How to Break the Cycle of Conflict With Russia

[BeckyDem]

Seeking Consensus Isn’t Appeasement—It’s Pragmatism
By Samuel Charap
February 7, 2022


( Long read and well thought out. )


Excerpt:

It was not easy to unite a group that included authors from countries, including Russia and Ukraine, that are essentially at war. But we did eventually settle on a comprehensive proposal for a revised regional order that covers security, regional conflicts, and economic integration. Our proposal would create a new consultative body for major-power engagement on regional security, new norms for the behavior of NATO and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization toward nonmembers (such as not calling into question the legitimacy of the other and its current membership), and an offer of multilateral security guarantees and other confidence-building measures to nonaligned states. It would facilitate increased multidirectional trade within the region; establish regular dialogue between the EU, the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and nonmembers of those trading blocs; and establish new rules to avoid future crises. Finally, our plan would provide mechanisms and processes to immediately improve the livelihoods of people living in regional conflict zones and eventually progress toward mutually agreed settlements.

A mutually agreed alternative to the current regional order would benefit all parties.

Our approach reflects the fact that disputes over security, regional conflicts, and regional integration are all interlinked. For example, Georgia’s separatist conflicts would need to be addressed in a mutually acceptable way if Tbilisi were to consider a nonaligned status. And conversely, these conflicts will remain unresolvable without movement toward a common approach on the regional security regime. The disputes over these issues cannot be separated, and therefore the solutions must be combined.

To see how this might work in practice, consider the hardest and most relevant case for today: Ukraine. In return for voluntarily adopting a nonaligned status, Kyiv could receive both multilateral security guarantees and Russian commitments of military restraint, including along the border area. Russia and the West would hold regular consultations on security issues and, importantly, commit to seeking mutual consensus before making changes to the regional security architecture. They would commit to respecting Ukraine’s nonalignment. The current negotiations over the Donbas region of southeastern Ukraine would have been significantly accelerated as part of a new international commitment to settling the conflict. And in addition to its current free trade deal with the EU, Ukraine would benefit from a restoration of trade with Russia (now hampered by Moscow’s punitive sanctions) and the creation of a trilateral consultation mechanism with the EU and the EAEU. These arrangements would provide far greater security, stability, and prosperity to Ukraine than the status quo—even if Russia were not threatening an imminent invasion.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2022-02-07/how-break-cycle-conflict-russia


Charap's bio can be read here: https://www.cnas.org/people/samuel-charap

[FreepFryer]

1. Bad take, imho, because it assumes the continuation of Putin's regime, ignores info war on the US.

We - and more and more of the Russian people, as well as their European neighbors - are done w his shenanigans.

[thucythucy]

2. Hasn't this been tried already?

Soon after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine agreed to give up its substantial nuclear arsenal in return for "guarantees" that its borders and sovereignty would be respected.

Not being Ukrainian I can't be sure, but I suspect in view of what's happened since that many there would not be willing to put a whole lot of faith in Russian guarantees of "military restraint."

[marie999]

4. I don't think Putin wants a war with Ukraine. Russia and Belarus could win but at too great a cost

But I think he would invade if Ukraine became a member of NATO. Russia and Belarus would not allow NATO to have a 3,322-mile border with Russia and Belarus.

[thucythucy]

7. If that's the case then his actions thus far have been counter productive.

The one sure way to push Ukraine and the Baltic states (and Finland and Sweden) into a tighter relationship with NATO is to seem to threaten military action against them.

With the exception of Sweden, all these nations have been attacked and/or occupied by Russia within living memory. It makes sense then that they'd want to enter into alliances to keep from this happening again.

If Putin was truly concerned about securing Russia's borders, he'd act to reassure his neighbors of his peaceful intentions. Instead, he's done just the opposite, provoking precisely the response he says he wants to avoid.

But I don't think this is about securing the borders of Russia and Belarus. Instead, it seems to me to be more about expanding those borders or at the least destabilizing Ukraine, something that has provoked an understandable anxiety on the part of Russia's neighbors.

The irony is that perhaps the gravest threat to Russian territory comes not from Europe--which after all is largely dependent on Russia for natural gas--but from China. The Soviet Union and China were in an actual shooting war along their thousand-mile border back in the latter half of the 20th century, and these tensions persist. There is a large swath of Siberia along the border with Manchuria that China continues to claim as its own.

Instead, it seems what Putin fears most is the example of prosperous, relatively stable and relatively free nations along his border, which set a bad example for his own people. A truly independent Ukraine, along with the Baltic states, relatively free of corruption and authoritarian rule, represent a far greater threat to his kleptocracy than any possible military threat from the west.

That's how I see this, anyway.

Best wishes.

[BeckyDem]

8. Not expanding. But I agree with you that he really does see any success free of corruption

on the border as a threat to his reign.

[marie999]

3. That is what I have been posting.

Ukraine needs to become a buffer country. Putin will not allow NATO to have a 3,322-mile border with Russia and Belarus. Putin does not want a war.

[marie999]

5. This is ther post I wrote in January.

Ukraine becomes a buffer zone. It does not join NATO and NATO doesn't put any troops in Ukraine. It is allowed defensive weapons worked out in an agreement. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus only put token forces near their borders also worked out in an agreement. NATO does not trust Russia for good reasons, but Russia also has good reason not to trust NATO. Does anyone have a better solution to avoid a war?

[BeckyDem]

6. I doubt it, Marie.

Thank you. +1

[Martin68]

9. This OP assumes both sides are negotiating in good faith with no hidden agenda (like taking another

piece to (or all of) Ukraine.

[dalton99a]

10. Russia agreed to a similar arrangement in 1994. Putin declared it null and void.

https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf