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soryang

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Member since: Sat Mar 14, 2009, 08:45 PM
Number of posts: 2,556

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Free Joseon - limited hangout?


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten 3.29) According to, Kim Jong Bong, a former ROK National Intelligence Service employee, Adrian Hong Chang had previously contacted Kim Jong Nam, Kim Hong Un's half brother, and asked him to lead a government in exile repeatedly which he refused to do.


(Source- YTN News 3.29) Kim Han Sol receiving US protection...going forward will this be a variable in negotiations? Story of Kim Han Sol's journey. State Department has nothing to say. Who assisted in Kim Han Sol's American journey? During the YTN interview, national security analyst Kim Jong Bong, said a Japanese language report stated that Kim Jong Nam met with two CIA people directly before he was killed at the Kuala Lumpur airport in 2017. (Kim Jong Nam was Kim Han Sol's father and Kim Jong Un's half brother.) In his opinion the Japanese report was credible. The YTN news graphic in the background shows the relationship he observes among three entities during the rescue of Kim Han Sol after his father's death: Choellima Civil Defense, extract; CIA, transfer; FBI protect.


Kim Jong Bong, a former National Intelligence Service, North Korea desk analyst, stated he felt there was involvement by the CIA in the Kim Han Sol defection and protection operation by the so called Choellima Civil Defense group, but doesn't believe they provided the command or direct support for the Madrid Embassy break in. He concedes that other observers perceive the possibility of US direct support but feels that this kind of action by the US is unlikely because it would hurt US interests and be futile in that respect.

The timing of the attack was intended to discourage the negotiations with the DPRK in Hanoi. The "Free Joseon" group also provides a useful pipeline for operations to weaken the DPRK political position in prospective negotiations and otherwise. Namely, an "independent group" carried out the embassy attack and then provided the FBI with intelligence information they took by force. Most Korean analysts seem to agree that the group that carried out the embassy attack has had extensive training in such special operations from military or intelligence training sources. The YTN guest, who also appears regularly on Channel A News Top Ten as an expert commentator, thinks the US relationship with Adrian Hong Chang probably emerged during his experience assisting and providing refuge to North Korean defectors.

Shin In Kyun's Analysis of "Free Joseon" suggests CIA operation

Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense Analysis of "Free Joseon" suggests CIA operation.

Title of the Defense Daily program on youtube 3.27 is US, North Korean regime change operation already in progress!? ( 美, 이미 北 레짐체인지 작업 진행중!? )


(Source- Shin In Kyun's Daily Defense TV 03.27) Was Free Joseon really made by North Korean defectors?

Established: 3.4.17 time of Park-US, military options being prepared; immediately after the assassination of Kim Jong Nam in February. Name: The use of words not used by North Koreans and the spelling of Choellima and Joseon in English and Civil Defense in Hangul; The main logo image used the national interior (South Korea) portal site Naver "shared gothic" font.

Tracks of expert participation: Site and email detoured through three countries; tracks of web site coding erased- unable to trace; cloud player server used location concealed; money collected by crypto-currency.

Principal activity: Multinational intelligence organization related Kim Han Sol defection and protection mission carried out.

Shin points to inauthentic word usage, spelling and translation between the two languages of English and Korean as evidence the organization's web site doesn't reflect the efforts of a natural Korean speaker but rather suggests the use of a digital translator by an outsider not sufficiently familiar with the Korean language. Shin says that the language and word usage in the very names and logos of the group are too mechanical and literal in nature. Despite the group's claims that it didn't use violence, and was "invited" into the DPRK embassy in Madrid, Shin finds that proposition dubious, that the entry was forcible and illegal, and for this reason the perpetrators used false names to conceal their identities. The origins of their web site and emails are concealed in an impressive and expertly proficient manner. The coordination of the attack by persons from three countries, and their skillful escape from accountability in Spain suggests military like organization and the sponsorship of a powerful international intelligence organization.

According to Shin, a national security analyst, no group of North Korean defectors could possess the full complement of skills, organization and resources necessary to accomplish either the defection of Kim Han Sol, nor the attack on the DPRK embassy, successfully without any one being caught. He notes that the origin of the alleged provisional government group go back to the Park Geun Hye administration in early 2017, which shortly thereafter fell from power in Korea, due to her impeachment. The effort in spiriting away Kim Han Sol, Kim Jong Nam's son (and Kim Jong Un's nephew), after the reported assassination of Kim Jong Nam in Malaysia, is clear evidence of a multinational intelligence organization's assistance to the alleged group. The Saenuri conservative government of former President Park would not have any problem with this sort of group being covertly organized and supported in early 2017. The current Moon administration would not approve. Shin concludes that the organisation involved is the CIA. Shin doesn't find the Free Joseon public comments concerning their relationship with the FBI credible either.

Shin hasn't appeared on the conservative Channel A News analysis program Top Ten recently, as he often does. The program focuses on diplomatic and military affairs affecting South Korea. This may be the second time his appearances have been suspended. This perhaps reflects an effort to muzzle his views. Shin is very conservative, but doesn't shrink from calling things as he sees them. His commentary is often impolitic as are the views he expresses on this subject. Yet, he has no objections to the regime change objectives of the CIA. He wishes them well.



친구여 조용필 가사 Dear Friend by Jo Yong Pil, lyrics

꿈은 A dream
하늘에서 잠자고 In the sky sleeping
추억은 Memory
구름따라 흐르고 flows following clouds
친구여 Dear Friend
모습은 어딜 갔나 Your visage, where has it gone?
그리운 친구여 Missed dear friend.

옛 일 Past days
생각이 날때마다 each time those thoughts arise,
우리 our
잃어버린 정 찾아 lost affection, I seek
친구여 Dear Friend
꿈속에서 만날까 in a dream shall we meet
조용히 눈을 감네 Quietly, close our eyes

슬픔도 기쁨도 Sadness and Joy too,
외로움도 함께 했지 loneliness too, we had together.
부푼 꿈 을 안고 Risen dream, embrace
내일을 다짐하던 Tomorrow, our promised
우리 굳 센 약속 어디에 Our sure strong pledge where is it?

꿈은 The dream
하늘에서 잠자고 Sleeps in heaven
추억은 The memory
구름따라 흐르고 flows following clouds
친구여 Dear Friend
모습은 어딜 갔나 Your visage, where has it gone?
그리운 친구여 Missed dear friend.

I'm sure Dan Coats got an earful during his visit in South Korea

On the visit to South Korea by DNI Dan Coats, he was accompanied by former CIA Korea Team chief, Andrew Kim, who is now "retired" and working at Stanford. It is said that Coats made a formal visit with President Moon, and gave a classified intergovernmental presentation concerning North Korean issues. One of the few comments publicly revealed by Andrew Kim was that there are large differences in views between the South Korean administration and the US concerning the nature of an effective approach to denuclearization objectives.


(Source JTBC News 3.22) Number 2 story today. North Korea withdraws from Kaesong Liaison Office. No. 1 story on Channel A News Top Ten. It appears as if North Korea withdrew from the joint North South Liaison office as a response to increasing sanctions from the US.


Dan Coats cancelled his visit to Panmunjum for unknown reasons. Some Americans say North Korean withdrawal of its Kaesong Liaison delegation doesn't matter because...they're not Koreans? Because they don't like the Moon government anyway? It's just another "edge of cliff" maneuver by the North? Maybe they withdrew because the US completely disregarded advice from their South Korean ally at Hanoi and are currently blocking virtually all joint South Korean economic initiatives with the North. The office had been open for 190 days and was the first such joint office operated by the two Korean states since the Korean conflict.

Unfortunately, there are quite a few other measures that North Korea can take to damage relations with South Korea, and increase tensions, short of launching a missile. They could start disregarding or deconstructing the extensive measures agreed to in military agreements with South Korea to defuse tensions in the DMZ and the Joint Security Area, and the buffer zones restricting military air and ship activities north and south of the DMZ and Northern Limit Lines in the West and East Seas. Likely such measures would just be the beginning of an unproductive and dangerous escalation cycle. Such actions would have the effect of discrediting and destabilizing the Moon government, something about which conservatives in South Korea, and opponents to negotiations in the US could care less.

The illusion of the Hanoi summit

Stephen Biegun has the temerity to say, that he cannot trust Kim Hyuk Chol, who refused to respond to demands that North Korea give up all of it's nuclear weapons, resources and facilities, as if this was something that was in the cards or on the agenda for the Hanoi summit. To get Kim to the summit Biegun implied there was wiggle room or flexibility in the US approach to negotiations and that not everything need be achieved at once. Yet once at the summit, US demands included everything, in an all or nothing approach, that exceeded the parameters of the Singapore summit, with no offers of any sanctions relief of any kind for interim measures. For example, the US demanded that all weapons of mass destruction, (a pet phrase of the neo-con proponents of interminable middle east wars) including chemical and biological weapons, as part of the US demands that would require fulfillment in addition to the so called hek list or inventory of all nuclear weapons, enrichment facilities, missile sites, production facilities and so on. It was this all or nothing approach that previously caused the talks to falter last summer after the Singapore summit, when Pompeo made similar demands in Pyongyang and Kim Jong Un refused to meet with him or other US representatives for months.

Moon Chung In, the unofficial advisor and spokesperson for the Moon administration has to maintain an optimistic attitude as does the National Security Advisor, because the Moon Jae In administration in South Korea committed itself to this course politically, regardless of how incompetent or offensive US policy is toward North Korea.

While the Blue House is not taking Choi's statements as an accurate indicator of no possibility of further negotiations, that possibility hangs by unlikely threads. The first according to Moon Chung In is that the US needs to demonstrate flexibility toward North Korea and toward South Korean economic overtures such as Kumgansang and Kaseong. Otherwise South Korea has no leverage. The US has stated repeatedly that isn't going to happen. In fact sanctions are closing on North Korea, and foreign revenues are drying up and food is in scarce supply. Humanitarian efforts such as the public health anti TB efforts in North Korea are even being shut down. Discussion of more sanctions is counterproductive according to Moon, but everyday, we hear Bolton and a coterie of demagogues in the Congress either initiating or threatening more sanctions on a daily basis. This is little more than a regime change policy.

Secondly, Moon says the smallest disputes now can result in disaster. Yet the largest dispute has already happened and shows no prospect of compromise possible on the US side.

This fundamental difference which is well understood by long term observers of the negotiations between the US "one bundle" or Libyan approach, and a simultaneously reciprocal step by step, phased trust building approach, favored by North Korea, has been the obstacle to negotiations all along. A retreat was required from the US all or nothing approach after Singapore which Stephen Biegun played out in working level talks, as evidenced by his presentation at Stanford before the Hanoi summit could even occur. Once, the North Koreans committed to meet at Hanoi, the US went back to the old playbook of all or nothing, give up everything in return for vague promises of future benefits and no sanctions relief of any kind in the interim. No one who knows anything about North Korea could have seriously thought this would work.

It was a duplicitous approach for a US administration which cannot stand up to domestic criticism of its North Korean initiatives by the intelligence establishment, the neo-cons, the press, the opposition, and the military industrial complex of think tanks, and Congressional defense industry flunkies. One can be assured of one thing in US East Asian policy in a conflict situation- when there is a bipartisan consensus in the US on what US policy should be, it is invariably based upon grandiose illusions. Such policies typically have the disastrous consequences we know so well- the so called loss of China, the "loss" of the first Korean conflict which resulted in war with China and an armistice rather than the expected military victory, the disaster in Vietnam, and finally this, the development of North Korea as a nuclear power.

Missile base activity in North Korea


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 3.7) North Korea- US: threat and pressure relationship.

The Tongchang Ri missile launch site, also referred to as the Sohae Satellite launch site, is the one where the recent construction has been reported, basically restoration of the facility to its prior condition. That is the northern most site in this Channel A News graphic.

Increased activity, noted as movement of materials by trucks, considered missile related by South Korean intelligence at a second site was reported in this Channel A News Top Ten program. That site is the Sanumdong missile general research complex 112 km to the southeast of Tongchang Ri. This site is considered significant because it is a place where ICBMs, like the Hwasong 15, are assembled and produced.

The recent activities at both sites are regarded as provocative and unwise by South Korean analysts but also as presenting an indirect, implicit threat of futher development of ICBM capability after the disappointing outcome of the Hanoi summit.

Here's a Time article on the subject:

http://time.com/5546740/north-korea-icbm-uranium-sanumdong-vehicle-activity/


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 3.7)

North Korean media, Chosun Sinbo, indicated that North Korea wishes to reengage in negotiations and expresses that by exhorting the US to taking the first steps with simultaneous action in a trust building process that can lead to denuclearization. Title of the commentary was "Corresponding measures to the dismantling of the Yongbyun nuclear facility are the basis of trust." And the statement as reported in the Channel A News broadcast was "Trump, if you do not want to miss the opportunity for denuclearization and avoid damage to your standing, before North Korea seeks a new path, decide to engage in simultaneous action, as a first step, in the process that must go forward to prepare to make it a reality."

It's not clear if the relative dangers of this approach have been accurately weighed by the North Koreans. Some conservative analysts regard it as a bluff for lack of a more nuanced characterization. The danger is that what is clearly implied that a loss of face is involved not for the US, but rather that Kim had already experienced a loss of face in Hanoi by the way the talks were carried out, and that most Korean analysts regard him as having been humiliated as much as he had tried to conceal that.

In the proposed course of action is the referenence to "another path" that Kim had mentioned in his new year's address. As noted around the time of the new year's speech there is a hint of reluctance by Kim to find this other path, but here it is again. The Channel A News analysts suggest this is linked to Trump's statement that Kim Jong Un had promised not to engage in missile flights or nuclear tests despite the lack of a written agreement or communique from the Hanoi summit, while indications on the ground suggest potentially that he might. The Chosun Sinbo statement suggests that they are reluctant to go ahead with such an threat. Channel A News Top Ten analysts referred to the situation as a pscyhological war.









US- South Korean Differences after Hanoi


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 3.7) Jong Se Hyun- "Ill fated Bolton villain." "Bolton's participation in the summit dialogue signaled its collapse. He is (an unwanted) ill fated person. The thought of an Indian killing white cavalry general comes to mind."

Jong Se Hyun criticized John Bolton's critical "no deal" role at the summit talks in Hanoi. Jong, the former Unification Minister of South Korea, described Bolton as an ill fated person, and likened him to a white cavalry general who kills "Indians." There is a minor media tempest on the right about his remarks criticizing Bolton's performance at the summit. Channel A analysts criticized Jong's remarks as undiplomatic and going too far. Jong maintained that Bolton deliberately killed the talks if the analogy with a General Custer like description wasn't clear enough. This pretty much comports with Tae Yong Ho's analysis a few days ago, except that Tae, the the North Korean diplmatic defector and darling of the right in South Korea, regarded the failure of the talks as a good outcome. So did a couple of the Top Ten analysts who are also conservative. One maintained that a successful "small deal" involving dismantlement of Yongbyun facilities in return for sanctions waivers for reopening of the South Korean resort in Kumgansan North Korea would be untenable or difficult for South Korea in some way had it been an agreed outcome at Hanoi. It's not clear what that difficulty would be.


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 3.7) 5. Trump-Moon split- trouble? Lessen North Korean sanctions- ROK-US out of step? Bolton- I'm looking for ways to strengthen sanctions against North Korea. (March 5) Moon- Advance the speed of North South cooperative enterprises. (March 4.)


There was some discussion of President Moon Jae In's reaction and response at a ROK Security Council meeting called after the Hanoi Summit. Moon asked the administration leadership to find the best ways to promote plans for economic cooperation with North Korea in the context of the framework of UN economic sanctions. The discussion by conservative analysts emphasized that Moon is out of step with the US policy, and the program quoted Bolton as looking for new ways to impose further sanctions on North Korea. Given that Moon wants to press ahead with South Korean policy objectives with North Korea, the analysts questioned whether Moon could function as an effective mediator between the US and North Korea any longer. They quoted from a Bloomberg source dated March 4, (which I've been unable to locate) that observed that US and South Korean policies with respect to North Korea were going separate ways. This was contrary to the view expressed by Jong Se Hyun, that there can't be any other path but to have Moon continue to press on with his role as facilitator of continued progress in negotiations as he is the party that understands the postures and positions of both the US and North Korea. This perspective was shared also on JTBC News yesterday in an interview by Moon Chung In, an independent advisor on national security to the Blue House. Their idea is that President Moon is the best suited individual to help close the gap between the parties.


(Source- Channel A News Top Ten, 3.7) Strange signal detected between the US and South Korea? February 23 (security advisers) meeting cancelled. Bolton- I have a "big deal" document to present to the North. Jong Eui Yong- Small deal, a big deal concept won't work.

Another part of the program noted that Bolton had planned to meet the National Security Advisor of South Korea, Jong Eui Yong, on February 23 before the Hanoi summit. The Korean National Security Advisor, apparently had an apprehension of Bolton's so called "big deal" written proposal with which he differed and the meeting was canceled. US press reports had merely reported that Bolton didn't go because he had more pressing matters in Venezuela to attend to. This fundamental difference in his views from those of the South Korean administration weren't disclosed. It's hardly conceivable that his presence would be welcomed in Seoul.

Thae Yong Ho Says Secret Uranium Enrichment Facility Deal Breaker in Hanoi


(Source- TV Chosun 03.2) US North Korea dispute going forward- are there or are there not other nuclear facilities in North Korea?


According to Thae Yong Ho, former DPRK diplomat and high level defector to South Korea, US National Security Adviser, John Bolton embarrassed Kim Jong Un by raising the so called secret nuclear facility issue directly with Kim Jong Un at the summit. Kim's apparent confusion at how to respond to the question resulted in in the DPRK Foreign Minster, Ri Yong Ho, sitting next to Kim stopping the talks. That's where the talks ended according to Thae's analysis. There are statements from the press interview of Choi Son Hui, from the DPRK, and also Donald Trump that indicated there may be something to this.

Kim could have been surprised for a couple of other reasons. Maybe this issue wasn't on the agenda for instance in the "small deal," scenario and wasn't addressed by the working level representatives. Or the facility or facilities don't exist. Thae suggests Kim is lying.

Choi Son Hui the veteran nuclear negotiator, said it was her feeling that Kim didn't understand the US calculating method in making additional demands.

Thae made some remark on the extended interview on Channel A News that the CIA probably would have cheered during the gotcha John Bolton moment or words to the effect. He made essentially the same comment in the podcast above from TV Chosun from which the still shot is taken. Other analysts felt that the issue in contention was likely related to the so called Kangson secret uranium enrichment site in the news last summer after the first summit. This is the link from the Diplomat.com:

https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/exclusive-revealing-kangson-north-koreas-first-covert-uranium-enrichment-site/

A lot of the public information about the suspected enrichment site in Chollima, North Korea, is based upon analysis provided by Jeffrey Lewis. Lewis almost always qualifies his analysis with appropriate caveats, as one should in intelligence work:


“What we feel comfortable saying is that we can’t say whether it is, or is not, an enrichment plant,” Lewis noted. But, “this is a suitable building that has a number of signatures consistent with that and no obvious inconsistencies,” he continued. Whatever the purpose of the site, Lewis continued, this facility at Kangson was “clearly a sensitive national defense site.”


Gareth Porter deconstructed the multiple secret enrichment plant stories in an article published in 38North.org* : How the Media Wove a Narrative of North Korean Nuclear Deception.

https://www.38north.org/2018/07/gporter072618/

With respect to the alleged nuclear enrichment facility at Kangson, Michael Madden authored a critical analysis, also at 38North.org, debunking unqualified allegations about Kangson in popular media reports:


However, while the intelligence community has been monitoring this site for more than a decade, its actual function is still in question. It does have some of the characteristics of a site for production of weapons grade material, but a variety of contextual factors, especially the location, suggest it has been built and is being used for some other purpose.


https://www.38north.org/2018/08/mmadden080318/

In a final irony, on March 1, Jeffrey Lewis published an opinion piece at NPR.com titled Trump Just Walked Away From The Best North Korea Deal He'll Ever Get.

https://www.npr.org/2019/03/01/698909173/opinion-trump-just-walked-away-from-the-best-north-korea-deal-hell-ever-get?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter

Lewis doesn't seem as convinced as Bolton and the other neocons that this should have been a deal breaker. This brings to mind Stephen Biegun's comments about intelligence information and policy in his presentation at Stanford not too long ago before the summit in which he said:


But we also have to understand what intelligence information is. Intelligence information is data and information combined with analysis that’s given to policymakers, and if you take it out of context, you – if you divorce it from policy, then you have a very incomplete picture, and this is really where my frustration is with the story that played out last week....

...So my frustration isn’t with the accuracy of the information. It’s how it’s presented and how it’s interpreted. You cannot divorce the intelligence information from policy. The intelligence information is critical as an underpinning for the policy, but the policy is to address the threat and that’s what my frustration was last week.


So one has to question the strategy of using a summit on the critical issue of denuclearization to test whether your intelligence theory about multiple alternative nuclear complexes is true or not. Thae suggests it is true from Kim's ambiguous response. It's much more likely that sandbagging the negotiating process was the policy objective of Bolton and Pompeo. Widening the agenda at the last minute to raise issues, such as a comprehensive inventory of nuclear weapons facilities, warheads, and "weapons of mass destruction" the old Bush administration cassus belli, that had not been discussed or agreed upon by Beigun's working group and their DPRK counterparts, was a sure method to derail negotiations, as, Bolton, the "bureaucratic insider," well knew. Trump, Bolton and Pompeo killed the small deal concept, threw Biegun under the bus, and went back to the Libyan model for negotiation. The one bundle approach with the code "big deal, not small deal," substituted an all or nothing negotiating process, in lieu of, step by step reciprocal trust building measures, leading potentially to a comprehensive denuclearization in stages.

*38 North is a website devoted to informed analysis of North Korea.

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