The history of the 'false positives' in the La Popa Battalion
This is a translation from The Herald
One of the most widely read newspapers in Colombia.
The history of the 'false positives' in the La Popa Battalion
Between paramilitary alliances and internal criminal logistics, 127 extrajudicial executions were configured in the La Popa Battalion.
"My dad was also a 'false positive' from the National Army." Thus, as difficult as it sounds and with all the weight, pain and harsh reality that that phrase entails, Laura Piña had to accept, at age 14, that her father had ceased to be an ordinary Colombian, painter and taxi driver in Barranquilla , to make part of the number of people extrajudicially executed and presented as casualties in combat by soldiers from the La Popa Battalion in Valledupar.
After eight months of a tireless search, since his disappearance on March 1, 2005, the body of Álvaro Adolfo Piña Londoño, his father, had been found in the capital of Cesar, buried as a nomen nescio (NN), who in Spanish can be interpreted as no name, and reported by soldiers as a member of an illegal armed group and killed in combat.
“Through local media we had an indication that my father could be buried as a NN, the comparison of footprints verified that this body was my father; an average Colombian, one of those who read stories to their daughters, who had no direct relationship with the armed conflict. It was then that we found out: my father was a 'false positive' ”, the woman told EL HERALDO.
Álvaro Piña, recognized by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP) as one of the 127 extrajudicial executions for which last Thursday, through Auto 128 of 2021, 15 soldiers who were part of the Artillery Battalion No.2 were charged. La Popa (BAPOP), between January 9, 2002 and July 9, 2005, within the Costa Caribe sub-case, one of the six prioritized areas of case 03, called 'Assassinations and forced disappearances presented as casualties in combat by agents of the State '.
In the framework of the investigation, the special court determined that within that military unit a criminal organization was formed whose purpose was to present fictitious operational results in which they presented as "casualties in combat" people killed in a defenseless state by members of the Army or by paramilitaries, with whom they worked hand in hand.
There were no isolated events. The military acted in full knowledge of their illegality, because according to the JEP "they covered up their actions to make them look legal." The Reconnaissance Room documented two modalities that became a pattern. The first consisted of holding and later killing the victims at checkpoints, in search and control operations in the area, and the second, deceiving and transferring victims from Barranquilla and Valledupar.
"People without support networks or family members who did not try to find them when their disappearance occurred and those who were deceived by promises of alleged legal or illegal work were chosen to capture and assassinate them," the JEP determined.
It was thus, with the promise of a better future, that Álvaro Piña came to Valledupar not to return to Barranquilla. “My father dreamed of giving us higher education to all his daughters and according to what the JEP has investigated, he was taken away with job offers, but it ended up being a 'false positive'”, Laura said.
The logistics to attract the 'false positives' began with an alliance between some members of the Army and the paramilitaries in the area. Links could be established with the Frente Mártires del Cacique de Upar, of the Northern Block of the AUC, who were in charge of handing over the victims to battalion troops after being detained, because at that time, the presentation of casualties in combat was an indicator of military success.
Within the Battalion, as determined by the JEP, the operation was like that of a criminal organization, with a detailed division of labor that was executed repeatedly and was adapted to allow that, regardless of changes in personnel and circumstances, the phenomenon persist and consolidate. "In some cases it led to the specialization of functions such as executing the victims, establishing contacts with the paramilitaries, participating in acts of combat simulation, preparing false documentation, obtaining weapons and uniforms or searching for victims in other places" .
After the murder, the court was able to verify that the victims were equipped with weapons, ammunition, uniforms and war material to pretend that they belonged to an illegal group and to justify the existence of assumptions to cover up the behavior and make the community believe that they were fighting the armed groups and giving these actions a touch of legality.
Among the main patterns of conduct, the JEP established that circumstances were documented that prevented the victims from accessing justice and generated the idea among those involved that their actions would go unpunished. Among these behaviors the most recurrent was reporting her as NN
Although this practice spread in the BAPOP, the special platoons Trueno and Claw, which were presented as an example for the others, were decisive in the commission of the crimes. Both were used as units aimed at obtaining illegitimate results. Of the 30 operations that the two platoons reported during the period analyzed, the JEP determined that 26 were illegitimate.
Likewise, the JEP was able to verify that 87% of the operational results reported during the command of Colonel Publio Hernán Mejía Gutiérrez, former commander of the La Popa Army Battalion between 2002 and 2003, were determined by the Chamber as murders and disappearances. And that his successor Juan Carlos Figueroa Suárez (2004 - 2005) continued the criminal act.
The alliance of the commands with the paramilitaries was maintained at various levels until the demobilization of these groups, when pressure for results in the middle of the paramilitary demobilization was essential for the criminal plan to be adapted with a view to continuing to respond to the need. to present casualties regardless of the origin of the victims.
The professor and historian of the Caribbean, Alejandro Blanco told this publishing house that “extrajudicial executions are one of the aberrant phenomena that occurred in the midst of the internal Armed Conflict, this fact has no precedent in the history of contemporary armed conflicts in West".
The historian explained that the Caribbean was seen as a kind of war laboratory against insurgents where dozens of extrajudicial executions were planned and carried out. The link of the La Popa Battalion with extrajudicial executions in the department of Cesar and Guajira are a clear example of this ”.
In the logic of construction of macroprocesses of the JEP, the universe of facts goes beyond the identification of the case by case. In this sense, the special court was able to verify that they followed the same line of conduct promoted by the BAPOP command, that they were not isolated events or committed spontaneously by its members.
The countdown for those linked began to tick. The 30 days after July 15 that the indictment was issued are decisive and both victims and perpetrators know it, so Laura sees in the actions of the JEP "a flash of justice, within a universe of impunity."
"It is progress, the next 30 days are important for as victims to make annotations to what the JEP has said, and for the military to recognize and begin to contribute to that truth," Piña mentioned.
He pointed out that "at least we were able to find my father's body, but I speak for those who still do not have remains to mourn and the only thing to know where the disappeared are is speaking, is that those responsible make an acknowledgment of that atrocious truth."
More:
https://www.elheraldo.co/colombia/la-macabra-logistica-detras-de-los-falsos-positivos-en-el-caribe-834634
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