From the linked article, as quoted in the OP, concerning the sstate of the law before Citizens United:
The notion of the business corporation as a person was in the past a legal fiction useful in the formation of business enterprises but never before was thought to confer political rights and protections equivalent to those of human beings, as the Supreme Court has held....
To the contrary, there were many, many instances before
Citizens United in which various Constitutional protections were held applicable to corporations. Just in the area of spending money to influence voters, there was
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978). For those who don't want to read the whole thing, here's the relevant part of the official summary (a U.S. Government work not under copyright so not subject to quotation restrictions), in which I've boldfaced the key sentence:
Appellants, national banking associations and business corporations, wanted to spend money to publicize their views opposing a referendum proposal to amend the Massachusetts Constitution to authorize the legislature to enact a graduated personal income tax. They brought this action challenging the constitutionality of a Massachusetts criminal
statute that prohibited them and other specified business corporations from making contributions or expenditures
"for the purpose of . . . influencing or affecting the vote on any question
submitted to the voters, other than one materially affecting any of the
property, business or assets of the corporation."
. . . .
Held:
. . . .
2. The portion of the Massachusetts statute at issue violates the First
Amendment as made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth.
(a) The expression proposed by appellants, namely, the expression of views on an issue of public importance, is at the heart of the First Amendment's concern. There is no support in the First or Fourteenth Amendment, or in this Court's decisions, for the proposition that such speech loses the protection otherwise afforded it by the First Amendment simply because its source is a corporation that cannot prove, to a court's satisfaction, a material effect on its business. Although appellee suggests that this Court's decisions generally have extended First Amendment rights only to corporations in the business of communications or which foster the self-expression of individuals, those decisions were not based on the rationale that the challenged communication materially affected the company's business. They were based, at least in part, on the Amendment's protection of public discussion and the dissemination of information and ideas. Similarly, commercial speech is accorded some constitutional protection not so much because it pertains to the seller's business as because it furthers the societal interest in the "free flow of commercial information." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U. S. 748, 425 U. S. 764.
(b) The asserted justifications for the challenged statute cannot survive
the exacting scrutiny required when the legislative prohibition is directed
at speech itself and speech on a public issue. This statute cannot be
justified by the State's asserted interest in sustaining the active role of
the individual citizen in the electoral process and preventing diminution
of his confidence in government. Even if it were permissible to silence
one segment of society upon a sufficient showing of imminent danger,
there has been no showing that the relative voice of corporations has
been overwhelming or even significant in influencing referenda in
Massachusetts, or that there has been any threat to the confidence of the citizenry in government. And the risk of corruption perceived in this Court's decisions involving candidate elections is not present in a popular vote on a public issue. Nor can the statute be justified on the
asserted ground that it protects the rights of shareholders whose views differ from those expressed by management on behalf of the corporation. The statute is both underinclusive and overinclusive in serving this purpose, and therefore could not be sustained even if the purpose itself were deemed compelling.
It's a mistake for progressives to focus on "corporate citizenship" if the consequence is an argument that the Constitution doesn't protect corporations. Could a tyrannical government simply seize property of a corporation that the President or the state Governor dislikes? Under current law, that could not happen, because all "persons" -- including corporations -- are constitutionally protected against having their property taken without due process of law. Some of the proposed amendments would eliminate that protection.
The real problem with both
First National Bank and
Citizens United is that they fail to recognize that spending money to influence voters is speech but is also conduct. The First Amendment protected an antiwar activist who wore a jacket saying "Fuck the Draft" into a courthouse, but it did not protect a draft protestor who burned his draft card. The difference was that the government could legitimately require young men to have and carry draft cards, and the destruction of one, even for free-speech purposes, was conduct that could be punished. The same should be held concerning the expenditure of corporate or individual funds in supporting or opposing a candidate or a ballot proposition.
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