Guardian exposes Russian "troll center" where paid trolls spew Putin web propaganda.

"Novaya Gazeta" is publishing Russia’s plan for the annexation of a number of territories of Ukraine, which were drawn up when Yanukovych was still president of this country.

The document that has come into the possession of Novaya was presumably “brought in” to the Presidential Administration in the period between February 4 and February 12, 2014.

2. Russia’s policy toward Ukraine must finally become pragmatic.

First, the regime of Viktor Yanukovych has gone totally bankrupt. Its political, diplomatic, financial, and information support from the Russian Federation is no longer meaningful.

Second, as a sporadic civil war in the form of urban guerrilla of the so-called “supporters of the Maidan” against the leadership of a number of the country’s eastern regions has become a fact, while the disintegration of the Ukrainian state along the line of geographical demarcation of regional alliances - “western regions plus Kyiv” and “eastern regions plus Crimea” - has become part of the political agenda, in these circumstances, Russia should in no way limit its policy toward Ukraine only to attempts to influence the political situation in Kyiv and the relationship of a systemic opposition (A. Yatsenyuk, V. Klitschko, O. Tyagnybok, P . Poroshenko, etc.) with the European Commission.

Third, in an almost complete paralysis of the central government, unable to form a responsible government even facing threats of default and of Naftogaz lacking funds to pay for Russian gas, Russia is simply obliged to get involved in the geopolitical intrigue of the European Community directed against the territorial integrity of Ukraine.

First of all, this is because otherwise our country risks losing not only the Ukrainian energy market, but also indirect control over Ukraine’s gas transportation system, which is much more dangerous. This will endanger the position of Gazprom in Central and Southern Europe, causing huge damage to our country’s economy.

3. The Constitution of Ukraine is in no case able to provide for a mechanism that could legitimately initiate the integration of Ukraine’s eastern territories and Crimea into the state-legal framework of the Russian Federation.

. . .
Current events in Kyiv convincingly show that the Yanukovych’s time in power could end at any moment. Thus, there is less and less time for an appropriate Russian response. The number of dead in riots in the capital of Ukraine is direct evidence of the inevitability of civil war and the impossibility of reaching consensus if Yanukovych remains president. In these circumstances, it seems appropriate to play along the centrifugal aspirations of the various regions of the country, with a view to initiate the accession of its eastern regions to Russia, in one form or another. Crimea and Kharkiv region should become the dominant regions for making such efforts, as there already exist reasonably large groups there that support the idea of maximum integration with Russia.

4. Of course, taking the burden of supporting Crimea and several eastern territories, Russia will be forced to take on budget expenses, which would be cumbersome in the country’s present position.

Undoubtedly, this will affect macroeconomic stability and the prospects for economic growth. However, geopolitically, the prize will be invaluable: our country will gain access to new demographic resources, highly qualified industry and transport personnel will be at its disposal. In addition, it can count on the emergence of new eastward Slavic migration flows - as opposed to the Central Asian migration trends. The industrial potential of the Eastern Ukraine, including the military-industrial sector, once included in the Russian military-industrial complex, will allow for the faster and more successful implementation of the program of rearmament of Russia’s military forces.

What is equally important, Russia’s constructive, “smoothing” participation in the highly probable disintegration of the Ukrainian state will not only give new impetus to the Kremlin’s integration project, but will also allow our country to retain control over Ukraine’s gas transportation system, as mentioned above. And at the same time, it will allow there to be significant changes in the geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe, allowing Russia to regain its major role there.

5. To start the process of a “pro-Russian drift” of Crimea and eastern Ukrainian territories, events should be created beforehand that can support this process with political legitimacy and moral justification; also a PR-strategy should be built that draws attention to the forced, reactive nature of the actions of Russia and the pro-Russian political elites of southern and eastern Ukraine.