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In reply to the discussion: The Real Question: How Did That Hawaiian False Attack Alarm Happen? UPDATED! [View all]FreepFryer
(7,086 posts)34. 4/17: Hack of Dallas Sirens Not the First or Last on Emergency Systems, Experts Warn
Typically, a city will have just one, central computer workstation that is used to manage a city-wide deployment of civil defense horns. Hacking into that system either from the network its connected to, or by gaining physical or logical access to the actual terminal is all thats needed to carry out the kind of attack seen in Dallas over the weekend [Steve Jung, a security researcher and penetration tester who has helped assess the security of such systems] said.
It wouldnt be the first time. In 2013, for example software and equipment by the firm Monroe that is used to managed emergency alert systems was the target of a hack during which EAS equipment operated by broadcasters in Montana, Michigan and other states was compromised and used to issue an alert claiming that the dead are rising from their graves, and advising residents not to attempt to apprehend them. Researcher Mike Davis of the firm IOActive discovered those flaws and, later, in the digital alerting systems DASDEC application servers, which receive and authenticate EAS messages. A scan of the public Internet at the time by IOActive found 412 systems running vulnerable Monroe Electronics software. A subsequent patch by Monroe to address some security issues in its products failed to address serious security issues.
The software that controls civil defense and alerting systems like the Dallas sirens is often vulnerable to both network and application-focused attacks, experts say. I would venture to guess that this is a relatively new frontier for that kind of software even to think about an application focused attack, Jung said. In 20 years in (information security) Ive never seen static code analysis of one of those boxes, he said, referring to the siren systems.
It wouldnt be the first time. In 2013, for example software and equipment by the firm Monroe that is used to managed emergency alert systems was the target of a hack during which EAS equipment operated by broadcasters in Montana, Michigan and other states was compromised and used to issue an alert claiming that the dead are rising from their graves, and advising residents not to attempt to apprehend them. Researcher Mike Davis of the firm IOActive discovered those flaws and, later, in the digital alerting systems DASDEC application servers, which receive and authenticate EAS messages. A scan of the public Internet at the time by IOActive found 412 systems running vulnerable Monroe Electronics software. A subsequent patch by Monroe to address some security issues in its products failed to address serious security issues.
The software that controls civil defense and alerting systems like the Dallas sirens is often vulnerable to both network and application-focused attacks, experts say. I would venture to guess that this is a relatively new frontier for that kind of software even to think about an application focused attack, Jung said. In 20 years in (information security) Ive never seen static code analysis of one of those boxes, he said, referring to the siren systems.
https://securityledger.com/2017/04/hack-of-dallas-sirens-not-the-first-or-last-on-emergency-systems-experts-warn/
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The Real Question: How Did That Hawaiian False Attack Alarm Happen? UPDATED! [View all]
MineralMan
Jan 2018
OP
hmmmm, it seems they are fishing for an explanation. ... been wondering/thinking the same. n/t
RKP5637
Jan 2018
#11
Yep, definitely. Next will be oops, I hit the nuclear launch button. I thought it said Lunch! n/t
RKP5637
Jan 2018
#14
I wan't to see secure area access records checked against shift change schedules.
LuvLoogie
Jan 2018
#17
it just seems to easy, wrong button, if that happened, all of them need fired for that setup
sunonmars
Jan 2018
#19
Why are there no failsafe procedures to be sure "mistakes" like that
The Velveteen Ocelot
Jan 2018
#20
4/17: Hack of Dallas Sirens Not the First or Last on Emergency Systems, Experts Warn
FreepFryer
Jan 2018
#34
The thing that doesn't sit with me is the latency. imho 38 mins is too long 4 human error alone. n/t
FreepFryer
Jan 2018
#37
When you're on a hair trigger, like when your pResident is making insane threats against N. Korea
LastLiberal in PalmSprings
Jan 2018
#40