A Vanguard for European Defence [View all]

[Celerity]

Rising conflicts and EU aspirations for autonomy revive the call for a European defence force—can it reshape global security?

https://www.socialeurope.eu/a-vanguard-for-european-defence



The ongoing wars in Ukraine and the Middle East, serious disagreements between wealthy and emerging nations on environmental policies, the crisis within the United Nations, and growing international disorder: all these developments are pushing the European Union to seriously consider the need for a European defence force. Though this idea was first introduced in the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 and later reinforced in the Lisbon Treaty of 2007, it has largely been ignored. Recently, three reports commissioned by the President of the European Commission (authored by Letta, Draghi, and Niinistö) have revisited the topic of European defence from varying perspectives. However, none of the reports delved into the institutional aspects required for establishing a European defence force, a task that, under the Lisbon Treaty, would be assigned to a new European Convention. In November of last year, the European Parliament approved a comprehensive reform proposal for the Lisbon Treaty that includes suggestions for a European defence initiative. Yet, with the European Council hesitant to consider Parliament’s proposals, the question arises whether a group of EU countries could move ahead independently, making use of the Lisbon Treaty’s provisions to build a European defence.

A Favourable Vanguard

During a recent meeting in Warsaw (November 19, 2024), the foreign ministers of France, Germany, Italy, Poland, and Spain made a joint declaration stating: “we are determined to stand united with our European and transatlantic partners to think and act big on European security.” The ministers emphasized the need to “to strengthen Europe’s security and defence, using all levers available to us, including the economic and financing power of the European Union … To this aim, we will … discuss innovative financing … invest in our critical military capabilities, including air defence, deep precision strikes, drones and integrated logistics, as well in critical infrastructure and cyber defence, while investing in research and development, and using new technologies.”

As is often the case in European politics, such statements could end up being merely symbolic. However, they might also represent a first step towards enhanced cooperation, as envisioned by the Lisbon Treaty. Article 42 of the treaty states: “The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets.” In line with this, a group of member states could establish “permanent structured cooperation,” which would need to be approved by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and then submitted to the Council for approval by qualified majority (Article 46). Only Council members representing the participating states would take part in the vote. The EU would face three key challenges after such a decision.

NATO and the EU

The main issue is the relationship between the EU and NATO. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, established in 1949, owes its origins to the Atlantic Pact, adopted by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, and several European nations during the early years of the Cold War. NATO is primarily a defensive alliance, with the United States assuming a dominant role thanks to its considerable nuclear arsenal. The supreme command of NATO is held by an American general, while the secretary general is appointed by European countries. The challenge today is reconciling American military dominance with the European aspiration for “strategic autonomy.” In 2016, High Representative Federica Mogherini attempted to initiate “permanent structured cooperation” between France and Germany but failed, likely due to disagreements over the organizational structure of a European defence and the difficult negotiations with the United States regarding military command. These same challenges now re-emerge in an international context that risks fracturing the EU, as some member states express sympathies for powers such as Russia and China, which could benefit from a divided and weakened Europe. Countries advocating for permanent structured cooperation should demand shared military command, split equally between an American and a European general. The respective governments of the EU and the United States would then need to negotiate the terms of cooperation, with additional agreements required with Canada and Turkey. However, it is clear that a European defence force led by an American general would not provide Europeans with true strategic autonomy. Military independence is fundamental to state sovereignty; without control over its military forces, the European Union would effectively become the 51st state of the United States.

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