Climate Change Will Reshape Russia

[Uncle Joe]

Heather A. Conley

Cyrus Newlin

January 13, 2021

When U.S. policymakers ponder Russia’s trajectory, they tend to focus on the leadership and longevity of President Vladimir Putin and the nature of his regime, on the Kremlin’s growing authoritarian tendencies at home and the poisoning of opposition figures, on Russia’s nuclear arsenal and cyber capabilities, or on Russia’s projection of power abroad, from election interference to military interventions in Ukraine and Syria. Rarely does climate change make the shortlist. Yet it is climate change, as much as any one politician or set of policies, that will exert the strongest force on Russia’s strategic future, reshaping its politics, economy, and society for decades to come.

(snip)

Dramatic shifts in global weather patterns, accelerated by warming Arctic waters and a diminishing ice cap, are expected to increase droughts in Russia’s rich southern agricultural “bread basket” regions encompassing Stavropol and Rostov. This could pose food security risks and threaten a primary Russian export: wheat. Though climate change will expand arable land in Russia in its northern latitudes, the northern topsoil tends to be thinner and more acidic than in Russia’s most productive southern regions and would not make up for its losses. In fact, arable land shrank by more than half to just 120,000 acres in 2017. In June of this year, regional officials in Stravopol, one of Russia’s major wheat regions, projected a remarkable 40 percent decline in wheat crop in 2020 as a result of droughts. This too has global implications: Russia is a core part of global food chains, accounting for 20 percent of global wheat exports, so climate disruption to Russian agricultural output will have strong effects well beyond Russia’s borders and budget coffers. As agriculture shifts north, scientists are concerned that the cultivation of carbon-rich soils will create a separate carbon feedback loop and expedite global warming.

(snip)

Meanwhile, Russia’s overreliance on hydrocarbon production is a conspicuous vulnerability as the world shifts toward low-carbon sources of energy and carbon neutrality. Natural gas and Arctic liquified natural gas may serve as bridge for Russia into a lower-carbon future, but global demand for gas is expected to be in sharp decline by mid-century. Russia’s top-down federal policy strongly favors state-led and managed industrial oil and gas giants. Though Russia has immense potential as a source of renewable energy, the share of renewables in Russia’s energy mix is negligible—under 0.1 percent for wind, solar, and geothermal—and there are no clear plans to invest significantly in their growth. Nor do current strategy documents foresee a major growth in nuclear and hydropower, which currently account for 36 percent of Russia’s electricity mix but under current plans will only climb to 43 percent by 2050. (To limit global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius, renewables must account for 70-85 percent of global electricity by 2050.)

(snip)

Change Has Already Arrived

Climate change will continue to compel change within Russia whether its leaders acknowledge the issue or not. The most immediate and significant thrust for change within Russia will come from the outside, as major energy export markets accelerate their environmental policies. This poses an existential threat to Russia’s economic model of hydrocarbon and mineral export, a threat heightened by years of weak domestic growth and a global economy suppressed by the pandemic. But change is also occurring from within, as climate-linked environmental disasters take their toil and as scarce state resources fail to address the growing frequency and magnitude of infrastructure decay, wildfires, local pollution, and other climate-related challenges, fueling protests and increasing tensions between regional governors and Moscow. The Russian Arctic, in particular, will be a case study in how climate change, regional political dynamics, and Russia’s economic ambitions interact, as businessmen, regional officials, and federal ministers, including key members of the Kremlin’s inner circle, jockey for state development resources but defer responsibility for funding disaster recovery and climate resilience. Our research and analysis must determine how climate change and climate policies—both internally and externally—will shape Russia’s future, and, in the near term, how the Kremlin and its fossil fuel export-based economy will—or will not—respond.


Cyrus Newlin is an associate fellow with the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Heather A. Conley is senior vice president for Europe, Eurasia, and the Arctic and director of the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/climate-change-will-reshape-russia