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Commentary on Zelensky's epic trolling of Putin
In case you haven't been following this, the two sides were going back-and-forth about the important celebrations occurring right now in Moscow
Putin has been very concerned about the celebrations being disrupted by potential Ukrainian offensive actions, and it's already bad enough that he's also in the position of being humiliated by not a lack of military hardware and soldiers to parade to Red Square
So Zelensky made a proclamation saying Red Square will be safe from their attacks over the next three days, but everything else is off-limits
Link to tweet
A few words about trolling and big politics.
The decree by the President of Ukraine allowing the parade in Moscow triggered a fascinating reaction. Some Ukrainians saw it as political trolling. Others — mostly Zelensky’s opponents — immediately started talking about “KVN-style politics.”
Russia reacted the same way. Some people there were visibly furious. Peskov himself looked confused, carefully searching for words that would answer the situation without making the Kremlin look ridiculous. Others urged Russians to simply “ignore the provocation.”
In reality, yes — the decree was political trolling. Not a “serious” document in the traditional sense. But with Russia — and many authoritarian states — this kind of move works extremely well on the domestic psychological front. Because it strikes at one very important thing: the perception of strength.
For decades Moscow positioned itself as being “above” its neighbors. Russian society was taught that Russia has the right to tell others what to do — even regarding their internal affairs. The rhetoric was always the same: “NATO expansion threatens us,” “we will protect Russian speakers,” “Russia has interests.” This logic justified Crimea in 2014, the invasion in 2022, and later demands for Ukraine’s “demilitarization” and “denazification.” In other words: Russia decides, others obey. Otherwise — consequences.
But here the mechanism breaks.
Because behind many Russian threats there is often far less power than propaganda claims. And when someone openly points this out, the Kremlin becomes nervous — especially when it has nothing convincing to respond with.
Remember the Azerbaijani plane incident. Aliyev demanded something simple: equal dialogue and an apology. Moscow resisted for a long time, but in practice Putin eventually did exactly that. And look at the reaction inside Russia at the time: “We should not apologize,” “Aliyev thinks too highly of himself.” The same dynamic is now visible with Armenia, where Pashinyan is increasingly portrayed by Russian propaganda as some kind of “fascist.”
Now back to Ukraine.
Russia’s negotiating position has always revolved around preserving Moscow’s “right” to limit Ukraine’s sovereignty — whether in foreign policy or domestic affairs. The message is always the same: “if we allow it.” For the average Russian, this feels natural and correct.
But then comes spring 2026.
And suddenly ordinary Russians see with their own eyes that Russian military pressure and political dominance are not as absolute as they were told. Even the Victory Day parade no longer feels untouchable.
And against this backdrop, Zelensky symbolically “grants permission” to Putin to hold the parade on Red Square.
Yes — it is trolling.
Yes — it is humiliation.
But the important thing is not the reaction inside Ukraine. The important thing is how Russian society and Russian elites perceive it.
The elites already noticed — and made a mistake by amplifying the story themselves through outrage and endless reactions. Which means society noticed it too.
And now the key psychological barrier has been broken: Ukraine “dared” to mirror Russia’s own imperial attitude back at the Kremlin itself. To look down at Moscow — with sarcasm.
For many Russians, this is deeply uncomfortable. Painful, even.
Because moments like this slowly plant dangerous thoughts in people’s minds:
“Has our tsar become old and weak?”
And those thoughts, over time, can lead to very serious consequences.
Not bad for a document that probably took twenty minutes to write.
The decree by the President of Ukraine allowing the parade in Moscow triggered a fascinating reaction. Some Ukrainians saw it as political trolling. Others — mostly Zelensky’s opponents — immediately started talking about “KVN-style politics.”
Russia reacted the same way. Some people there were visibly furious. Peskov himself looked confused, carefully searching for words that would answer the situation without making the Kremlin look ridiculous. Others urged Russians to simply “ignore the provocation.”
In reality, yes — the decree was political trolling. Not a “serious” document in the traditional sense. But with Russia — and many authoritarian states — this kind of move works extremely well on the domestic psychological front. Because it strikes at one very important thing: the perception of strength.
For decades Moscow positioned itself as being “above” its neighbors. Russian society was taught that Russia has the right to tell others what to do — even regarding their internal affairs. The rhetoric was always the same: “NATO expansion threatens us,” “we will protect Russian speakers,” “Russia has interests.” This logic justified Crimea in 2014, the invasion in 2022, and later demands for Ukraine’s “demilitarization” and “denazification.” In other words: Russia decides, others obey. Otherwise — consequences.
But here the mechanism breaks.
Because behind many Russian threats there is often far less power than propaganda claims. And when someone openly points this out, the Kremlin becomes nervous — especially when it has nothing convincing to respond with.
Remember the Azerbaijani plane incident. Aliyev demanded something simple: equal dialogue and an apology. Moscow resisted for a long time, but in practice Putin eventually did exactly that. And look at the reaction inside Russia at the time: “We should not apologize,” “Aliyev thinks too highly of himself.” The same dynamic is now visible with Armenia, where Pashinyan is increasingly portrayed by Russian propaganda as some kind of “fascist.”
Now back to Ukraine.
Russia’s negotiating position has always revolved around preserving Moscow’s “right” to limit Ukraine’s sovereignty — whether in foreign policy or domestic affairs. The message is always the same: “if we allow it.” For the average Russian, this feels natural and correct.
But then comes spring 2026.
And suddenly ordinary Russians see with their own eyes that Russian military pressure and political dominance are not as absolute as they were told. Even the Victory Day parade no longer feels untouchable.
And against this backdrop, Zelensky symbolically “grants permission” to Putin to hold the parade on Red Square.
Yes — it is trolling.
Yes — it is humiliation.
But the important thing is not the reaction inside Ukraine. The important thing is how Russian society and Russian elites perceive it.
The elites already noticed — and made a mistake by amplifying the story themselves through outrage and endless reactions. Which means society noticed it too.
And now the key psychological barrier has been broken: Ukraine “dared” to mirror Russia’s own imperial attitude back at the Kremlin itself. To look down at Moscow — with sarcasm.
For many Russians, this is deeply uncomfortable. Painful, even.
Because moments like this slowly plant dangerous thoughts in people’s minds:
“Has our tsar become old and weak?”
And those thoughts, over time, can lead to very serious consequences.
Not bad for a document that probably took twenty minutes to write.
2 replies
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