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The NAALC (the labor protection provisions from NAFTA) and the ILO
Interesting (though somewhat old) background paper. The NAALC framework was one of Bill Clinton's biggest legacies (he added it to Poppy's earlier positions on NAFTA). It's a major reason we will not in our lifetimes form a free trade bloc with, say, India or China.
Also, this round-up provides a good overview of the bilateral agreements that seem to be the basis for the TPP negotiations, so they're probably good to consider right now (Chile/Singapore is particularly important, since along with Mexico they're the big question marks in the TPP). CAFTA in particular gave the US much more leverage to work for better labor rights in Central America, though the results have been mixed, like in the US.
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/ljawps/2/
Every successive trade agreement since NAFTA has been fundamentally based on the approach taken in the NAALC. The central tenet of the NAALC is that a country’s own internal labor laws become binding standards to which the state may be held by its trading partners. Within the NAALC, however, a member may change its labor laws at any time and for any reason – either increasing or decreasing the amount of protection it affords its own workers.
Substantively, the NAALC covers eleven specific areas of labor law including three union protections – the freedom of association and the right to organize; the right to collective bargaining; and the right to strike -- and eight so-called “technical labor standards,” such as compensation in cases of illness. Claims involving the eleven areas of law are heard in a three-tiered, graduated dispute settlement process involving consultation, evaluation and arbitration. However, the three union rights may only be heard at the consultation stage, and only three of the technical standards – minimum wage, child labor, and safety and health laws – may be heard at the arbitral stage. If a member state is unwilling to resolve a claim after the lengthy consultation and evaluation process, the arbitral panel may ultimately assign and impose a monetary assessment. The offending state may agree to pay the money, which it must use to improve its own deficient enforcement of labor laws, or it may choose to endure trade sanctions by the aggrieved state, up to the amount of the monetary assessment.
...
While U.S. influence over Central American laws is reduced by the disappearance of GSP sanctions, the lack of enforcement resources in those countries had already significantly diminished the supposed effectiveness of the unilateral option. While U.S. threats to restrict access to its market have proven effective at changing the laws on the books in foreign countries, national governments have often refused, or been unable to enforce those laws, rendering the statutory change ineffective. Violations of the new codes are no more feared in the workplace than violations of the old code. Thus the effectiveness of the GSP and other unilateral tools may be overestimated. Perhaps given U.S. frustrations with previous experiences, the focus of U.S. efforts in the labor chapter appears to have shifted from statutory change to “effective enforcement.”
...
Rather than imposing external standards on sovereign states, the U.S. can help ensure that foreign workers are empowered to negotiate their own standards. When pressing claims or negotiating future substantive protections, U.S. negotiators must be mindful that some rights, such as the right to organize and bargain collectively, are in themselves capable of creating and enforcing all other standards. Indeed, building the capacity of labor organizations would dramatically expand the enforcement capacity of less developed countries (LDC) without significant state expenditure. And despite the anxieties of LDC governments, empirical studies have demonstrated that observance of core labor rights do not significantly reduce the comparative advantage of cheap labor.
Substantively, the NAALC covers eleven specific areas of labor law including three union protections – the freedom of association and the right to organize; the right to collective bargaining; and the right to strike -- and eight so-called “technical labor standards,” such as compensation in cases of illness. Claims involving the eleven areas of law are heard in a three-tiered, graduated dispute settlement process involving consultation, evaluation and arbitration. However, the three union rights may only be heard at the consultation stage, and only three of the technical standards – minimum wage, child labor, and safety and health laws – may be heard at the arbitral stage. If a member state is unwilling to resolve a claim after the lengthy consultation and evaluation process, the arbitral panel may ultimately assign and impose a monetary assessment. The offending state may agree to pay the money, which it must use to improve its own deficient enforcement of labor laws, or it may choose to endure trade sanctions by the aggrieved state, up to the amount of the monetary assessment.
...
While U.S. influence over Central American laws is reduced by the disappearance of GSP sanctions, the lack of enforcement resources in those countries had already significantly diminished the supposed effectiveness of the unilateral option. While U.S. threats to restrict access to its market have proven effective at changing the laws on the books in foreign countries, national governments have often refused, or been unable to enforce those laws, rendering the statutory change ineffective. Violations of the new codes are no more feared in the workplace than violations of the old code. Thus the effectiveness of the GSP and other unilateral tools may be overestimated. Perhaps given U.S. frustrations with previous experiences, the focus of U.S. efforts in the labor chapter appears to have shifted from statutory change to “effective enforcement.”
...
Rather than imposing external standards on sovereign states, the U.S. can help ensure that foreign workers are empowered to negotiate their own standards. When pressing claims or negotiating future substantive protections, U.S. negotiators must be mindful that some rights, such as the right to organize and bargain collectively, are in themselves capable of creating and enforcing all other standards. Indeed, building the capacity of labor organizations would dramatically expand the enforcement capacity of less developed countries (LDC) without significant state expenditure. And despite the anxieties of LDC governments, empirical studies have demonstrated that observance of core labor rights do not significantly reduce the comparative advantage of cheap labor.
I limited it to four paragraphs, but the bit on the International Labour Organization is definitely worth reading too, particularly as regards formal vs. substantive compliance -- Honduras has ratified four times as many provisions of the ILO as the US has, but it would be difficult to seriously claim Honduras substantively protects its workers better than the US.
