Russia's Return to the Middle East (THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL)
THE FOREIGN SERVICE JOURNAL > JULY/AUGUST 2020
By Angela Stent.
Russia’s return to the Middle East is one of the major successes of President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy. After the USSR’s collapse, post-Soviet Russia did not have the wherewithal to sustain previous commitments in the region, and largely withdrew. But when Putin came to power 20 years ago and the Russian economy began to recover, Russia gradually ventured back into the region...By returning to the Middle East, Putin was able to escape the isolation that the West sought to impose on Russia after the 2014 annexation of Crimea and launch of a war in the Donbas region of Ukraine. Unlike in Soviet times, Russia’s involvement in the Middle East today is nonideological, pragmatic and flexible. Russia is the only major power that talks to all sides in all the conflicts in the region. It has close ties to Iran, to all the major Sunni states—and to Israel. Indeed, its newest partners are two close U.S. allies, Saudi Arabia and Israel. Both countries believe that Russia can act as a restraining influence over their chief adversary, Iran.
... Putin has also used Russia’s return to the Middle East to reinforce his popularity domestically. The Russian population is increasingly feeling the effect of the country’s economic challenges, and the Kremlin appeals to its citizens by evoking their pride in Russia’s role as a great power that once again has a seat on the global board of directors. But, in the era of the COVID-19 pandemic, the mobilizing effect of Russia’s role in the Syrian civil war has declined as Russia’s economic situation has deteriorated. More Russians ask why resources are being expended for foreign military campaigns when they could be better deployed domestically. Nevertheless, public opinion data show that the majority of Russians do believe that Russia is a great power once again.
... Russia’s capacity to expand its presence in the Middle East could, of course, be limited by the longer-term effects of the pandemic on the Russian economy. The Syrian operation has, so far, not required significant resources. Putin has been a talented tactician in the Middle East—as elsewhere—taking advantage of opportunities presented to him by Western indecision and inaction to insert Russia into Syria and beyond. So far the focus has been on ensuring that Russia remains a player in the region and concluding profitable deals there. Moreover, the Kremlin relies heavily on private military groups such as the Wagner Group—as opposed to the Russian armed forces—to do most of the fighting in the Middle East. In May, the United States reported that Russia was sending fighter jets to Libya to support Russian mercenaries and Syrian soldiers fighting alongside rebel commander General Haftar against the U.N.-recognized Libyan government, which is backed by Turkey. Despite the pandemic, Russia has stepped up its involvement in the Libyan civil war.
It is unclear whether Putin has a longer-term strategy for the Middle East. Russia cannot replace the United States, either economically or militarily, in the region. But if Washington continues its withdrawal from the area—a process that the pandemic could accelerate—Russia will surely pursue future opportunities there. This assumes that Russia emerges from the current COVID-19 crisis with its attendant economic contraction, and is still able to project power beyond its borders. So far, despite its severe domestic toll on the Russian population, the pandemic does not appear to be constraining Russia’s activities in the Middle East.
More here
http://www.afsa.org/russias-return-middle-east
Could not do this article justice. It is long but really worth the read.
Note on the author: Angela Stent is Director of the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies and Professor of Government and Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. She is also a Senior Fellow (nonresident) at the Brookings Institution and co-chairs its Hewett Forum on Post-Soviet Affairs. During the academic year 2015–2016 she was a Fellow at the Transatlantic Academy of the German Marshall Fund. From 2004 to 2006 she served on the National Intelligence Council as National Intelligence Officer for Russia and Eurasia. From 1999 to 2001 she served in the Office of Policy Planning at the U.S. Department of State. Dr. Stent served as a member of the senior advisory panel for NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander in Europe for Admiral James Satvridis and General Philip Breedlove. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.
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