Most people with common sense are deeply suspicious of Michael Hastings' death.

[Ichingcarpenter]

75. In addition

Experimental Security Analysis of a Modern Automobile


Karl Koscher, Alexei Czeskis, Franziska Roesner, Shwetak Patel, and Tadayoshi Kohno


Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of Washington Seattle, Washington 98195–2350

Stephen Checkoway, Damon McCoy, Brian Kantor, Danny Anderson, Hovav Shacham, and Stefan Savage

Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of California San Diego La Jolla, California


Abstract—Modern automobiles are no longer mere mechan- ical devices; they are pervasively monitored and controlled by dozens of digital computers coordinated via internal vehicular networks. While this transformation has driven major advance- ments in efficiency and safety, it has also introduced a range of new potential risks. In this paper we experimentally evaluate these issues on a modern automobile and demonstrate the fragility of the underlying system structure. We demonstrate that an attacker who is able to infiltrate virtually any Electronic Control Unit (ECU) can leverage this ability to completely circumvent a broad array of safety-critical systems. Over a range of experiments, both in the lab and in road tests, we demonstrate the ability to adversarially control a wide range of automotive functions and completely ignore driver input — including disabling the brakes, selectively braking individual wheels on demand, stopping the engine, and so on.

We find that it is possible to bypass rudimentary network security protections within the car, such as maliciously bridging between our car’s two internal subnets. We also present composite attacks that leverage individual weaknesses, including an attack that embeds malicious code in a car’s telematics unit and that will completely erase any evidence of its presence after a crash

. Looking forward, we discuss the complex challenges in addressing these vulnerabilities while considering the existing automotive ecosystem.



http://www.autosec.org/pubs/cars-oakland2010.pdf