Intel Community and DOS IGs found that HRC "emails were not retroactively classified"

The Freedom of information Act (FOIA) requires the government to release all, or all parts of a document, that do not fall under a specific set of allowed exemptions. If information cannot be excluded, it must be released. If some part of a document can be redacted to allow the rest of the document to be released, then that is what must be done. Each redaction must be justified by citing a specific reason for exclusion.

But don’t believe me. Instead, look at page two of this State Department document which lists the exemptions.

Note specifically the different types of “(b)(3)” redactions, including “CIA PERS/ORG.” As common sense would dictate, the government will not release the names of CIA employees via the FOIA process. It would — literally — be against the law. What law? Depending on the nature of the individual’s job at CIA, National Security Act of 1947, the CIA Act of 1949, various laws that govern undercover/clandestine CIA officers and, potentially, the Espionage Act of 1917.

Yet Hillary’s emails contain at least three separate, specific instances where she mentioned in an unclassified email transmitted across the open Internet and wirelessly to her Blackberry the names of CIA personnel. Here they are. Look for the term “(b)(3) CIA PERS/ORG” Click on the links and see for yourself: CIA One; CIA Two; CIA Three

May 10, 2016: The New York Times reports that 18 of Clinton's publicly released emails have been deemed classified on the grounds that they identified CIA officials. The Times claims that, "In 18 emails, for example, information has been classified on the grounds that it identifies CIA officials, including two instances that are now considered "secret." (The New York Times, 5/10/2016) However, this is not entirely accurate. A search of the State Department's database of Clinton's released emails indicates that 49 emails used the code "B3 CIA PERS/ORG," which indicates a redacted mention of secret CIA personnel or organizational details. Many of these are emails from the same email chain. But there are in fact five separate chains mentioning the name of a CIA official classified at the "secret" level, not two. (US Department of State, 1/29/2016) (US Department of State, 2/29/2016) (US Department of State, 1/29/2016) (US Department of State, 1/29/2016) (US Department of State, 1/29/2016) There are 17 more separate email chains that have the redacted names of secret CIA officials, for a total of 22, not 18. Additionally, it has previously been reported that a "handful" of additional emails make veiled references to the fact that certain government officials actually work for the CIA. (NBC News, 2/4/2016)

Source: The Clinton Email Scandal Timeline ©2016 #ClintonEmailTimeline
http://www.thompsontimeline.com/The_Clinton_Email_Scandal_-_Long_Version_-_Part_8

In addition to the F.B.I. investigation, there are continuing inquiries into Mrs. Clinton’s emails by the inspector general of the State Department, the inspector general of the intelligence agencies, the State Department’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security

The dual complaints from the campaign trail and from Capitol Hill regarding the watchdogs could be an effort to proactively inoculate Clinton should one of the two offices issue a report that is damaging to Clinton's presidential campaign. Clinton's campaign has already aggressively worked to undermine the credibility of the two offices. Brian Fallon, a spokesman for Clinton's campaign, has accused the inspector general of the intelligence community of working in concert with Senate Republicans to release information about classified material in Clinton's email to damage her. And he has complained that a top official in the State Department's IG office used to work for Republican Sen. Chuck Grassley (Iowa). He declined to comment on the new congressional letter.

The lawmakers also questioned the qualifications of the IGs in classification decision making. “Classification determinations are complex, subjective, often in dispute between different agencies, and are not normally within the purview of Inspectors General,” they wrote. “In fact, inspectors general are not even mentioned in Executive Order 13526, which establishes the rules for classifying, safeguarding, and declassifying national security information. We are concerned that the review process being undertaken by the two inspector general offices has not taken these complexities or the interagency differences on each email into account.”

They asked that “any future reviews and releases be 100 percent accurate, impartial and complete. We also expect written communications regarding your offices’ review to be precise and impartial,” they said.

Prosecutors and FBI agents investigating Clinton's use of a personal email server have so far found scant evidence that the leading Democratic presidential candidate intended to break classification rules, though they are still probing the case aggressively with an eye on interviewing Clinton herself, according to U.S. officials familiar with the matter.

That point about her intending to break classification rules is important, because in order to have broken the law, it isn't enough for Clinton to have had classified information in a place where it was possible for it to be hacked. She would have had to intentionally given classified information to someone without authorization to have it, like Gen. David Petraeus did when he showed classified documents to his mistress (and then lied to the FBI about it, by the way). Despite the enormous manpower and time the Justice Department has devoted to this case, there has never been even a suggestion, let alone any evidence, that Clinton did any such thing.

...

Just to be clear: I'm not defending Clinton's decision to use her own email for work, and house it on a private server. That was a mistake. It violated State Department policy. She shouldn't have done it. But acknowledging that is very different from saying she broke the law or jeopardized national security. As of now there is zero evidence that she did either.

http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-hillary-clinton-emails-private-server-20160509-story.html

Here’s what we know about the investigation so far.

The FBI is conducting an investigation. (It’s the Federal Bureau of Investigation, after all.)

Inspectors General from the State Department and the intelligence community referred the case to the Executive Branch in July 2015. The referral memo made clear that the Inspectors General were not suggesting that anyone involved in Clinton’s email setup committed a crime. Rather, they were following their statutory obligation to inform the intelligence community about any potential security breach — namely, that Clinton possibly held classified information on her email server located outside secure government facilities*.

Clinton says she never knowingly sent or received classified information, a possibly criminal action.

http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/article/2016/may/12/fbis-investigation-hillary-clintons-emails-recap/

B6
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
RELEASE IN
PART B6
From: Sidney Blumenthal
Sent: Thursday, October 25, 2012 9:57 AM
To:
Subject: H: Latest intel: Libyan leadership private discussions. Sid
Attachments: rim memo Libyan Leadership Private Discussions 102512,docx
CONFIDENTIAL
October 25, 2012
For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions Sz Plans
SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as the
highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
1. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that he and
Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff General Youssef al
Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with Misrata and Zintan militias
in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country. According to a sensitive
source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on September ii, 2012 Mangoush resisted
greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing that such a move undercuts the
government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias left over from the 2011 civil war. At
this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that the situation in the country is becoming
increasingly dangerous and unmanageable. Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work
with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the Zintan forces to step up operations against the other
militias, (supported by the Misrata troops), that also come from the mountainous region of Western
Libya. At the same time he will instruct NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa
Belgasirn Haftar to pursue operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in
Southern and Southeastern Libya.
2. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Zidan agree that Libya's
future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation over the next six
months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces, with the assistance of al
Qai'da in the Islamic Magreb (AQIM), in the assassination of the U.S. Ambassador has focused the
world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the security issues surrounding the
militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the situation is far worse than Western
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045748
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
sources realize. Mangoush informs them that AQIM and radical Salafist groups are increasing their
efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the various militias with the government, using the
attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an inspiration for their activities. Just as Ansar al Sharia
began as a militia supporting the federalist claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated
by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the
country could follow the same path, if his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He
also agrees with Zidan that they must move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia
conflict that dominates most of Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against Ansar
al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four national
policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders from Haftar
Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the town of Sousa.
According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties in the fighting, but
believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al Sharia's senior commanders,
Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan
that Qamu had been previously captured by United States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo
Bay facility.
4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the town of
Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi family,
engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar dispatched troops with
heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the NLA downplayed the level of
the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the Government. That said the NLA/Misrata
force had captured the city center and the airport after suffering significant casualties. The
Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition positions around the city hospital, using
heavy mortars and motorized guns.
5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf and
Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation will remain
tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for mid-2013 as a
potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar focused on Bani
Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders were, according to a
knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior officials, Omran Shahan, at the
hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walid. The Misrata commanders report that Shaban was one of
the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the
town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders, supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the
surrender of the men who arrested and killed Shahan. As the fighting expanded through late
September and early October, Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important
symbol of their commitment to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their
involvement accordingly.)
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045749
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
CONFIDENTIAL
October 25, 2012
For: Hillary
From: Sid
Re: Latest Libyan Leadership Private Discussions & Plans
SOURCE: Sources with direct access to the Libyan National Transitional Council, as well as
the highest levels of European Governments, and Western Intelligence and security services.
I. During mid-October 2012 Libyan President Yussef el Magariaf stated in private that
he and Prime Minister Ali Zidan have ordered National Libyan Army (NLA) Chief of Staff
General Youssef al Mangoush to establish a more coordinated operational relationship with
Misrata and Zintan militias in order to support expanded army operations throughout the country
According to a sensitive source, prior to the death of the United States Ambassador on
September 11, 2012 Mangoush resisted greater reliance on these specific large militias, believing
that such a move undercuts the government's efforts to disarm and demobilize all of the militias
left over from the 2011 civil war. At this point, however, Mangoush agreed with Magariaf that
the situation in the county is becoming increasingly dangerous and unmanageable.
Accordingly, the Chief of Staff stated that he will work with Ousama al Jouwali, the leader of the
Zintan forces to step up operations against the other militias, (supported by the Misrata troops),
that also come from the mountainous region of Western Libya. At the same time he will instruct
NLA troops under ground force commander General Khalifa Belgasim Haftar to pursue
operations against tribal forces fighting on behalf of the Qaddafi family in Southern and
Southeastern Libya.
2. (Source Comment In the opinion of this individual, Magariaf and Ziclan agree that
Libya's future depends on the success of their efforts in this militia demobilization operation
over the next six months. While they believe that the involvement of Ansar al Sharia forces,
with the assistance of al Qai'cla in the Islamic Magrel• (AQIM), in the assassination of the U.S
Ambassador has focused the world business and diplomatic community on the reality of the
security issues surrounding the militias, the President and Prime Minister also fear that the
situation is far worse than Western sources realize Mangoush informs them that AQIM and
radical Salafist groups are increasing their efforts to take advantage of the frustrations of the
various militias with the government, using the attack on the U.S. Consulate in Benghazi as an
inspiration for their activities Just as Ansar al Sharia began as a militia supporting the federalist
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045750
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768 .
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER.
claims of Eastern tribal leaders, and was then infiltrated by AQIM radicals, Mangoush believes
many of the other regional and ethnic militias around the country could follow the same path, if
his troops do not succeed in the disarmament program. He also agrees with Zidan that they must
move quickly since Libya's tradition of avoiding the Sunni-Shia conflict that dominates most of
Middle East is beginning to erode during this period of chaos.)
3. A particularly sensitive source noted that NLA operations have already begun against
Ansar al Sharia forces south of Benghazi, after members of that militia/terrorist group killed four
national policemen during a grenade attack at a roadblock in the Sousa Mountains. Under orders
from flaftar Libyan troops surrounded more than 100 Ansar al Sharia fighters in the region of the
town of Sousa. According to this sensitive source, the NLA suffered relatively heavy casualties
in the fighting, but believe they captured a number of AQIM operatives and one of Ansar al
Sharia's senior commanders, Sufian bin Qamu, who they believe ordered the attack on the
police. Mangoush also reported to Zidan that Qamu had been previously captured by United
States forces and imprisoned at the Guantanamo Bay facility.
4. At the same time the Libyan army and forces from the Misrata militia entered the
town of Bani Walid approximately 100 miles south of Tripoli, in an area still loyal to the Qaddafi
family, engaging in close fighting with pro-Qaddafi forces. During the fighting Haftar
dispatched troops with heavier arms to support the Misrata forces. According to this source, the
NLA downplayed the level of the fighting, in an effort to reassure the supporters of the
Government. That said the NLAJMisrata force had captured the city center and the airport after
suffering significant casualties. The Government forces entered the city after shelling opposition
positions around the city hospital, using heavy mortars and motorized guns
5. (Source Comment: In the opinion of this knowledgeable individual, while Magariaf
and Zidan remain optimistic about the future of Libya, they believe that the security situation
will remain tenuous throughout 2013. Magariaf also sees the national election scheduled for
mid-2013 as a potentially complicating factor. According to this source, Mangoush and Haftar
focused on Bani Walid under pressure from the Misrata commanders. These militia leaders
were, according to a knowledgeable source, angered over the death of one of their senior
officials, Omran Shaban, at the hands of pro-Qaddafi forces in Bani Walk). The Misrata
commanders report that Shaban was one of the organizers of the Misrata militia unit that
captured and executed Qaddafi in 2011 outside of the town of Sirte. The Misrata leaders,
supported by the General National Council (GNC), demanded the surrender of the men who
arrested and killed Shaban. As the fighting expanded through late September and early October,
Magariaf and his advisors came to see Bani Walid as an important symbol of their commitment
to disarm the militias and anti-government groups, and increased their involvement accordingly.)
UNCLASSIFIED
U.S. Department of State
Case No. F-2015-04841
Doc No. C05739768
Date: 05/13/2015
STATE DEPT. - PRODUCED TO HOUSE SELECT BENGHAZI COMM.
SUBJECT TO AGREEMENT ON SENSITIVE INFORMATION & REDACTIONS. NO FOIA WAIVER. STATE-SCB0045751

Please do me a yuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuuugeeeeeeeeee favor...

Mail Message

http://www.democraticunderground.com/?com=view_post&forum=1251&pid=2140168

Please tell her that Democrat Since Birth asked me to tell you he wears your scorn like a medal.

WikiLeaks' Stratfor Dump Lifts Lid on Intelligence-Industrial Complex

WikiLeaks' latest release, of hacked emails from Stratfor, shines light on the murky world of private intelligence-gathering

by Pratap Chatterjee
Published on Tuesday, February 28, 2012 by The Guardian/UK

What price bad intelligence? Some 5m internal emails from Stratfor, an Austin, Texas-based company that brands itself as a "global intelligence" provider, were recently obtained by Anonymous, the hacker collective, and are being released in batches by WikiLeaks, the whistleblowing website, starting Monday.

The most striking revelation from the latest disclosure is not simply the military-industrial complex that conspires to spy on citizens, activists and trouble-causers, but the extremely low quality of the information available to the highest bidder. Clients of the company include Dow Chemical, Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon, as well as US government agencies like the Department of Homeland Security, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Marines.

SNIP...

Assange notes that Stratfor is also seeking to profit directly from this information by partnering in an apparent hedge-fund venture with Shea Morenz, a former Goldman Sachs managing director. He points to an August 2011 document, marked "DO NOT SHARE OR DISCUSS", from Stratfor CEO George Friedman, which says:

"What StratCap will do is use our Stratfor's intelligence and analysis to trade in a range of geopolitical instruments, particularly government bonds, currencies and the like."

CONTINUED...

http://www.commondreams.org/view/2012/02/28-10

Clearances
All About Security Clearances

THE SECURITY CLEARANCE

Eligibility for access to classified information, commonly known as a security clearance, is granted only to those for whom an appropriate personnel security background investigation has been completed. It must be determined that the individual’s personal and professional history indicates loyalty to the United States, strength of character, trustworthiness, honesty, reliability, discretion, and sound judgment, as well as freedom from conflicting allegiances and potential for coercion, and a willingness and ability to abide by regulations governing the use, handling, and protection of classified information. A determination of eligibility for access to such information is a discretionary security decision based on judgments by appropriately trained adjudicative personnel. Eligibility will be granted only where facts and circumstances indicate access to classified information is clearly consistent with the national security interests of the United States. Access to classified information will be terminated when an individual no longer has need for access.