. It needs to feel loved and secure when it fears for its existence. Instead of hectoring Israel, Biden wanted to bank emotional capital. He wanted Netanyahu to understand his own belief in Israel’s right to self-defense; and he wanted to show the Israeli public his steadfastness. Then, over the course of the conflict, he planned on drawing down the trust he had deposited, by guiding Netanyahu to the most prudent course of action.
During the 11 days of the 2021 conflict, Biden kept calling Netanyahu. As with the current war, Netanyahu’s strategic objectives weren’t entirely clear. Some in the Israeli military told their American counterparts that a ground invasion of Gaza was a live option. The risks of that weren’t hard to see. But instead of lecturing Netanyahu, Biden conducted the calls in the spirit of a Socratic dialogue. He would ask questions that forced Netanyahu to articulate his goals: How will this end? And how will you know when you’ve restored deterrence?
Biden had learned from the failures of the Obama administration. By adapting a more confrontational stance with Netanyahu, that administration may have pleased allies and domestic groups critical of Netanyahu, but it stoked Israeli insecurities. Instead of curtailing settlements or rushing to the peace table, the Israelis rebelled against the pressure. In fact, Biden personally suffered from this approach. When he visited the Jewish state in 2010, the Netanyahu government humiliated him by announcing the expansion of new housing in East Jerusalem. Rather than aborting his trip, which many back in Washington advised, Biden met up with Netanyahu and embraced him, saying, “This is a mess. How do we make it better?”
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