http://journal-neo.org/2013/06/10/the-korean-war-and-the-peace-treaty-issue/
For a quick look, here -
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_Armistice_Agreement#United_States_abrogation_of_paragraph_13.28d.29
For a more longer look, this -
http://www.japanfocus.org/-Lee-Jae_Bong/3053/article.html
The Pentagon claimed that North Korea had introduced by early 1956 some 450 fighter planes into North Korea, of which over 250 were jet aircraft, and that it was a matter of urgency to replace obsolete weapons and equipment used by the U.S.F.K. and South Korean forces. They proposed two ways to introduce new weapons, including nuclear and other materiel into South Korea. One was the temporary suspension of the armistice agreement, and the other was the reinterpretation of paragraph 13(d) of the agreement. The UNC also iterated the need to replace obsolete weapons in South Korea through a more 'flexible' interpretation of the relevant clause.
...Although the Pentagon acknowledged that evidence to back up raw intelligence reports on the physical existence of nuclear weapons or its delivery systems in North Korea did not exist, it contended that new weapons and equipment had been introduced after the ceasefire and that it might not be long before delivery systems for nuclear weapons entered the communist nation.
Nevertheless, at a June 1956 meeting of the Military Armistice Commission at Panmunjom, the U.S.F.K. and UNC issued a statement detailing 'alleged' North Korean violations of paragraph 13(d) of the armistice agreement and indicating that the UNC would no longer consider itself bound by that paragraph until such time as the relative military balance has been restored and North Korea has demonstrated its willingness to comply with the terms of the armistice. On the heels of the expulsion of the NNSC inspection teams in June 1956, the U.S. had abrogated the very clause that prevented it from deploying nuclear weapons in South Korea.
The NNSC was the group meant to monitor both sides to ensure no new weapons were introduced. The UNC alledged that NK had new weapons and pretty much forced out their monitor teams, telling them to go and look into N. Korea harder because they are hiding new toys somewhere. Well, guess what we did right after that?
Yep. Christmas time, new toys!
The NNSC later pulled out of NK since they were not allowed back in to monitor SK, realizing that the only reason they weren't let back in was because one side was playing dirty - Since one side had no intention of staying to the agreements, they felt no need to hold the other side to them pretty much.
As for the 'They had new weapons in in early 1956..." comment, well...
The U.S. Department of Defense began weighing the option of deploying atomic weapons in South Korea around January 1956 at the latest. In a joint meeting of State and Defense Department officials on January 6, 1956, Maxwell Taylor, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, said that new tanks and new types of artillery would be introduced into Korea if it were not for paragraph 13(d) of the armistice agreement, and in particular, mentioned the possibility of introducing Honest John missiles that could be mounted with atomic cannons and nuclear weapons. Also, the Commander-in-Chief of the UNC (CINCUNC) Lyman Lemnitzer sent a telegram dated January 30, 1956 to the Department of the Army in which he suggested that it was highly desirable for the U.S.F.K. to possess weapons with atomic delivery capability in order to alleviate the imbalance of strength between the opposing forces in Korea.
We were trying to get new weapons in at the same time, or even before.
Combine this with the unproven allegations made against NK, that we used to justify ignoring the armstice, well... If it talks like a duck and walks like a duck...
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