New evidence finds anomalies in Wisconsin vote, but no conclusive evidence of fraud

[Coyotl]

Source: WA Post by Walter R. Mebane, Jr.

Did the outcome of voting for president in Wisconsin accurately reflect the intentions of the electors? Concerns have been raised about errors in vote counts produced using electronic technology were machines hacked? and a recount may occur.

Some reports involving statistical analysis of the results has been discussed in the media recently. These analyses, though, rely on data at the county level. Technology, demographics and other important characteristics of the electorate vary within counties, making it difficult to resolve conclusively whether voting technology (did voters cast paper or electronic ballots?) affected the final tabulation of the vote for president.

For this reason, I have examined ward-level data. Wards are the smallest aggregation unit at which vote counts are reported in Wisconsin, and many wards have fewer than 100 voters. My analysis, which relies on using election forensics techniques designed to identify electoral fraud, reveals some reasons to be suspicious about vote patterns in Wisconsin. To be very clear, my analysis cannot prove whether fraud occurred, but it does suggest that it would be valuable to conduct an election audit to resolve such concerns definitively.

Read more: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/28/new-evidence-finds-anomalies-in-wisconsin-vote-but-no-conclusive-evidence-of-fraud/

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Wisconsin precincts are the smallest reporting units, and wards report aggregates of precincts. This is one problem I've encountered in analysis of Wisconsin, the reporting units are not equal. Good election analysis requires precinct level reporting, and Wisconsin makes that impossible by not reporting on the precinct level is some Republican-dominated areas. However, this is not a big issue in this particular type of analysis.

Wisconsin's reported results are very anomalous in terms of the exit polls and pre-election polling, second only to Ohio among the battleground states with robust polling.

[mopinko]

1. i've been thinking about this, and this is what i think we need-

all election systems are some point are computer counted. computers always know what time it is. a time stamp should be affixed to the votes, and at least hourly totals reported on election eve tallies.
if someone is really "stuffing the ballot box", that is usually something that is a short burst of activity, usually late in the day, when turnout numbers give parties a clue which way the wind is blowing.
if there is an hour in the day that gets unusual traffic, especially if it is not the usual rush time, ding ding ding, we have a red flag.

you could also mark the time on the ballot applications, or even the ballots themselves, if they are paper, and make sure they line up w the time stamps on the counters.

we also need to be protecting our own precincts, where ever we are. tallies are posted after the counts are done, and we should all be checking that those are the numbers that appear in the final tally. i am guilty of not doing this, but we all really should. me first.

certainly cursed to be living in interesting times.

[Coyotl]

2. The way you stuff a ballot box is by replacing ballots cast by voters with ones you fill out.

Chain of custody is the issue. We need hand-counted paper ballots reported at the precinct level, so we have a vote tally before the ballots go off in someone's car, maybe a right wing sheriff's deputy or someone else to a central tabulator.

[mopinko]

3. the elections i worked in chicago

there were seals all over the place in the supply box, but there was no reporting anywhere of the numbers, etc, except those on the final packaging of the election materials, and data cartridges.
i recall being unable to figure out which seal went on what, even tho they were all color coded, and different sizes. wasnt mentioned in the judges trainings i went to.
also think some judges dont put the seals on the ballot box in case they need to muck around w the tabulator in some way. i always made sure it was sealed cuz this was the "dummy station". you parked your barely sentient judge there to keep them out of trouble. they just thanked voters and handed out the little stickers.

iirc, those actual numbers arent written down till they get to the receiving stations. they check it when you enter the building, after making sure the whole thing is complete.

none really on the equipment being returned.

i agree that the trip to the receiving station is rife w opportunity for abuse. pocket the seals, hope no one notices, walk out the door, substitute you own materials, bingo.
doing that run is the last thing i ever wanted to do. any 2 judges who volunteer get the honors. then they are free. and get a bonus in their pay to boot.
sadly, we certainly have adequate technology to fix this. thumbprints on the envelopes, easily matched to the files created in advance of each judge. done. mostly.

i am eagerly awaiting the recounts, and so thrilled that the team will include people w the standing/stones to insist on a full audit, not just a sham count.

[riversedge]

4. Rec and thanks for post

[riversedge]

5. We need an audit--not just a recount!!...

https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/11/28/new-evidence-finds-anomalies-in-wisconsin-vote-but-no-conclusive-evidence-of-fraud/?utm_term=.847d7bee12e8

................A rigorous post-election audit, like some are trying to have happen in several states, is not subject to the limitations that prevent a full regression-style analysis nor to the interpretive uncertainty involved in using statistics like those from the Toolkit.

A crucial feature of an audit is that paper ballots are inspected directly by humans and not merely tabulated again by a machine, which can happen in a recount under some state recount procedures. An audit can tell us at least whether the votes marked on paper have been correctly tabulated by the machines.

A rigorous audit or a full recount that has humans manually checking the paper ballots can provide convincing evidence about who won the election. In the current environment, the reassurance such an audit may provide would contribute to the incoming government’s legitimacy.

Walter R. Mebane Jr. is a research associate at the Center for Political Studies, professor of political science and professor of statistics at the University of Michigan.
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