General Discussion
In reply to the discussion: Expert: Georgia election server showed signs of tampering (2016) [View all]Hermit-The-Prog
(33,331 posts)I am not talking about the type of verification you may have learned about in CS. None of the examples you give are election systems.
With paper ballots (physical tokens):
* Paper ballots allow the voter to verify that the ballot represents the voter's vote.
* The general public can verify that the voter cast a ballot, without having to know the vote.
* The general public can verify that the paper ballots are not tampered with while waiting to be counted.
* The general public can observe and verify the count of the ballots.
In electronic voting (abstractions, not physical tokens):
- The voter cannot verify that the internal state of the device represents the voter's vote. (This is true no matter how many pre-election or post-election tests are performed on the device).
- The general public cannot observe or verify that the voter cast a ballot. (The electorate has a critical, prime responsibility to observe and verify this).
- The general public cannot observe or verify the (abstract, invisible, electronic) ballots are true to the forms (state) they were in when cast.
- The general public cannot observe or verify the (invisible, electronic) count of the (abstract, invisible, electronic) ballots.
Elections are far more important than the check-out line at the grocery store, bank or Amazon. Verification is needed by the individual voter, by the rest of the electorate, and by the general public while still maintaining a secret ballot. Physical tokens that human beings can perceive are required.